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Abstract 
Despite their explicit intent to speak with a single voice in foreign affairs, EU member 
states manage to do so only some of the time. Which are the factors that determine 
whether or not the EU member states successfully coordinate their positions in the 
international arena? To find out, I propose to examine the voting behaviour of the EU 
member states inside the United Nations General Assembly; a forum in which, 
notwithstanding heterogeneous policy preferences, they intend to coordinate their 
votes and are thus subject to coordination pressures. This means that for divisive 
resolutions, each member state must try to reconcile its national policy preference 
with the objective of casting a unified vote.  I hypothesise that the balance a member 
state strikes generally depends on how important it views the issue at hand, how 
powerful it is, what type of relationship it maintains with the EU and under certain 
conditions, what type of relationship it maintains with US. I further argue that the 
balance is expected to tip in favour of EU unity when increasing the collective 
bargaining power by working together becomes a tangible objective.  By adopting a 
multi-method approach, the thesis shows that the EU member states make a genuine 
and continuous effort to coordinate their votes inside the General Assembly. 
Significantly, the thesis illustrates that member states, at times, are able to override 
their heterogeneous national policy preference in order to stand united. I conclude by 
connecting the findings with the constructivist/rationalist debate, which juxtaposes 
foreign policy cooperation according to the logic of appropriateness with the logic of 
consequence.  The results obtained have implications not only for the study of EU 
voting behaviour in the United Nations, but also for theoretical debate underlying it. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The small Balkan state of Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia in 
February of 2008. This decision has been seen as highly sensitive and controversial by 
the world community. This is not surprising, considering both, the history of the 
Balkans, including the more recent episode of turmoil and bloodshed following the 
political disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s; as well as the larger questions 
about territorial integrity and the possible implications of unilateral declarations of 
sovereignty for the world community. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
remains divided on the issue, with Russia plainly rejecting Kosovo’s declaration as 
illegal and China expressing concerns as well. To date, of the international community, 
only 60 countries have recognised its independence.  
 
By virtue of Kosovo’s geographical vicinity to the European Union (EU), in addition to 
the fact that some of its formerly Yugoslav neighbours have already joined or are in the 
process of joining the Union; the position taken by the EU was seen as crucial and thus 
highly anticipated by all involved.  Falling short of any such expectation, the EU as a 
whole did not take a decision on Kosovo’s independence. Twenty-two of the 27 
European Union member states have recognised Kosovo’s independence to date, 
while five EU members – Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus – have not. The 
five member states that have not recognised Kosovo, officially base their opposition on 
the legal uncertainty that surrounds Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. 
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Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that for each of these countries irreconcilable 
national interests are at stake as well. Most of them have sizable minorities of their 
own (e.g. Basque minority in Spain, ethnic Hungarian minorities in both Slovakia and 
Romania). They fear that by recognising Kosovo a precedent might be set in their own 
countries; if not for outright separatist movements (such as in Spain), at least for the 
strengthening of minority rights (such as in Slovakia and Romania). Cyprus heavily 
sympathises with Serbia’s position, which views the declaration as illegal. Shortly after 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Cypriot President Dimitris Christofias was 
reported as stating in an interview with the Russian magazine Ellada, that “the 
territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of both Serbia and the Republic of 
Cyprus [are] being violated in the most brutal manner” (p. 29). Finally, the position of 
Greece is less clear, especially as officials publicly vacillate between being on the verge 
of recognition and considering recognition under no circumstances.  
 
In short, the EU has failed to manage a united response on the question of Kosovo 
independence; making this an example of EU disunity in foreign affairs
1
. And not even 
the recently adopted non-binding resolution by the European Parliament (EP), calling 
on all EU member states to recognise Kosovo’s independence, has had the intended 
effect (European Parliament, 2009). If anything, it has led the five member states to 
reiterate their original positions. The divided response by the EU on the question of 
Kosovo independence serves as only one of many examples where the EU member 
                                                      
1
 In this thesis I use the terms ‘foreign affairs’ and ‘international affairs’ interchangeably. 
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states do not speak with a single voice in foreign affairs.
2
 Other notable examples 
include questions pertaining to Zimbabwe (where the member states remain divided 
over how much to cooperate with Mr Mugabe) and Russia (where the member states 
remain divided over how to deal with Russia’s increased assertiveness); with the 
possibility to further extend the list. That is not to say, however, that the member 
states never reach a common position. While generally considered less newsworthy, 
some of the time, they in fact stand united on the international stage, for instance 
matters of human rights (K. E. Smith, 2006b).  
 
This then raises questions about which factors decide whether or not the member 
states of the European Union speak with a single voice in foreign affairs. The casual 
observer of EU affairs might swiftly reach the conclusion that if the EU member states 
are unable to speak with a single voice in foreign affairs at all times; as sovereign 
nation states they quite naturally must only do so when they happen to share the 
same view (see Glarbo, 1999, p. 635). I, on the other hand, shall use the present thesis 
to investigate the matter of EU (dis)unity a bit further and explore alternative 
explanations.  
 
In fact, EU disunity runs counter the member states’ explicit intent to speak with a 
single voice in foreign affairs. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) provides a 
useful example of a forum in which the EU member states work very thoroughly on 
negotiating a common position between them, despite the fact that it is an 
                                                      
2
 Throughout this thesis, I use the phrase ‘speaking with a single voice’ in colloquial terms – similar to how it is used 
by politicians and journalists, and some academics – to mean the successful coordination of one common position 
by the EU member states in foreign affairs (e.g. Jones & Evans-Pritchard, 2002; Owen, 2002; K. E. Smith, 2006a; 
Solana, 2002). Unless otherwise stated, the phrase does not refer to the delegation of (foreign) policy 
responsibilities to Brussels institutions, as is typical for trade matters for instance. 
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international forum in which they act in their capacity as sovereign nations and as such 
are free to vote as they wish. Diplomatic representatives of the twenty-seven EU 
member states convene on a regular basis to coordinate their respective positions on 
all those UNGA resolutions that are tabled for a vote. They diligently engage in highly 
systematised coordination efforts. They plough through pages upon pages of 
resolution text, they analyse its content, if applicable compare and contrast it with 
previous resolutions on the topic and subsequently send a report to their capitals. 
With national instructions in hand, they then meet the other national diplomats to 
coordinate their views. If no common EU position is reached, additional discussions 
with the capital followed by further meetings in New York become necessary. In such 
instances, efforts to identify a position acceptable to everybody are usually undertaken 
until right before the roll-call vote.   
 
Taking it all together then, the puzzle guiding my research project can be summarised 
as follows: Despite their explicit intent to speak with a single voice in foreign affairs, EU 
member states manage to do so only some of the time. Which are the factors that 
determine whether or not they stand united? For the purpose of this thesis, I take the 
term ‘to speak with a single voice’ quite literally and propose to examine the voting 
behaviour of the EU member states in the United Nations General Assembly.
3
  Within 
that framework, I argue that the EU member states intend to coordinate their votes in 
the United Nations General Assembly despite their heterogeneous policy preferences. 
It is theoretically plausible that they do so in order to signify their unity (constructivist 
approach) or to increase their collective bargaining power (rationalist approach). The 
                                                      
3
 The advantages and disadvantages of choosing this particular framework are discussed in more detail 
in chapter 4.  
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theoretical framework underlying these assumptions is further discussed in the 
subsequent chapters. It follows then, that for those resolutions for which national 
positions diverge from the EU majority
4
, each member state must find a way to 
reconcile its national policy preference with the objective of casting a unified vote. I 
hypothesise that the balance a member state strikes between the two generally 
depends on four aspects – how powerful it is, how important it views the issue at 
hand, how it views its relationship with the EU and how it is affected by external 
factors, precisely how it is affected by its relationship with the United State (US). I 
further argue that the balance is expected to tip in favour of EU cohesion when 
increasing the collective bargaining power by working together becomes a tangible 
objective (that is to say, in instances in which it makes a difference whether or not 
they speak with a single voice).  The objective of this introductory chapter is to 
illustrate the importance of the study in section 1.1 and to provide an overview of the 
remainder of the thesis in section 1.2. I will provide a brief conclusion to the chapter in 
section 1.3. 
 
1.1 Importance of the Thesis 
As highlighted in the introduction, to some, analysing the conditions under which EU 
member states speak with a single voice in foreign affairs is likely to result in a 
foregone conclusion.  Because the EU member states frequently do not stand united, 
quite naturally the expectation is that as sovereign nation states they speak with a 
single voice in foreign affairs, only when they happen to agree on the issue at hand. As 
is evident by this thesis, I consider it to be worthwhile to further explore the question 
                                                      
4
 EU majority is defined as the votes cast by the majority of the EU member states per resolution.  
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of EU cohesion in foreign affairs. That is so for a number of theoretical as well as 
practical reasons.  
 
In a world dominated by Westphalian nation-states the European Union is a relatively 
new type of political entity. If such a new type of political entity were in a position to 
formulate a cohesive foreign policy, it would affect current international relations (IR) 
theory in a profound manner.  
“Both Keohane and Grieco agree that the future of the 
European Community will be an important test to their 
theories. If the trend toward European integration [including in 
foreign policy formulation] weakens or suffers reversals, the 
neorealists will claim vindication. If progress toward integration 
continues, the neoliberals will presumably view this as support 
for their views.” (Baldwin, 1993, p. 5) 
 
If the member states of the European Union were able to achieve the same level of 
cohesion in negotiating foreign policy matters, as they have been in the economic 
realm; such a development could ultimately lead to a new post-national world, in 
which political systems such as the EU can be effectively compared to that of a nation-
state and can fully develop into prominent international actors (Hix, 2005; H. Smith, 
2002). Conversely, if the EU failed to formulate a foreign policy comparable to that of 
the traditional nation-state, the predominance of the traditional Westphalian nation-
state in the international arena would be reinforced. 
 
In such a situation, it is only prudent not to rely exclusively on prevailing ideas but to 
take stock of the situation empirically. Pijpers (1991) rightly highlights the importance 
of questions, such as: “why, when, and to what extent [would] something like a joint 
European foreign policy develop” (p. 13). I make no claims to provide definitive 
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answers to these questions. Rather, this thesis serves as acknowledgement that these 
are important questions that need to be addressed. And by investigating the extent to 
which EU member states are able and willing to successfully coordinate their votes in 
the United Nations General Assembly – even perhaps overriding national policy 
preferences – I hope to help take a step in the right direction.  
 
With that in mind, there are furthermore practical reasons for undertaking such a 
study. Any insight gained into the member states’ ability and willingness to reconcile 
differences between them so as to speak with a single voice in foreign affairs, is useful 
in two ways. One, at the very minimum it may help to manage expectations in this 
regard, harboured inside the EU or by other international actors. Two, realistic 
expectations in turn may lead to better informed policy options. And better informed 
policies, in many ways, tend to be more economical.  
 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
The thesis consists of eight chapters and is divided into four parts. I use this section to 
briefly outline the remainder of the thesis.  
 
Part I: Introduction 
Part I is introductory in nature and incorporates chapter 1 and chapter 2. It provides a 
platform for contextualising the thesis with reference to the more general academic 
field of European foreign policy (EFP) analysis, as well as with reference to the more 
specific field of EU coordination inside the United Nations. To this end, chapter 1 
serves as starting point; introducing research question and argument, and providing an 
outline for the remainder of the manuscript.  In chapter 2, I present an overview of the 
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existing bodies of research, which this thesis touches upon. To this end, I place the 
thesis in the larger field of EFP on the one hand and discuss in more detail research 
which specifically deals with EU coordination inside the UN on the other hand. I will 
furthermore discuss how both areas are informed by a set of theoretical 
considerations that draw on elements from IR theory as well as EU integration theory.  
 
Part II: Conceptional and Methodological Discussion 
Part II incorporates chapter 3 and chapter 4 and serves as platform for discussing the 
conceptional underpinnings and various methodological aspects of the thesis. To this 
end, in chapter 3, I set out to explore the central idea that the EU member states 
intend to coordinate their votes, notwithstanding heterogeneous policy preferences. I 
further seek to elaborate on the factors which I hypothesise determine their voting 
behaviour. In chapter 4, I lay out the methodological framework and discuss aspects 
pertaining to the operationalisation of the study. The chapter is used to explain my 
choice of the United Nations General Assembly as suitable framework of analysis, 
readily availing itself to quantitative and qualitative analysis. In addition to a versatile 
analytical framework, the empirical analysis also benefits from the possibility to 
measure certain variables in a variety of different ways so as to account for the various 
contexts in which they may be conceptionalised. For instance, the transatlantic 
relationship may be measured in economic, political and cultural terms. 
 
Part III: Empirical Analysis 
Part III incorporates chapters 5 to 7 and makes up the empirical core of the thesis. The 
first two of the chapters present the quantitative analysis, while the last chapter 
presents the qualitative analysis. The quantitative analysis can best be described as a 
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voting pattern analysis and examines the data by means of system-level analysis in 
chapter 5 and by means of individual-level analysis in chapter 6. The former sets out to 
highlight any systematic variation in the overall levels of EU cohesion in the UNGA, 
while the latter examines the way in which individual member states contribute to the 
variation in overall EU vote cohesion levels. In chapter 7, I set out to examine the vote 
coordination process that takes place between the member states prior to the roll-call 
voting. The particular focus shall be on resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict as well as on resolutions in the military realm. 
 
Part IV: Conclusion 
Part IV serves as framework for the conclusion of the thesis. It is tantamount to 
chapter 8, where I summarise in a few words the main argument and outline the 
propositions, before highlighting its key findings. I further discuss shortcomings of this 
particular thesis and suggest ways of taking the research agenda forward, followed by 
some concluding remarks.  
 
1.3 Conclusion 
Chapter 1 served as starting point of this thesis. This is a thesis about EU foreign policy. 
More specifically, it is a thesis about the ability and willingness of EU member states to 
speak with a single voice in foreign affairs. While using this chapter as platform to 
introduce my research question and the main arguments, I also emphasised the 
theoretical and practical importance of such a study. I argued that because the 
European Union is a relatively new political entity on a world stage dominated by 
Westphalian nation-states, its attempts to formulate joint foreign policies and to stand 
united in foreign affairs – if successful – may have far-reaching implications for current 
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IR theory. Furthermore, I explained that gaining a deeper understanding of the 
member states’ ability and willingness to speak with a single voice has practical 
implications for EU policy options as well. For these reasons, I argued, it is prudent to 
take empirical stock of the current situation. In chapter 2, I will attempt to place the 
present study in the larger academic framework, discussing the various bodies of 
research it touches upon. 
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CHAPTER 2: EXISTING RESEARCH  
 
The thesis touches upon various bodies of existing research. In broad terms, this is a 
thesis in the area of European foreign policy studies. In the narrowest terms, it is an 
analysis of EU vote coordination in the United Nations General Assembly. Research in 
both areas is informed by a set of theoretical considerations that draw on elements 
from IR theory as well as EU integration theory. I shall use this chapter to summarise 
the main constituents of the above-mentioned bodies of research and to set out ways 
in which this thesis seeks to contribute to them. 
 
To this end, chapter 2 is divided into four sections. In section 2.1, I seek to highlight 
existing research in the field of EFP. Section 2.2 serves as platform to thrash out how 
the existing research is informed by the theoretical debate.  In section 2.3, I focus 
specifically on the EU in the UN, discussing existing research and highlighting possible 
points of departure for this thesis. A brief conclusion to the chapter is provided in 
section 2.4. 
 
2.1 European Foreign Policy Studies  
Broadly speaking, this is a study about European foreign policy; a discipline that is 
naturally multifaceted. It includes but is not restricted to research in the following 
areas, listed in no particular order of importance: institutional evolution of EU foreign 
policy in general (e.g. Cameron, 1999; Ginsberg, 2001; Ifestos, 1987; Norgaard, 
Pedersen, & Petersen, 1993; Nuttall, 2000; Elfriede Regelsberger, Tervarent de, & 
Wessels, 1997; Rummel, 1990; K. E. Smith, 2003, pp. 25-53) and  2
nd
 pillar institutional 
evolution in particular –  European Political Cooperation (EPC) (e.g. Hill, 1992; Nuttall, 
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1992, 1997; Elfriede Regelsberger, 1988), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
(e.g. Eliassen, 1998; Ginsberg, 1997; J. Peterson & Sjursen, 2002; Elfriede  Regelsberger 
& Wessels, 1996; Rummel, 1992) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); 
the EU as a civilian power (e.g. Telo, 2005); the EU as a normative power (e.g. K. E. 
Smith, 2003, p. 253); EU policy towards third countries (such as Neighbourhood Policy, 
Near Abroad, ACP etc) (e.g. Bicchi, 2007; Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005; Martenczuk, 
2000) and also the role of national foreign policies in the study of EU foreign policy 
(e.g. Hill, 1996).  
 
Despite the diversity of the academic field, virtually all of the studies pertaining to EFP 
are essentially guided by the three following questions: Who is the foreign policy 
actor? What type of foreign policy is executed? And, is it successful? In analysing these 
questions, the difficulty of studying European foreign policy frequently lies in the 
“uncertainties about how to define basic terms such as [foreign policy actor] or 
‘foreign policy’” (Allen, 2002, p. 43; Weber, 1995, p. 193). It further lies in the 
complexity of deciding upon foreign policy success or failure. In order to effectively 
place the present thesis in the larger field of EFP studies, in this section, I shall consider 
these three guiding questions in more detail before linking them to the study of EU 
vote coordination inside the United Nations General Assembly in section 2.3. 
 
2.1.1 Foreign Policy 
In very loose terms, ‘foreign policy’ can be conceptionalised as the “coherent, 
coordinated and consistent identification and pursuit” of an actor’s external interests 
(Allen, 2002, p. 46). Traditionally, the dividing line between what is considered 
“politico-military” foreign policy as opposed to “external economic policies” has been 
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rather stark (Allen, 2002, p. 46). To this end, analysts “have tended to assume a 
distinction between external economic relations as ‘low politics’ (‘external relations’ 
for short) and more traditional politico-diplomatic activities as ‘high politics’ (or 
‘foreign policy’)” (Morgan, 1973). With ‘high politics’ considered more important for 
the survival of the nation state, only the former would be considered foreign policy 
proper. Nevertheless, since “the distinctions between external relations governed by 
commercial policy and foreign relations inspired by foreign policy have become 
increasingly fuzzy”, external economic relationships are more and more considered 
“genuine acts of foreign policy”, particularly when they are pursuant of a political 
objective (Piening, 1997, p. 9 italics in original; also see M. Smith, 2002, pp. 77-95). 
Conceptionalising the term in such a way ensures the inclusion of military, diplomatic 
as well as politically motivated external economic policies under the foreign policy 
umbrella. This is a fruitful adjustment, particularly when discussing foreign policy with 
reference to the EU, as shall become evident in the following paragraphs. 
 
2.1.2 Foreign Policy Actor 
The European Union is neither a state nor a conventional international institution. By 
virtue of its “supranational authority structures” (Krasner, 2001, p. 233),  the EU can be 
termed a polity.
5
 But because there “is a tendency to see foreign policy as essentially 
an act of government and therefore exclusive to states” (Allen, 2002, pp. 44-45), the 
EU makes a rather “unorthodox actor in international affairs” (Bretherton & Vogler, 
2006, p. 13; Ginsberg, 1997, p. 15). 
 
                                                      
5
 Simpson and Weiner (1989) define a polity as “being constituted as a state or other organized community or body” 
(pp. 35-36). 
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Nevertheless, “the EU has become a force in international affairs, especially in trade, 
development, cooperation, the promotion of regional integration, democracy and 
good governance, human rights and to an increasing extent, also in security policy” 
(Söderbaum & van Langenhove, 2005, p. 250). It uses “[t]rade agreements, 
cooperation and association agreements, aid, diplomatic recognition and eventual EU 
membership” as foreign policy instruments (K. E. Smith, 1998, p. 253). The EU has over 
time, also developed a certain modus operandi for diplomatic coordination in 
international affairs (Strömvik, 1998, p. 181). 
 
Looking at it up closely then, it transpires that with regards to foreign policy, the EU 
essentially incorporates three types of foreign policy actor. Depending on international 
forum and policy instruments used, the EU can either be termed a supranational 
foreign policy actor or an intergovernmental foreign policy actor. As part of the former, 
decision-making power is transferred to an authority broader than the governments of 
the member states and decisions tend to be taken by qualified majority (QMV). As part 
of the latter, the member states of the EU take EU legislative and executive decisions 
amongst themselves (mostly by unanimity but sometimes by QMV) without them 
having to pass through national parliaments.
6
 Additionally, since the “EU clearly lacks a 
monopoly on foreign policy-making in Europe” (Allen, 2002, p. 43), its member states 
may also conduct foreign policies independently. While they may refer to their EU 
membership in doing so, they act in their capacity as sovereign nation-states. 
                                                      
6
 The three pillars established by the Maastricht Treaty are illustrative of the policy areas subject to the 
different decision-making frameworks. Accordingly, all EU policies governed exclusively by supranational 
decision-making are summarised under pillar I. Policies in the areas in which the member states favour 
closer cooperation without wanting to subsume them to supranational decision-making are summarised 
under the two pillars governed mostly by intergovernmental decision-making. That is to say, foreign, 
security and defence policy is summarised under pillar II and asylum and immigration policy and criminal 
and judicial cooperation is summarised under pillar III. 
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The EU as a Supranational Foreign Policy Actor 
Two of the EU’s most powerful foreign policy instruments fall under the remit of the 
European Community (EC): the capacity to enter into international agreements and the 
provision of financial assistance to third countries (K. E. Smith, 2003, p. 55). “The EU is 
above all an economic power and trade provides the foundation of its actorness.” 
(Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p. 62) There is a huge demand for agreements with the 
Community, the largest trading bloc in the world. To this end,  
“the Union has developed a repertoire of roles in the world 
political economy. Most evident, to the very large number of 
states that rely upon trading access to the single market, is its 
role as gatekeeper and negotiator of access to the markets of 
others” (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, p. 47).  
 
The Community is also one of the world’s largest aid donors. For a number of years 
now, more than half and up to 60%  of overall development assistance comes from the 
EU and its member states (European Union, 2008b). While these are primarily 
economic instruments, they give the EU the potential to exercise considerable 
influence in international affairs (K. E. Smith, 2003, p. 55).  
 
All economic agreements fall under pillar I and are thus subject to supranational 
decision-making rules. Here, the European Commission has the sole right of initiative 
and the Council of Ministers together with the European Parliament decide upon the 
fate of the tabled measure. The decisions are usually taken by means of qualified 
majority voting. 
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The EU as an Intergovernmental Foreign Policy Actor 
Cooperation under pillar II is more akin to what traditionally has been perceived as 
foreign policy – mainly diplomatic coordination and as of recent also to a certain 
extent military cooperation. Diplomatic instruments include: common positions, joint 
actions, common strategies, declarations and decisions. These are mostly adopted by 
unanimity in the Council and are (politically) binding for the member states. Diplomatic 
coordination by the member states in international affairs formally took root in the 
early 1970s when the EPC was established. More recently, the EU has also ventured 
into the military realm of foreign policy and under its European Security and Defence 
Policy. It launched its first ever military operations in 2003. A UNSC-backed operation, 
entitled CONCORDIA, replaced a NATO assignment in the West Balkans. And 1800 
troops were sent to Congo the same year in an operation, entitled ARTEMIS (European 
Union, 2009). The EU has since embarked on numerous civilian missions as well as 
military operations in regions as varied as Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia 
(European Union, 2009). 
 
In Pillar II, the Commission does not enjoy a special right of initiative and is merely 
considered to be associated with the policy process. Here, decision-making takes place 
outside the community framework, within the Council of Ministers. This essentially 
means that member states have a final veto on any decision put to the table. What 
makes cooperation in the second pillar so problematic is that “no EU Member State, 
with the possible exception of Luxembourg, appears ready to subsume its statehood 
into a European state” (Allen, 2002, p. 44). 
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The EU Member States as Foreign Policy Actors 
The member states of the European Union remain crucial actors – within the EU but 
also on the international stage more generally (Laatikainen & Smith, 2006, pp. 10-12).  
While, as sovereign nation states, they predictably hold on to their national foreign 
policies, there is also an expectation, anchored in Article 18 of the Treaty of the 
European Union (TEU)  for them to act as “strategic agent[s] of the EU” (Kissack, 2007, 
pp. 4-5). The United Nations is a point in case. It is an international forum in which EU 
member states participate in their capacity as sovereign nation-states. Nevertheless, a 
strong connection to Brussels exists. This connection is based on Article 19 of the TEU, 
whereby “member states shall coordinate their action in international organizations” 
(European Union, 1992`, Article 19(1)). In particular, EU member states are requested 
to “uphold the common positions” they have agreed upon as part of the CFSP 
(European Union, 1992`, Article 19(1)). To this end, 
“every year, well ahead of the beginning of the UNGA session, a 
draft paper is circulated by the Presidency which outlines the 
basic line to take on various agenda points in the forthcoming 
UNGA session. It is submitted to EU coordination in the 
framework of the Council and goes through several revisions 
before the UN starts. This triggers a coordination process in the 
relevant Council Working Groups, but which can take place at 
different levels in Brussels. That process feeds into the 
positions which the EU will take on the spot in New York” 
(Paasivirta & Porter, 2006, p. 40). 
 
To summarise, for some then European foreign policy is “synonymous with EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP) which should be differentiated from the 
European Community external competences (the traditional trade policy and the new 
development policy complementary to those of the Member States)” (Churruca, 2003, 
p. 1). Michael Smith (2002) however, suggests that students of the Common Foreign 
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and Security Policy are misguided in their assumption that the essence of European 
foreign policy is to be found within pillar II.  Since  “foreign economic policy [...] falls 
under the competencies of the EU itself” (Weber, 1995, p. 193), Smith (2002) argues 
that Europe’s international potential is mostly in pillar I (also see Allen, 2002, p. 47). 
Hill (2002) employs the term “European foreign policy” to identify the ensemble of 
international activities of the European Union, including relevant activities emanating 
from all three pillars. Others find the singular focus on EU activity to restrictive and 
consider that in addition to Community external relations and CFSP, EFP also includes 
the foreign policies of the member states (e.g. Churruca, 2003). 
 
2.1.3 Foreign Policy Success or Failure 
When studying the success or failure of anything, the natural question that arises is by 
what standard is success or failure measured; in this case foreign policy success or 
failure (Jorgensen, 1997). With respect to EFP, two overarching yardsticks emerge. The 
baseline of each EFP study is whether or not EU member states speak with a single 
voice in international affairs (e.g. Farrell, 2006; Ginsberg, 1999, p. 430; Kissack, 2007, 
p. 1; Knodt & Princen, 2003, p. 201; Laatikainen, 2006, p. 78; Luif, 2003, p. 1; Meunier, 
2000, p. 105; Rummel, 1988; K. E. Smith, 1998; Stadler, 1989, p. 3). If one stopped 
there, instances where EU member states speak with a single voice would be 
considered a success. That is to say, speaking with a single voice in international affairs 
would be considered an end in itself: Bearing in mind that previously warmongering 
European nation-states have come together and are able to speak with a single voice 
in international affairs, it is in itself not a small achievement. In fact, “in the recent past 
there were those, such as the Benelux states or the European Commission, who 
argued for a European foreign policy as a symbol of integration, without much 
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apparent concern for its substance or effectiveness” (Allen, 2002, p. 44). That is to say, 
to strive for a collective position so as to signify EU unity. 
 
If, on the other hand, one took it a step further, instances where EU member states 
speak with a single voice would be seen as necessary condition for conducting 
successful EU foreign policy. That is to say, speaking with a single voice in international 
affairs would be considered a means to an end.  According to this argument, signifying 
EU unity on the international stage is only a necessary pre-condition to wielding 
collective influence. And that collective influence is what counts as success.  Anything 
that falls short of actually giving the EU a “greater say in international politics” 
(Jorgensen, 1997, p. 88; Scheel, 1988) cannot be considered a success. In fact, one of 
the main criticisms of EU foreign policy is that it “consists largely of declarations” 
(Rummel, 1988, p. 120). 
 
2.2 The Underlying Theoretical Debate 
“EU’s external activities have been sitting uneasily between (European) integration 
studies and the discipline of International Relations.”(Del Sarto, 2006) Even though the 
former is to a certain extent incorporated in the latter,  integration theory is generally 
“more concerned with the process of integration than with the political system to 
which that integration leads” (Diez & Wiener, 2004, p. 3). Having said this, the 
emerging “new system of governance” (Diez & Wiener, 2004, p. 3) entails implications 
for foreign policy. And these are of interest here.  
 
Traditionally of course, the relationship between sovereign states has almost 
exclusively been covered by IR. However, with the expansion of EU foreign policy into 
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the area of economic foreign policy on the one hand, and EU member states trying to 
work together in the diplomatic field on the other hand, European integration theories 
have something to add to the study of foreign policy cooperation between the 
member states.  Having said this,  
“EU member states assert the right [to ‘domaines réservés’] 
over certain foreign policy problems [and even within the EU 
framework] retain a capacity and willingness to take some 
decisions on a purely national basis, although they may need to 
justify them at the EU level. For these largely unilateral 
decisions one can rely on standard foreign policy decision-
making models” (M. Smith, 2004, p. 748). 
 
A certain degree of overlap between relevant IR theories and EU integration theories is 
hence inevitable. For instance, one can easily see connections between rationalism 
and intergovernmentalism. Similarly, constructivists and neofunctionalists both 
emphasise the role of supranational institutions (see, e.g. Haas 2001). Notwithstanding 
the occasional overlap, I want to use this section to highlight the contribution of 
relevant IR and EU integration theories to the study of foreign policy cooperation 
between the EU member states. The following main theoretical approaches are 
discussed in more detail: realism, liberalism, rationalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, 
constructivism, and neofunctionalism.  
 
The Realist View  
According to the realist view, sovereign states are the main foreign policy actors in the 
international arena, which they describe as anarchic. This means that realists see the 
international arena as lacking hierarchical political order based on formal 
subordination and authority (Donnelly, 2000, p. 10). Given the constraints of anarchy 
in the international arena, “realists are in general sceptical about the possibility of 
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international cooperation” (Andreatta, 2005, p. 25). They see survival as their 
fundamental motive. Wanting to maintain their sovereignty, states “think strategically 
about how to survive in the international system” (Mearsheimer, 1994-5, p. 10). That is 
to say, they are occupied with power and security, whereby power is seen as a 
facilitator of security in an anarchical system (Waltz, 1986, p. 331). While this does not 
mean that states never cooperate (states may decide to form temporary alliances 
against a common enemy for instance), concerns for relative gains are likely to limit 
cooperation (Waltz, 1979) and alliances are expected to quickly come apart. According 
to the realist then, identically cast votes in the United Nations General Assembly would 
be indicative of similar preferences rather than active vote coordination. 
 
The Liberal View  
The liberal perspective consists of a “broad family of liberal theories” (Stephen M. 
Walt, 1998, p. 32). And similar to the realists, they generally see sovereign states as the 
main foreign policy actors in the international arena. However, liberalists do not share 
the realist assumption that power is the means by which security is guaranteed 
(Cranmer, 2005). Rather, they see cooperation as pervasive element in international 
affairs (Stephen M. Walt, 1998, p. 32).  
 
The main aspects underlying the optimism about (foreign policy) cooperation is the 
emphasis of a state of interdependence between the actors, facilitated particularly by 
international institutions, free trade and to a lesser extent by peace and democracy 
more generally.  In the broadest terms, “interdependence suggests a relationship of 
interests such that if one nation’s position changes, other states will be affected by 
that change” (Rosencrance & Stein, 1973, p. 2; see also Young, 1969).  
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Some liberalists believe that cooperation between states can be made more tenable 
through formal or informal institutions (Andreatta, 2005, p. 28; Mowle, 2003, p. 561). 
Institutions, such as the WTO,  may reinforce the prospect of cooperation by 
enhancing the commonality of interests among players, by reducing the number of 
uncertain variables, and by reiterating the interaction in a more structured setting 
(Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997; Keohane, 1984). 
Economic institutions, moreover, “further interdependence in both a ‘purely 
institutional’ manner, but also in an economic manner: such institutions make free 
trade easier by lowering transaction costs, [resulting in] greater amounts of trade” 
(Cranmer, 2005, p. 13). Economic interdependence tends to imply an “increased 
national “sensitivity” to external economic developments (Rosencrance & Stein, 1973, 
p. 2; see also (Cooper, 1968, p. 59).   
 
Although liberal theorists acknowledge that states have an incentive to cooperate, 
they “are quick to point out, however that an incentive to cooperate does not 
necessarily translate into the act of cooperation itself” (M. Smith, 2004, p. 743; 
Sterling-Folker, 2002, p. 51). Particularly democratic states have to take the national 
politics, interest groups and public opinion into consideration, which could inhibit 
cooperation. This point has also been highlighted by the liberal intergovernmentalists 
and I shall discuss it in more detail in the ensuing paragraphs. With the emphasis on 
economic policy, the liberal view seems especially suited to help explain cooperation in 
the area of EU foreign economic policy  (Andreatta, 2005, p. 30). 
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The Rationalist View  
Most broadly speaking, rationalism refers to “any ‘positivist’ exercise in explaining 
foreign policy by reference to goal-seeking behaviour” (Fearon & Wendt, 2002, p. 54). 
States are seen as unitary actors which calculate the marginal utility of their actions. 
Faced with the possibility of cooperation, “actors calculate the utility of alternative 
courses of action and choose the one that maximizes their utility under the 
circumstance” (Schimmelfennig, 2004: 77). Their behaviour is inspired by the logic of 
consequentiality. That is to say it is driven “by preferences and expectation about 
consequences” (J. G. March & Olsen, 1989, p. 160). Cooperation is likely when the 
perceived gains of common action through the advantages of scale outweigh the 
potential costs of lost sovereignty or national prestige (Gordon, 1997, p. 80). 
Agreements reached at the bargaining table thus reflect the relative power of each 
member state (Pollack, 2000) as well as their preferences. According to the rationalist 
view then, EU member states are expected to coordinate their positions inside the 
United Nations General Assembly, as long as the perceived gains of doing so prevail 
over the potential costs of overriding their national policy preferences. 
 
The Liberal Intergovernmentalist View 
The rationalist view and the liberal intergovernmentalist view share some of their core 
assumptions. Specifically, rationalism “overlaps loosely with liberal 
intergovernmentalism in its insistence on unitary actors, marginalist calculations, and 
credible commitments” (P. Schmitter, 2004, p. 48). Having said this, liberal 
intergovernmentalism famously emphasises the role played by domestic actors. 
Hence, liberal intergovernmentalism can essentially be described as a two-step 
sequential model of domestic preference formation and international bargaining 
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(Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 19-20). Influenced by national politics, interest groups and public 
opinion, states aggregate their interests domestically and act rationally to advance 
their preferences internationally (Pollack, 2000, p. 17).  
 
Having said this, with particular reference to the area of foreign policy, the treatment 
of national preference formation as distinct domestic political process, as heralded by 
liberal Intergovernmentalism, may not be quite as crucial. Intensive domestic lobbying 
on CFSP issues is rather rare relative to other EU policy domains, nor do EU states 
typically ‘ratify’ common policy decision, either formally or informally” (M. Smith, 
2004, p. 741). Accordingly, in foreign policy matters, the state can be treated as a 
“unitary actor according to the IR tradition because [it is assumed] that domestic 
actors do not play a significant independent role in negotiations beyond the state” 
(Schimmelfennig, 2004, p. 77). 
 
The Constructivist View  
Like the aforementioned approaches, constructivism also views the state as the 
principal actor in international relations. What distinguishes constructivism as 
approach, is its emphasis on the intersubjective structure of the state system which 
helps formulating state identities and interests (Alexander Wendt, 1994, p. 385). In 
essence then, the constructivist perspective stresses the importance of “shared ideas 
that shape behaviour by constituting the identities and interests of actors”(Copeland, 
2006, p. 1). States are driven by the logic of appropriateness – they do what they 
consider proper within the context of the group. This is not to say that “states are 
irrational or no longer calculate cost and benefits [; rather,] they do so on a higher 
level of social aggregation” (Alexander Wendt, 1994, p. 386). Constructivism is best 
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placed to offer an explanation for continued cooperation. “Through repeated acts of 
reciprocal cooperation, actors form mutual expectations that enable them to continue 
cooperation.”(Alexander Wendt, 1994, p. 390) The constructivist would further stress 
that  
“by engaging in cooperative behaviour, an actor will gradually 
change its own beliefs about who it is, helping to internalize 
that new identity for itself. By teaching others and themselves 
to cooperate, in other words, actors are simultaneously 
learning to identify with each other – to see themselves as a 
“we” bound by certain norms. [...] The fact that humans do 
associate in communities suggests that repeated interaction 
can transform an interdependence of outcomes into one of 
utility”(Alexander Wendt, 1994, p. 390). 
 
Acknowledging its relative weakness in explaining the initiation of cooperation, 
constructivism does not preclude the existence of material interests altogether; it 
simply does not view it as the only motivating driver for inter-state cooperation. The 
argument goes that in addition to interests, “political co-operation leaves room for a 
social integration that stems from diplomatic communication processes set up through 
political co-operation history” (Glarbo, 1999, p. 636).  According to the constructivist 
view then, EU member states vote coordination inside the United Nations General 
Assembly is the result of “informal, ‘societal’ development that have created a dense 
web of consultation with integrative effects” leading to the creation of a diplomatic 
community within the EU (Glarbo, 2001). Collective votes would hence signify EU 
unity. 
 
The (Neo) Functionalist View  
In many ways, the neofunctionalist perspective finds itself opposite the realist 
perspective. One, rather than largely disregarding the possibility of inter-state 
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cooperation, it moves beyond it by considering the option of full-fledged integration, 
whereby “loyalties, expectations and political activities [would shift] toward a new 
centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing 
national states” (Andreatta, 2005, p. 21; see also Haas, 1958, p. 13). The basic 
motivational driver for inter-state cooperation and eventual integration is the so-called 
spill-over effect. Accordingly, integration between states in one sector (in the case of 
the EU, the economic sector for instance) will quickly create strong incentives for 
integration in further sectors (e.g. the political sector); in order to fully capture the 
benefits of integration in the original sector.  
 
Two, instead of ‘high politics’, the neofunctionalists framework commonly focuses on 
‘low politics’. As already explained above, the former tends to focus on more 
traditional politico-diplomatic activities considered essential for the survival of the 
nation-state, while the latter tends to focus on external economic relations. That 
sometimes leaves it to underestimate the potential resistance of the nation state, 
particularly in power politics.   Because of its distaste for power politics, foreign policy 
is relegated to an ancillary position (Andreatta, 2005, pp. 22-23). Since 
neofunctionalism envisages full-fledged integration of the EU member states, as such, 
it would be rather ill-equipped to explain EU vote coordination inside the UNGA; 
particularly because it is a forum in which the member states continue to participate in 
their capacity as sovereign nation-states.
7
 
 
                                                      
7
 The only forum within the United Nations, where the EU has obtained an elevated position is the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in which, since 26 November 1991, the “EC can vote on behalf of the 
EU Member States, particularly in the fields of trade, agriculture and fisheries”(European Union, 2007b). 
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Summarising the approaches that I have outlined above, it can be noted that with the 
exception of neofunctionalism, which sees a shift of loyalty, expectation and activity 
towards a new supranational centre (Haas, 1958), all of the theoretical perspectives 
discussed view the state as the chief actor in international affairs.  Furthermore, state 
preferences are most narrowly defined for the realist, for whom the ultimate driving 
force is state sovereignty; a means to security and facilitated by power. The 
preferences for the remaining theoretical approaches are more broadly defined. As 
regards preference formation, constructivism stresses the importance of the 
intersubjective structure for interest (and identity) formation and liberal 
intergovernmentalism acknowledges a domestic role in preference formation. 
 
The Constructivist/Rationalist Debate 
Particularly interesting from the perspective of this research appears to be the 
constructivist as well as the rationalist approach. According to the former, foreign 
policy cooperation between the EU member states is the result of “the so-called ‘co-
ordination reflex’, the wide-spread tendency to co-ordinate foreign policy with other 
member states rather than going it alone”  (Diez & Wiener, 2004, p. 4). The co-
ordination reflex in itself is the result of “informal, ‘societal’ development that have 
created a dense web of consultation with integrative effects” leading to the creation of 
a diplomatic community within the EU (Glarbo, 2001). According to the latter, foreign 
policy cooperation between the EU member states is the result of utility maximisation 
calculations, which implies that the actors are willing to cooperate, even on foreign 
policy matters, as long as the perceived gains of common action through the 
advantages of scale outweigh the potential costs of lost sovereignty or national 
prestige (Gordon, 1997, p. 80). Cooperation is facilitated either “if the gains of 
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common action are seen to be so great that sacrificing sovereignty is worth it, or if 
their interests converge to the point that little loss of sovereignty is entailed”(Gordon, 
1997, p. 81).  
 
Both approaches are enmeshed in the constructivist/rationalist debate, which 
juxtaposes rationalist ideas with constructivist ideas about inter-state cooperation.  In 
ontological terms,  
“rationalism is usually seen as assuming an individualist 
ontology, in which wholes are reducible to interacting parts, 
[while] constructivism [is seen] as assuming a holist ontology, in 
which parts exist only in relation to wholes” (Fearon & Wendt, 
2002, p. 53). 
 
Nevertheless, rather than ‘competing Weltanschauungen’, they can also be seen as, to 
a certain degree, complementary analytical tools used for a pragmatic interpretation 
of inter-state cooperation (Fearon & Wendt, 2002, pp. 53, 67). Cooperation may be 
initiated by means of rationalist ideas about utility maximisation. And while actors 
would be predicted to cooperate as long as doing so has a utility maximising effect, 
over time a shared identity may develop which further facilitates cooperation among 
the actors even if there was no explicit opportunity to maximise their utility by 
cooperating together. As Diez and Wiener importantly point out: “the extent to which 
[either or both of these perspectives] is true is a matter of empirical analysis” (2004, p. 
4). Such empirical analysis is carried out in this thesis. To this end, I examine which are 
the factors that determine whether or not EU member states successfully coordinate 
their votes in the UNGA and to what extent, if at all, member states are willing to 
override their heterogeneous policy preferences. By developing and testing 
hypotheses that on the one hand highlight features associated utility maximisation 
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(e.g. hypotheses on power, salience and collective bargaining power) and on the other 
hand are emphasising the integrative effects of EU membership (e.g. hypotheses on 
enthusiasm about EU membership and extent of voluntary integration), I seek to tease 
out some of the differences in the debate.  
 
2.3 The EU in the United Nations General Assembly 
As already mentioned, the focus of this thesis is on the European Union member states 
as foreign policy actors. The ‘foreign policies’ that I am concerned with are their 
respective votes in the United Nations General Assembly. Research about the EU at the 
UN can loosely be divided into two groups. One group focuses on EU representation at 
the UN. A second group focuses on EU-UN cooperation (e.g. Brantner & Gowan, 2008; 
Hoffmeister, Ruys, & Wouters, 2006; Ruys & Wouters, 2005). While the former studies 
EU “behaviour as a [...] cohesive bloc within UN political forums”, the latter 
investigates “significant operational (and financial) cooperation at the field level” 
between the EU and the UN (Brantner & Gowan, 2008, p. 37). The focus here rests on 
the former, not the latter.  
 
Of the research conducted in the field of EU representation inside the United Nations, 
some scholars choose to study EU representation inside the United Nations Security 
Council (Biscop et al., 2005, pp. 69-83; Bourantonis & Kostakos, 2000; Hill, 2006; 
Verbeke, 2006). Others elect to focus on EU representation in other UN bodies or 
specialised agencies, such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) or the EU in 
Geneva (e.g. Damro, 2006; Kissack, 2006; Taylor, 2006). Particularly recent research 
has extended the “scope of investigation into the areas of [...] economic and social 
organisations, environment and labour standards” (Kissack, 2007, p. 2). The vast 
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majority of scholars working in the area of EU representation at the UN, however, 
selects to analyse EU representation inside the United Nations General Assembly (e.g. 
Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; Featherstone & Ginsberg, 1996; Hurwitz, 1976; 
Johansson-Nogues, 2004, 2006; Luif, 2003; Rees & Young, 2005; Wouters, 2001). In the 
remainder of this section I will focus on EU representation inside the United Nations 
General Assembly. 
 
2.3.1 Existing Research 
The United Nations General Assembly is a popular framework for studying EU 
representation inside the United Nations.
8
 As pre-eminent multilateral deliberation 
forum, it is “often seen as a natural showcase for the European Community and its 
Member States” (Bruckner, 1990, p. 174). And since it so readily avails itself to both, 
quantitative voting pattern analysis
 
and qualitative analysis of the vote coordination 
process, the UNGA presents an especially rewarding framework for empirical analysis.
9
 
Researchers tend to investigate EU voting patterns over several UNGA sessions –  
anywhere from two annual sessions (Foot, 1979: years 1975-1977) to over twenty 
annual sessions (Luif, 2003: years 1979-2002). 
 
It appears that research on EU representation inside the United Nations General 
Assembly has been particularly popular in connection with EU institutional 
developments pertaining to European foreign policy. Since its inception in 1958, the 
                                                      
8
The United Nations General Assembly has been a popular framework for the analysis of voting patterns and voting 
bloc alignments, practically since its inception in 1946 concerning not just the EU but the entire UN membership  
(e.g. Ball, 1951; Hovet, 1960; Kim & Russet, 1996; Lijphart, 1963; Marin-Bosch, 1998; Meyers, 1966; Moore, 1975; 
Newcombe, Ross, & Newcombe, 1970; Russett, 1966; Vincent, 1976; Voeten, 2000). 
 
9
UNGA voting pattern analysis is the most prominent type of analysis within the specific field; however, some 
scholars have looked into analysing resolution sponsorship (Mower, 1962; Rai, 1977), or EU statements and 
explanation of votes (K. E. Smith, 2006a).  
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EC/EU has undergone two major institutional developments with reference to its 
foreign policy. These are the initiation of the European Political Cooperation in the 
early 1970s and the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1992. 
Earlier studies tend to investigate EC voting patterns inside the UNGA with reference 
to the EPC development (e.g. Bruckner, 1990; Foot, 1979; Hurwitz, 1976; Lindemann, 
1976, 1978, 1982; Stadler, 1989, 1993). Later studies tend to investigate EU voting 
behaviour with reference to the CFSP (e.g. Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; Rees & 
Young, 2005; K. E. Smith, 2006b; Sucharipa, 2003; Wouters, 2001). A few specialised 
studies explore the voting patterns of candidate countries prior to the 2004 Eastern 
enlargement (e.g. European Union, 2004b; Johansson-Nogues, 2004, 2006; Luif, 2003). 
Other authors focus on national case studies. For instance, Thijn (1991) and 
Laatikainen (2006) have investigated the voting behaviour of the Netherlands, while 
Holmes, Rees et al. (1992) have analysed Ireland’s voting behaviour.  
 
Theoretical/Conceptional Perspectives  
Research in the field of EU coordination inside the General Assembly (GA) is dominated 
by two theoretical perspectives. The realist perspective tends to be employed to 
explain a lack of vote cohesion (Stadler, 1989).  Researchers using this perspective 
maintain that “power remains a divide” among the member states and that powerful 
countries continue “to protect national proclivities to a degree that middle powers and 
smaller states are unable to” (Laatikainen & Smith, 2006, p. 14). The constructivist 
perspective on the other hand tends to be relied upon to explain the presence of vote 
cohesion (Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999). Researchers who view things through the 
constructivist prism propose that EU member states coordinate their positions for the 
sake of EU unity, regardless of national interests. They maintain that the “reflex of 
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seeking and promoting a common position, typically under the leadership of the EU 
Presidency, is [...] firmly entrenched in the GA” (Paasivirta & Porter, 2006, p. 36). 
Above and beyond that, they argue in favour of a gradual reconciliation of divergent 
positions leading to increased agreement over time (Kissack, 2007, p. 5).  
 
Methodology  
The two main methodological tools that are used in the existing studies are descriptive 
voting pattern analyses and qualitative expert interviews. The vast majority of these 
studies employ descriptive statistical analysis. At a minimum, they all present and 
discuss a table of fully cohesive votes (e.g. Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; Bruckner, 
1990; Johansson-Nogues, 2006; K. E. Smith, 2006a). Taking it a step further, some of 
the studies analyse vote defection. That is to say they analyse the occurrence of two-
way splits (possible constellations: yes/no, yes/abstain, no/abstain) and three-way 
splits (possible constellations: yes/no/abstain) in the EU vote (e.g. Bourantonis & 
Kostakos, 1999; Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Stadler, 1993; Strömvik, 1998; Wouters, 
2001). Luif (2003) and Strömvik (1998) each include a ranking measure and calculate 
respectively the distance between the votes of the individual EU member states and  
the distance between the individual member states and third countries.  In doing so, 
Strömvik (1998) follows a model proposed by Lijphart (1963). None of the studies that 
concern themselves with EU representation inside the UNGA employ inferential 
statistical analysis. However, studies that explore voting alignment in the UNGA more 
generally do. The methods that are used range from factor analysis (Kim & Russet, 
1996; Newcombe, Ross, & Newcombe, 1970), hierarchical cluster analysis and 
multidimensional scaling (Holloway & Tomlinson, 1995) to NOMINATE analysis 
(Voeten, 2000). 
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In addition to quantitative analysis, much of the research on EU representation inside 
the UNGA benefits from qualitative analysis as well. Most of the information is derived 
by means of expert interviews with officials in Brussels, the capitals or New York (e.g. 
Bruckner, 1990; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006; Luif, 2003; Paasivirta & Porter, 2006; 
Rasch, 2008; K. E. Smith, 2006a).  
 
Empirical Findings 
Collectively, research on EU cohesion inside the United Nations General Assembly (i.e. 
the extent to which the EU member states cast identical votes in the General 
Assembly) spans over several decades and considers a varying size of EU membership. 
Nevertheless, there is a broad agreement in the field that the “degree of a common 
European ambition” (Brantner & Gowan, 2008, p. 38) and EU cohesion inside the 
United Nations General Assembly varies over time and by issue area. Scholars agree 
that EU cohesion levels have neither been constant over time, nor that they have 
unequivocally increased since the initiation of the European Political Cooperation in 
the early 1970s. Rather, EU cohesion levels have noticeably fluctuated. After an initial 
period of vote convergence during the 1970s, cohesion levels reversed to lower levels 
again in the 1980s (Johansson-Nogues, 2004, p. 71). Coinciding with the 1992 inception 
of the CFSP, an “unprecedented rise in the share of unanimous votes” took place 
(Strömvik, 1998, p. 185). For the time periods under consideration, annual EU cohesion 
levels peaked in 1994 (Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Strömvik, 1998, p. 185). EU cohesion 
levels vacillated again afterwards, but have not dipped below their 1992 levels.  
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The voting patterns of France and the United Kingdom (both nuclear powers and UNSC 
member states) have been identified as the most isolated of all the EU member states 
(e.g. Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; Fassbender, 2004, p. 862; Foot, 1979; Johansson-
Nogues, 2004; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006, p. 14; Rees & Young, 2005, p. 200; Wouters, 
2001). The Benelux countries, on the other hand, have been identified as part of the 
EU core that votes with the EU majority most of the time (Rees & Young, 2005; Stadler, 
1989, p. 15; Sucharipa, 2003, pp. 783`, 791). And while Greece’s voting behaviour has 
been perceived as maverick during the 1980s (Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Stadler, 1989, 
p. 74);  its voting record with regards to the EU majority has markedly improved during 
the 1990s (Rees & Young, 2005). 
 
Some issue areas produce persistently low levels of EU cohesion.  Scholars agree that 
UNGA resolutions pertaining to military questions and decolonisation are particularly 
divisive for the EU member states and produce continually low EU cohesion levels 
(Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; Brantner & Gowan, 2008: 39; Johansson-Nogues, 
2004; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006; e.g. Luif, 1995: 279; Luif, 2003: 3; Wouters, 2001). As 
such, these tend to be issues that within the EU fall under the remit of the CFSP. And 
with the “UN […] traditionally […] an arena for national diplomacy, the EU diplomats 
are not always ‘CFSP minded’ enough” (K. E. Smith, 2006a, p. 165). The European 
Commission supports this view in a 2003 report, where it states that the “[v]otes in 
which the EU is unable to agree on a common line continue to occur, mainly on issues 
in the area of CFSP” (European Union, 2003b, p. 4). And Tank (1998) explains that the 
efforts of the EU member states in finding a common ground, particularly on these 
issues, is undermined by their historical ties and individual “relationships to countries 
beyond the Community framework”(p. 14). 
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Other issue areas generate persistently high levels of EU cohesion.  EU member states 
tend to vote much more cohesively on resolutions pertaining to human rights issues 
(Luif, 2003). In fact, this is an issue area, where the EU as a whole has been much more 
active and rather than having to deal with internal divisions, is confronted with 
external opposition (Wouters, 2001, pp. 393-396). Nevertheless, even though human 
rights resolutions tend to yield relatively high cohesion levels; they are not perfect. 
And according to Smith (2006a) “voting cohesion [for resolutions pertaining to human 
rights] is not visibly improving, though fears that the 2004 enlargement would lead to 
much less cohesion have not, as yet, been realized”(p. 163). 
 
Finally, a third group of resolutions has seen its cohesion levels increase over time. A 
case in point is the group of resolutions pertaining to the Arab Israeli conflict. In the 
early to mid-1980s Middle East resolutions did not generate high levels of EU cohesion 
(new EU members Greece, Portugal and Spain tended to vote in isolation) (Stadler, 
1989, p. 186; Strömvik, 1998). However, EU cohesion levels on Middle East issues 
started to increase and continued to rise well into the 1990s (Luif, 1995, p. 279). 
 
In an attempt to generalise EU voting patterns, especially with view to particular issue 
areas, a number of scholars have thought it helpful to divide the member states into a 
progressive and a conservative bloc (Hurwitz, 1976; Rees & Young, 2005; Stadler, 
1989). France, the United Kingdom and Germany are seen as more conservative, while 
Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden have been categorised as more progressive (Rees 
& Young, 2005). Hurwitz (1976) includes Denmark in the progressive bloc. This 
categorisation tends to hold exceptionally well when analysing military resolutions, 
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and resolutions pertaining to decolonisation. More specifically with regards to nuclear 
resolutions, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden tend to cast their votes together on 
one side of the nuclear issues (Rees & Young, 2005); while  France and the UK can be 
found on the other side (Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; Johansson-Nogues, 2004; 
Wouters, 2001). Similarly,  Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden do not share the 
sensitivities  France and the UK experience with reference to resolutions pertaining to 
colonial issues (Rees & Young, 2005). Finally, there tends to be a general impression, 
that the neutral states and the Southern states are more sympathetic to 3
rd
 World 
demands (Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999, p. 23).  
 
2.3.2 Proposed Research 
In this section, I set out to compare the existing research in the field of EU voting 
behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly to my proposed research with 
reference to theoretical/conceptional, methodological and empirical aspects in an 
attempt to identify possible points of departure. 
 
Theoretical/Conceptional Perspective 
Notwithstanding different theoretical approaches, the existing body of research does 
not sufficiently discriminate between EU member states casting identical votes due to 
shared interests and EU member states casting identical votes despite of divergent 
interests. Isolated voting tends to be explained by diverging and strong national 
interest, while high levels of EU cohesion tend to be explained as the result of 
socialisation effects (Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Luif, 2003; K. E. Smith, 2006a). Only a 
handful of studies acknowledge the predicament. Kissack (2007) points out that “in 
situations where the level of consensus is high among all parties voting, one cannot 
rule out the possibility that cohesive voting by the EU Member States is coincidental” 
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(p. 5-6). And Rees and Young (2005) find that while “in general it has been found that 
member states now vote more often together than they did in the past, [...] whether 
this reflects improved EU coordination and/or greater member state consensus on 
international issues is more difficult to assess” (pp. 205-206). In the present thesis, I 
seek to address this issue and to this end, will present a corresponding conceptional 
framework in the ensuing chapter. 
 
Separately, a number of researchers make casual observations about EU voting 
behaviour with reference to US voting behaviour. Kim and Russet (1996) and Marin-
Bosch (1998) have observed that particularly during the 1980s and early 1990s France, 
Germany, the UK and the Benelux countries could be counted on as the US’s most 
reliable allies in UNGA voting. And while Voeten (2002, p. 213) and Johansson-Nogues 
(2004, pp. 74, 79) point towards a voting pattern that indicates that European 
countries overall have moved away somewhat from the United States during the post 
cold war period; Fassbender (2004) sees particularly the UK and France, as permanent 
UNSC members and nuclear powers  remaining rather close and “often [aligning] 
themselves with the United States” (p. 862). Employing a distance measure, Luif (2003) 
finds that “the overall gap between the EU majority and the United States has become 
quite large since 1979, though less so during the Clinton years. This gap has been 
widest on Middle East issues (especially concerning Israel)” (p. 4). Encouraged by these 
observations, in the present thesis, I seek to consider the transatlantic relationship in a 
more methodical manner, developing and testing a number of hypotheses about it.  
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Methodology 
Existing research on EU representation in the UNGA tends to rely heavily on 
descriptive statistics; with the main focus on analysing voting patterns over time and 
across issue areas.  Most conventionally, intra-EU voting disagreements are discussed 
in terms of split votes, where “two-way split votes mean that EU voting behaviour falls 
into two camps (in favour/against, in favour/abstention or against/abstention)” and 
“three-way split-votes mean that EU voting behaviour falls into three camps (in favour, 
against, abstention)” (Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Wouters, 2001, p. 387).  In the present 
thesis, I seek to strengthen the current set of descriptive statistical analysis, by 
applying more sophisticated indices for measuring EU cohesion as well as for 
measuring voting distances between individual member states. I further seek to 
complement the existing descriptive statistical analysis with inferential statistics where 
appropriate. 
 
Empirical Findings 
There is a general agreement among existing researchers that EU cohesion in the 
UNGA varies over time and across issue area, with some issue areas more prone to 
disagreement than others. With the expectation to find the results generally 
confirmed, I further seek to illustrate that the picture of EU vote coordination inside 
the United Nations General Assembly may be more complex than to simply draw 
dividing lines along the neutral states or the nuclear powers with seats in the UNSC; or 
to make general statements regarding particular issue areas such as military matters or 
decolonisation.  
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2.4 Conclusion 
The thesis touches upon various bodies of existing research. In broad terms, this is a 
thesis in the area of European foreign policy studies. In the narrowest terms, it is an 
analysis of EU vote coordination in the United Nations General Assembly. Research in 
both areas is informed by a set of theoretical considerations that draw on elements 
from IR theory as well as EU integration theory. The objective of chapter 2 was to 
summarise the main constituents of the above-mentioned bodies of research and to 
set out ways in which this thesis seeks to contribute to them. To this end, I started out 
by setting the larger theoretical and empirical framework before discussing existing 
research about the EU in the UN more specifically. With reference to the latter, I 
highlighted that only limited attention is being paid to the difficulties that emerge from 
the inability to differentiate between EU member states casting identical votes due to 
shared interests and EU member states casting identical votes despite of divergent 
interests; an issue which I seek to address in the next chapter of this thesis.  I further 
explained that in methodological terms, I seek to build on the existing descriptive 
voting pattern analysis by employing more sophisticated indices and applying 
inferential statistics where appropriate. Finally, I pointed out that existing research 
tends to find that EU cohesion varies over time and across issue area. I stressed that I 
expect to confirm these findings by and large; albeit hoping for some scope to further 
break down the results. Although any results will in the most direct way be applicable 
to the field of EU coordination in the United Nations General Assembly, the thesis 
findings will also have implications for the larger field of EFP studies and conceivably 
feed into the constructivist/rationalist debate. 
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PART II: CONCEPTUAL & METHODOLOGICAL 
DISCUSSION 
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In chapter 1, I outlined the overarching research question for this thesis. To reiterate, 
the thesis is motivated by an underlying interest in analysing which factors determine 
whether or not EU member states speak with a single voice in international affairs. 
Having narrowed it down to an analysis of EU vote coordination inside the United 
Nations General Assembly, I discussed the merits of this thesis with reference to other 
studies in the field in chapter 2. Following on from that, it is the objective of chapter 3 
to provide the conceptual framework for the analysis. 
 
The central idea is that the EU member states intend to coordinate their votes in the 
UNGA, notwithstanding heterogeneous policy preferences. I will use the present 
chapter to elaborate on this idea and develop testable hypotheses. The chapter is 
divided into four sections.  In section 3.1, I set out to explain in more detail the notion 
of intended vote coordination as well as heterogeneous policy preference. In section 
3.2, I hypothesise which factors might determine a country’s voting behaviour in the 
UNGA. The model presented here contains an operational limitation that warrants a 
theoretical discussion, which takes place in section 3.3. Finally, in section 3.4, I offer a 
conclusion to the chapter. 
 
3.1 The EU Member States in the UNGA 
In this section, I seek to explain in more detail the notion of vote coordination intent as 
well as heterogeneous policy preference and how they are linked to the voting 
behaviour of the EU member states in the UNGA. To this end, I shall elaborate on the 
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role of institutions and discuss the notion of actors assuming multiple roles, before 
narrowing in on intended vote coordination and heterogeneous policy preferences.  
 
The Role of Institutions 
The study of EU member state vote coordination inside the United Nations General 
Assembly focuses on the very narrow aspect of state interaction and cooperation in 
international institutions (on state interaction within the context of institutions see 
Axelrod & Keohane, 1985, p. 238; Keohane, 1984). Here, ‘institution’ refers to the 
United Nations as well as the European Union. According to Checkel (1998), 
rationalists and constructivists by and large agree that institutions matter. However, 
the two approaches differ fundamentally about how institutions matter (Pollack, 2000, 
p. 18). With the notion of strategic calculation deeply embedded in rationalist theory, 
rationalists argue that state behaviour is initially motivated extrinsically by self-defined 
political preferences, assumed to be material and power-oriented and culminating in 
the desire to attain and maintain political power (Schimmelfennig, 2005, p. 830). 
Consequently, states enter institutions in pursuit of their (exogenously given) 
preferences. Seeking to maximize their interest and given the institutional constraints, 
they might modify their behaviour.  
 
Constructivists on the other hand tend to envisage a more essential role for 
institutions, one which shapes actors’ preferences and identities (Pollack, 2000, p. 18; 
see also A Wendt, 1994). According to this approach, while states retain ultimate 
control over their policies and do not transfer any of their sovereignty to the 
institution, they tend to conform to the institutional rules and ‘scripts’ to which they 
have subscribed (Hall & Taylor, 1996). “In other words, states adopt the logic of 
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appropriateness according to which they follow institutional rules, [...], because they 
fear being considered untrustworthy or ‘inappropriate’ (J. March & Olsen, 1998).” 
(Andreatta, 2005, p. 32) Seen in this light, the European Union would be considered a 
normative entity, the existence of which at the very least would be expected to exert 
pressure to preserve its unity, developing a consistent bias toward common, rather 
than national positions. And at most it would help develop a European identity 
(Andreatta, 2005, p. 32).  
 
Following on from the discussion in section 2.2, it is important to note, however, that 
in the form of new institutionalism,  March and Olsen (1989) make room for the 
possibility that political actors are driven by institutional roles as well as by calculated 
self-interest (p. 159). In their own words: 
“Human actions, social contexts and institutions work upon 
each other in complicated ways, and these complex, interactive 
processes of action and formation of meaning are important to 
political life. Institutions seem to be neither neutral reflections 
of exogenous environmental forces nor neutral arenas for the 
performances of individuals driven by exogenous preferences 
and expectations.”(J. G. March & Olsen, 1984, p. 742) 
 
So, it is possible that “what starts as behavioural adaptation, may – because of various 
cognitive and institutional lock-in effects – later be followed by sustained compliance 
that is strongly suggestive of internationalization and preference change (Checkel, 
2005, pp. 808-809). A transformation of the logic of consequentiality into a logic of 
appropriateness has thus taken place. 
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Actors’ Rights and Responsibilities 
The participants meet within the context of the United Nations, yet in their capacity as 
EU member states. But because they meet within the context of the United Nations, 
notwithstanding that they do so in their capacity as EU member states, they 
simultaneously meet as sovereign states (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, p. 6). As such, the 
actors “embody multiple roles” (Krasner, 1999, p. 6).  
 
The basic rationale maintains that there is an overlap between the responsibility 
associated with a country’s EU membership and the rights associated with its UN 
membership. As United Nations members, countries act solely in their capacity as 
sovereign nation states. That is to say, for all roll-call votes in the General Assembly, 
they are free to cast their votes according to their heterogeneous policy preferences. 
As EU member states, on the other hand, their intention to speak with a single voice in 
international affairs extends to their voting behaviour inside the United Nations 
General Assembly. So, while they may be free to vote as they please as UN member 
states, as EU member states in the UNGA, they are subject to coordination pressures 
to cast a unified vote. Adam (1999) summarises aptly that: 
“As a group of fifteen sovereign States, the European Union 
does not act or behave [...] like a single nation in the United 
Nations. The UN system is composed of sovereign States, not 
regional unions. This [...] has the inconvenience of a 
cumbersome coordination mechanism due to the present state 
of the European common foreign and security policy.” (p. 3) 
 
Any coordination pressure within the EU stems from their underlying intention to 
coordinate their positions. This intention in turn is resultant from their objective to 
speak with a single voice in international affairs either to signify EU unity 
(constructivist approach) or to increase their clout by signifying EU unity (rationalist 
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approach). As highlighted in the previous chapter, both possibilities are theoretically 
appealing.  
 
And as explained below, they are also both plausible when applied to the study of EU 
voting behaviour in the UNGA. At the UN, “the member states’ foreign ministries are 
the privileged players and remain central to the process” (Laatikainen & Smith, 2006, 
p. 14). Rationalist would argue that as such the member states are expected to protect 
their geopolitical interests (Hix, 1999, p. 15); which may include using their EU 
membership for the pursuit of shared goals and joint gains (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, p. 
6; Walsh, 2001, p. 61). That is to say, EU member states come together  to coordinate 
their otherwise individually cast votes in the United Nations General Assembly so that, 
by speaking with one voice, they may  “increase the collective bargaining power of the 
area vis-à-vis other international actors” (also see Jorgensen, 1997, p. 95; P. C. 
Schmitter, 1969, p. 165).  In other words, EU member states coordinate their positions 
when it allows them to defend their interests better than going it alone (Allen, 2002; 
S.M Walt, 1987). Constructivists would argue that while EU member states “continue 
to be international actors in their own right”, the emergence of a diplomatic 
community between the EU member states at the UN has led to a foreign policy “co-
ordination reflex”  (Diez & Wiener, 2004, p. 4). In essence then, EU member states “try 
to act in concert at the UN and try to make their unity visible” (Fassbender, 2004, p. 
882). 
 
A potential conflict of interest emerges when a country’s national policy preference 
does not coincide with the EU majority position, defined as the vote cast by the 
majority of the EU member states, leaving that country in a position to vote either 
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according to its national policy preference or to vote with the EU majority.  This is the 
moment when coordination pressure is most difficult to deal with.  
 
Whether the intention to speak with a single voice  is illustrative their objective to 
signify EU unity or to increase their clout by signifying EU unity at this point, the 
member states must consider “the trade-off between the advantages [...] and the 
disadvantages of overriding heterogeneous preferences” (Frieden, 2004, p. 261). 
Speaking in the rationalist vein, Allen (2002) points out that while 
“all [expect] an effective EU to exert more power and influence 
than any one of them could aspire to individually […], there is 
little appreciation of the fundamental contradiction between 
seeking to maximise the external potential of the European 
Union and seeking to maintain national competence and 
authority in foreign policy” (p. 45). 
 
Constructivists on the other hand would “argue that  the likelihood of such 
compromises might be higher within the European Union than in other, looser, 
coalitions of states because of underlying political tendencies within the European 
Union to search for common positions and institutionalized mechanisms for 
coordination” (Brantner & Gowan, 2008, p. 39; Carlsnaes, Sjursen, & White, 2004; K. E. 
Smith, 2006b).   
 
The validity of this conceptual framework rests on the correctness of the notion that 
EU member states intend to coordinate their voting positions inside the United 
Nations despite their heterogeneous national policy preferences. If member states did 
not intend to coordinate their voting positions, irrespective of the level of vote 
cohesion, studying EU coordination would not be justified. And if member states had 
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identical voting preferences they would be expected to cast identical votes by default; 
irrespective of whether or not they coordinated their voting positions. For, “where 
interests are in full harmony, the capacity of states to cooperate […] is irrelevant to the 
realization of mutual benefits” (Oye, 1985, p. 6). Or as Axelrod and Keohane (1985) put 
it: “Cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting 
and complementary interests. In such  situations, cooperation occurs when actors 
adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others.” (p. 226) 
 
In what follows I will address the question of how serious member states are about 
vote coordination and how heterogeneous their policy preferences can truly be 
expected. 
 
3.1.1 Intentional Vote Coordination 
“Only states have the right to vote within the UN’s main bodies.” (Farrell, 2006, p. 28; 
United Nations, 2006, p. 34; Rule 124) That means EU member states vote individually 
inside the UNGA with no automatic vote cast on behalf of the EU. That 
notwithstanding, EU member states intend to coordinate their votes in the General 
Assembly and they “aim for unanimity” (European Union, 2004b, p. 11). 
 
The aim for EU member states to speak with a single voice on the international stage 
first took shape informally outside the UN realm before it extended into the UN realm. 
Over time it has become much more formal and finally codified. I will in a few words 
sketch a historical picture of how the intent for foreign policy coordination developed 
informally outside and inside the UN before I provide a few key examples as to where 
these intentions have led to institutional developments and have manifested in 
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writing, followed by several examples of senior national politicians who openly 
promote effective EU foreign policy coordination.  
 
The aspiration for the member states of what was then the European Community to 
speak with a single voice (Solana, 2002) globally became evident at a point in time 
when not even all member states had obtained UN membership.
10
 The establishment 
and further development of the European Political Cooperation from 1970 onwards, 
where effective coordination was already a principal objective (Elfriede Regelsberger, 
1988), is testament to the endeavour of the EU member states to try to speak with a 
single voice in world affairs. For example, irrespective of, in all likelihood rightful, 
claims that the Venice Declaration only had limited effect (Tomkys, 1987), it 
nonetheless provides “a striking example of EPC’s capability to produce a bold 
initiative” (Nuttall, 1992, p. 168).  
 
Given their objective to act in accord outside the UN realm, it would appear only 
logical for EU member states to also intend to coordinate their positions inside the 
UN.
11
 To that end, shortly after being admitted as member to the UN, the West 
German government in late 1974 called on its fellow EC members to prioritise the 
development of a common strategy by the Nine with regards to the United Nations 
(Lindemann, 1982, p. 82). The aspiration for EU member states to speak with a single 
                                                      
10
 The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (and for that matter the German Democratic Republic (GDR)) did not 
formally gain UN membership until 1973. 
11
 Both, the UN and the EU are multilateral systems which share the same values - the protection for human rights, 
the respect for international law, the concern with democracy promotion and the belief in the role of international 
institutions in fostering international cooperation. Any EU “commitment to strengthen relations with the 
UN”(Farrell, 2006, p. 45) would therefore not be surprising. By strengthening its relations with the UN, the EU as 
one multilateral system supports and helps to legitimise another multilateral system and in turn has an opportunity 
to help legitimise its own role in international affairs (see Laatikainen & Smith, 2006). In more practical terms, by 
virtue of its voting system, the UNGA makes for a useful vehicle for member states to demonstrate their unity. 
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voice in the UN in particular is illustrated in two ways. One, over time, a gradual build-
up of European institutional capacity in the UN in general and the UNGA in particular 
can be observed. Two, references to intended policy coordination are made repeatedly 
in a variety of documents considered significant for EU integration. In what follows, 
both aspects are discussed. 
 
Even without the EU ever having obtained a designated EU ambassador or EU seat in 
the UNGA or UNSC, a gradual build-up of European institutional capacity at the UN can 
be observed, as the following two examples illustrate.  One, the European Commission 
holds a delegation office at the UN in New York. This office originated as an 
information office in 1964 and was turned into the delegation office ten years later, 
when the EC was granted observer status in the UNGA in 1974 (Farrell, 2006, p. 38). As 
permanent observer in the UNGA, the European Community, represented by the 
European Commission is allowed to take the floor (European Union, 2008c). Two, 
“[t]he system of the rotating EU Presidency supported by the Council Secretariat has 
become entrenched” in the UN network (Laatikainen & Smith, 2006, p. 13). The 
member state holding the Presidency presents the EU position to the General 
Assembly, whether in negotiations or debates, in the form of a Presidency statement. 
EU member states work together with the Council and the Commission to prepare and 
finalise EU statements. The first of such statements was expressed by the Italian 
Foreign Minister on 23 September 1975, at the beginning of the 30th UNGA session 
(Luif, 2003, p. 10). Over time, the amount of times the Presidency speaks on behalf of 
member states has become striking (Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999, p. 22; Farrell, 
2006, p. 31). 
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Repeated references to deliberate policy coordination in a variety of major EU 
agreements and declarations can be seen as written manifestations of the EU’s intent 
to speak with a single voice in international organisations in general and the UN in 
particular. As subsequent examples illustrate, while some documents simply indicate a 
need or objective to work together in international organisations, others spell it out in 
less ambiguous terms. Several texts even attempt to discuss mechanisms to help 
coordinate these positions. In earlier documents, member states simply “agree to 
adopt common positions wherever possible” (European Union, 1973) or “endeavour to 
adopt common positions” (European Community, 1986, Title 3, Art 7a) and “signal 
their resolve to clear their concertation of all obstacles, so that the Community may 
come out with all the weight of its responsibility in the UN (European Community, 
1975; Luif, 2003, p. 10). In later documents wording is not only more precise but also 
stronger. 1992’s Treaty of the European Union as well as its successors, the 
Amsterdam Treaty and the Nice Treaty set out that:  “Member States shall co-ordinate 
their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall 
uphold the common positions in such forums.” (European Union, 1992, Article 19, 
emphasis added)
12
 
 
Finally, several documents even attempt to address possibilities of how policy 
coordination might be achieved (European Union, 2003b; Rees & Young, 2005, p. 179). 
Generally, early action is seen as crucial. That includes “early coordination of national 
positions on as many UNGA topics as possible and the early drawing up of common 
                                                      
12
 The Lisbon treaty, albeit not directly relevant for this dissertation as its applicability extends beyond the 
framework of analysis, illustrates a continuation of this trend by stipulating that the High Representative for the 
Union in Foreign and Security Studies shall organise the coordination of the member states action in international 
organisations (Lisbon Treaty Article 34[19]). In doing so, coordination between the EU member states in 
international organisations, among them the UNGA, becomes ever more tied to the EU. 
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positions, Presidency statements and resolution”(European Union, 1995; Lindemann, 
1978, p. 83; Luif, 2003, p. 11). Currently, “[m]ore than 1,000 internal EU coordination 
meetings are conducted each year in both New York and Geneva” (European Union, 
2008c).  The ambitious 1975 Dublin report was supposed to provide the foundation for 
the systematic coordination of EC member states positions in the UNGA. However, 
member states had difficulties in finding agreement on the requirement to vote in 
unison. They finally agreed that in case of diverging opinions votes should be adopted 
so as to avoid direct opposition in UNGA roll-call votes. That is to say, in case of direct 
opposition a “yes” or a “no” vote should only be matched by an “abstain” (Lindemann, 
1978, p. 83; Stadler, 1989, p. 15).
 13
 
 
At last, there is no shortage of national and EU politicians calling for the EU member 
states to speak with a single voice in international affairs, as the following, by no 
means exhaustive, list of examples illustrates. Former Vice-President of the European 
Commission, Lord Brittan of Spennithorne has stated that “the EU should endeavour to 
[…] strengthen its political role and standing in the world” (Gilmore, Henery, Newton, 
Owen, & Syal, 2005). Berlusconi and Prodi, leading Italian politicians of different 
parties, both said at separate occasions that if Europe wanted to strengthen its 
political role and  “increase its influence on the world scene […] it must speak with a 
single voice on all aspects of external relations (Jones & Evans-Pritchard, 2002; Owen, 
2002). Finally, former British Liberal Democrat leader, Sir Menzies Campbell, adds that 
in order for Europe to be able to speak with a single voice, cooperation in foreign 
affairs must be increased (Gilmore, Henery, Newton, Owen, & Syal, 2005). 
                                                      
13
 Since the report was not published, Lindemann’s statements are based on interviews which she has conducted in 
Dublin in April 1973, in London in January 1976 and in Bonn in July 1976 and March 1977. 
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3.1.2 Policy Preference Heterogeneity 
“The EU’s effort to speak with one voice in the UN runs up against the traditions of 
national diplomacy by member states, reflecting different national interests and 
prerogatives.” (Laatikainen & Smith, 2006, p. 12) Even if one only considered the 15 
old member states, “Europe is characterised by the great diversity of its […] national 
and state traditions” (Loughlin, 2008, p. 187).   
 
For, despite the notion of liberal democracy presenting a “strong unifying link between 
the members of the European Union, […] there are substantial differences between 
the political societies of Europe regarding constitutionalism, the rule of law as well as 
forms and processes of representative democracy” (Athanassopoulou, 2008, p. xi). 
Furthermore, there are “economic […] and military differences among [them]” 
(Rummel, 1988, p. 118). In addition to political and economic differences, more 
generally, member states have idiosyncratic world views (Breedham, 1996; Jorgensen, 
1997, p. 92) and on the whole, while some countries are more progressive, others are 
more conservative (Rees & Young, 2005). Thus, one would expect different policy 
preferences. 
 
The underlying idea is that a nation’s set of policy preferences is informed by its 
political framework. A nation’s political framework, consisting of appropriate 
institutions and norms, tends to be established in response to its need for political 
stability and is never created in a historical vacuum. Rather, based on its cultural 
traditions and historical ties, a nation’s political framework reflects that nation’s 
interpretation of the political, economic and fiscal currents of the time. And that is 
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precisely the reason why policy preferences even between countries that share basic 
democratic values may differ (Kimmel, 1992, p. 26). “Given the history and 
heterogeneity of the member countries” (Hooghe, 2001, p. 10; Rummel, 1988, p. 119), 
their difficulty in achieving successful vote coordination is thus not surprising. 
 
3.1.3 Coordination Pressure and Bargaining Tactics 
As already emphasised earlier in this chapter, a country whose national policy 
preference does not coincide with the EU majority is still subjected to coordination 
pressures. This country may decide either to sustain the pressures and vote according 
to its national policy preference or to succumb to the pressure and vote with the EU 
majority. Negotiating from the minority position, or in other words from the weaker 
position, a country which is minded to succumb to the coordination pressure 
eventually,  might still try  to take advantage of the knowledge that successful vote 
coordination is generally valued highly among the EU member states. The mere fact 
that the EU member states get together to coordinate their votes inside the General 
Assembly is a strong indication of their intention to speak with a single voice in the 
forum. Based on the assumption that the fellow negotiators are keener on a 
successfully coordinated vote than on the precise point on the preference spectrum at 
which it takes place, the member states holding the minority position may engage in 
bargaining tactics to shift the final position closer to their ideal point before caving in. 
 
When negotiating from a weaker position, a popular tactic used to shift the 
coordinated position closer to one’s ideal point involves the evocation  of an 
“irrevocable commitment” (Schelling, 1960, p. 24).  
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“The essence of [this tactic] is some voluntary but irreversible 
sacrifice of freedom of choice. [It rests] on the paradox that the 
power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to 
bind oneself; that, in bargaining, weakness is often strength, 
freedom may be freedom to capitulate, and to burn bridges 
behind one may suffice to undo an opponent.”(Schelling, 1960, 
p. 22) 
 
In other words, these may be seen as red lines illustrative of domestic constraints.
14
 
Among the officials at the EU coordination table in New York, it is known as the 
“power of defection” (Official #29, 18 September 2008; Official #32, 4 December 
2008). As long as national representatives in international negotiations are able to 
create a bargaining position based on some sort of domestic constraint (which could 
be legislative in nature or based on public opinion) their “initial position can [...] be 
made visibly “final”” (Schelling, 1960, p. 28). The use of a bargaining agent in form of 
the national diplomats sitting at the EU negotiation table is further aids their purpose  
insofar as the “agent may be given instructions that are difficult or impossible to 
change, such instructions (and their inflexibility) being visible to the opposite party” 
(Schelling, 1960, p. 29). Having said this, member states engaging in such tactics “all 
run the risk of establishing an immovable position that goes beyond the ability of the 
other to concede, and thereby provoke the likelihood of stalemate or breakdown” 
(Schelling, 1960, p. 28). Hence, particularly in an arena where repeated games are the 
norm, member states are quite careful not to isolate themselves too much.  
 
Moreover, with particular reference to the UNGA, the bargaining potential inside the 
EU vote coordination meetings is limited. For the majority of resolutions, the member 
states have no say on the text of the resolution and are only able to coordinate their 
                                                      
14
 See section 3.2 for an example. 
69 
 
respective voting positions. EU member states are only able to negotiate the text of a 
resolution, which they have sponsored or co-sponsored. One notable exception are 
the resolutions dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. These are drafted by the 
Palestinians and usually sponsored by the Arab group; however, by special invitation, 
the EU member states are requested to negotiate among themselves any amendments 
that might be needed for their unified support for these resolutions (see chapter 7). 
 
3.2 Hypotheses 
I have demonstrated in the previous section that EU member states intend to 
coordinate their votes inside the UNGA despite their heterogeneous national policy 
preferences. The key to understanding their subsequent voting behaviour rests upon 
understanding how the EU member states respond to whatever coordination 
pressures they are exposed to.
15
  
 
As already explained at length in the previous paragraphs, there is no fixed EU position 
inside the UNGA and each member state casts its vote individually. The EU majority 
position is thus defined as the position chosen by the majority of the member states. 
In those instances in which no majority of member states emerges, no EU majority 
position exists. As will be demonstrated in the ensuing empirical chapter, this happens 
extremely rarely. Following on from that, for those resolutions for which national 
policy preferences diverge from the EU majority position each EU member state 
experiences a conflict of interest and must find a way to reconcile its national policy 
                                                      
15
 As shall become evident in the ensuing paragraphs, many of the factors hypothesised to have an 
impact on the voting behaviour of the EU member states in the UNGA fit loosely into the 
constructivist/rationalist debate. That is to say, some implicitly test whether the member states work 
together so as to signify EU unity and others whether they seek to signify unity so as to maximise their 
utility. 
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preference with the objective of casting a unified vote.  I call these divisive resolutions. 
Issue areas for which most resolutions are divisive are called divisive issue areas. For 
divisive resolutions, EU member states have two options. They either engage in EU 
majority – oriented voting behaviour. That is to say, they vote alongside the majority 
of the EU member states even though that means overriding their heterogeneous 
policy preferences. Alternatively, they stick with their national policy preferences and 
defect from the EU majority position. 
 
I hypothesise that the balance a member state strikes between the two options 
generally depends on the following aspects – how powerful it is, how important it 
views the issue at hand, how it views its relationship with the EU and how it views its 
relationship with the US as external factor. I furthermore argue that the balance tips in 
favour of vote cohesion, if by working together the EU member states see a concrete 
possibility at taking a leadership position. In other words, the balance tips in favour of 
vote cohesion when increasing the collective bargaining power becomes a tangible 
objective, that is to say if increasing the collective bargaining power helps them 
achieve another goal. I shall use this section to discuss the hypothesis in more depth. 
 
3.2.1 State-Focused Factors (National Interests) 
State-focused factors emphasise the national position as the driving force behind 
UNGA voting. 
Hypothesis One: More powerful EU member states are less susceptible to vote 
coordination pressures and are less likely to exhibit EU majority – oriented voting 
behaviour than less powerful EU member states. 
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Cooperation in international organisations entails benefits and costs for all 
participating countries. On the upside, cooperation in international organisations 
decreases the cost of action for individual participants and simultaneously increases 
the legitimacy of an action as well as adding clout to a common cause. On the 
downside, cooperation in international organisations imposes constraints on the 
freedom of individual actions. With reference to the EU member states in the United 
Nations General Assembly, cooperation means vote coordination. Depending on how 
powerful they are, states are affected differently by the benefits and costs of vote 
coordination (Moravcsik, 1993, pp. 486-487). In essence, the potential gains of EU vote 
coordination inside the UNGA through ‘increased scale’ must be evaluated with 
reference the costs associated with overriding one’s national policy preference 
(Gordon, 1997).  
 
Why then is it considered less likely for more powerful countries to engage in EU 
majority – oriented voting behaviour compared to less powerful countries? Compared 
to less powerful countries, more powerful countries gain less from the ‘increased 
scale’ of successful vote coordination. Because more powerful countries are the chief 
providers of clout and legitimacy, as such they gain little extra clout by cooperating 
with less powerful countries. On the other hand, effective vote coordination provides a 
lot of extra clout for less powerful countries.  To illustrate, consider the following:  the 
difference between the effect of the EU taking a stance and the UK taking a stance is 
much smaller than the difference between the effect of the EU taking a stance and 
Luxembourg taking a stance. 
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In addition, more powerful countries suffer the costs of overriding one’s national 
policy preferences tend to be higher for more powerful countries for the following 
reasons.  More powerful countries have more pronounced individual foreign policies. 
The breadth and depths of their international interests makes very often for unique 
positions for which they are unwilling to find a compromise (Tonra, 1997, p. 188). Less 
powerful states, on the other hand, “posses little effective sovereignty to begin with” 
(Tonra, 1997, p. 192). Through successful vote coordination they “lose something, 
which is largely irrelevant, which is the capacity of standing up and saying that [they] 
disagree; [but they] win something which is far more relevant to the practical life of 
international relations, which is the capacity to influence outside events” (Tonra, 1997, 
p. 193). 
 
Hence, more powerful countries can be expected to be more reluctant to give up their 
national policy preference in exchange for ‘increased scale’ and have a tendency not to 
engage in EU majority – oriented voting behaviour in order to pursue their individual 
interests more often than less powerful countries. Less powerful countries, on the 
other hand, are not only expected to engage in EU majority – oriented voting 
behaviour more often; they are further expected to turn a blind eye to the occasional 
vote defection by more powerful states because they value EU vote coordination very 
much, and fear that more powerful states might withdraw from vote coordination 
altogether if they were not allowed to defect from the EU majority position from time 
to time. At any rate, punishing the defectors becomes more difficult as the EU 
membership increases in size, because “strategies of reciprocity become more difficult 
to implement without triggering a collapse of cooperation.” (Oye, 1985, p. 20) In 
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essences then, those who gain the most compromise the most, whereas those who 
gain the least impose conditions (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 3). 
Hypothesis Two: The more salient an EU member state perceives an issue to be the 
less susceptible it is to vote coordination pressures and the less likely it is to exhibit EU 
majority – oriented voting behaviour. 
 
“The dividing line between compromise and confrontation within political cooperation 
remains national interest.” (Tonra, 1997, p. 194)
16
  Having said this, from time to time 
member states are willing to overcome their diverging national interests. As long as 
they view  “jointly accessible outcomes as more preferable to those that are or might 
be reached independently” (Stein, 1982, p. 311); or as long as they are indifferent 
enough with regards to the resolution (Heritier, 1999), they might view compromise as 
part of the ‘one hand washes the other’ strategy. Accordingly, member states might 
decide to vote for a resolution that they are fairly indifferent to, in exchange for 
support by other member states for a resolution they perceive as important. And with 
the United Nations General Assembly an ideal arena for repeated games, states are 
more or less aware that if they indiscriminately pursue their own interest vis-à-vis 
other states – regardless of how successful they might be in their pursuit of these 
interests – they might at the very least forfeit the support of others for a matter close 
to their heart. In 2007, for instance, EU Commission President Barroso warned Poland 
that by blocking an EU deal on the future of the constitutional treaty (now called the 
Lisbon Treaty), the country would risk other members turning their backs on it in 
future budget talks (EurActiv, 2007).
17
  
                                                      
16
 “National interest [is] usually understood to be defined ultimately by state governments.” (Allen, 2002, p. 44) 
17
 And even at the top end of power, with a real possibility to go-it-alone, the United States has acquired the 
reputation of “a ‘lonely superpower’ (Huntington, 1999), alone not only in its preponderant power but also in its 
preferred resolution of many issues” (Voeten, 2004, p. 72). 
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Having said this, it is not always possible to harmonise diverging national interests. The 
more salient a member state perceives the issue at hand the less likely it is to 
compromise with reference to its national interest.  
“If an issue or a vote engages a significant domestic political 
constituency, if national citizens are involved, if trade or 
investment is affected or if long-established foreign policy 
principles are at stake then diplomats have been willing, and 
remain willing and able to break consensus.” (Tonra, 1997, p. 
194) 
 
Experience illustrates that each member state cultivates a number of taboo areas 
which are not subject to compromise (Rummel, 1988, p. 119; Stadler, 1989, p. 14).
 
 
Countries are known to draw red lines and map out no-go zones to that effect. 
Mutually acceptable positions are often arrived at, if at all, only after long and painful 
negotiations (Rummel, 1988, p. 119).
18
 The four red lines drawn by the UK in the 
negotiations about the Lisbon Treaty serve as case in point. UK Foreign Secretary David 
Miliband insisted that only after “Britain had secured concessions in four “red line” 
policy areas during negotiations over the new pact”(EU Business, 2008), was a 
referendum no longer necessary. As outlined earlier in this chapter, however, not 
every time a member state proclaims that under no circumstances will it overstep its 
“red lines” does it intend to do so; rather they simply may be part of a bargaining tactic 
(see section 3.1.4 for a discussion on bargaining tactics). 
 
Traditionally, political spheres have been divided into low politics and high politics. To 
this end, analysts “have tended to assume a distinction between external economic 
                                                      
18
 For the purpose of the thesis, it suffices to acknowledge that a) states have preferences and b) these policy 
preferences are heterogeneous. It is of no concern to this study, how these preferences emerge.  
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relations as ‘low politics’ (‘external relations’ for short) and more traditional politico-
diplomatic activities as ‘high politics’ (or ‘foreign policy’)” (Morgan, 1973).  By using 
these terms, it was implied that diplomacy was more important than ‘mere’ economic 
relations (Allen, 2002, p. 43; Keohane & Nye, 1971; Waltz, 1993). The reason for that is 
two-fold. First, low politics issues tend to be considered less salient for the survival of 
the nation state and therefore less controversial among participants. This means 
consensus can be reached fairly easily. Second, some low politics issues, for instance 
externalities stemming from pollution and global warming are actually more 
successfully dealt with collectively. However, it is argued here that the matter of issue 
salience must be considered in a more nuanced manner, since “state preferences are 
neither fixed nor uniform: they may vary within the same state across time and issues” 
(Schimmelfennig, 2004). That is to say, what is trident for the UK might be fisheries for 
Sweden and a Green party in power can be expected to have different views on certain 
issues than, say, a Christian Democrat party. As will become evident in the ensuing 
methodological chapter, in this thesis I seek to address this issue and stress the 
nuanced way in which to measures salience. 
 
3.2.2 Institutional Factors (EU Membership) 
Institutional factors emphasise aspects pertaining to EU membership as the driving 
force behind UNGA voting. 
Hypothesis Three: While all EU member states are expected to be susceptible to 
institutionalised vote coordination pressures, member states less dedicated to the EU 
are less likely to exhibit EU majority – oriented voting behaviour than member states 
that are more dedicated to the EU. 
 
A country’s membership in the EU is expected to play an important role with reference 
to its voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly. After all, it is their EU 
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membership which provides the basis for their intent to coordinate their votes. The EU 
consists of a set of “voluntary agreements [and] treaties that have created 
supranational authority structures” (Krasner, 2001, pp. 233, emphasis added). By 
virtue of its “supranational authority structures” (Krasner, 2001, p. 233), the EU can be 
termed a polity.  Because individual member states at one point or another, have 
taken the deliberate choice to join such an elaborate union, it is reasonable to assume 
that they are susceptible to its institutionalised pressures for vote coordination and 
the upholding of common positions in international forums such as the UN (European 
Union, 1992, p. Article 19). 
 
These institutionalised pressures can be divided into informal pressures and formal 
pressures.  Informal pressures (e.g. resolutions which the member states have 
collectively sponsored or co-sponsored) call for the member states to coordinate their 
votes without obliging them to vote in unison.
 
Member states are expected to vote 
cohesively on these, because they already have as a collective endorsed them. Formal 
pressures are embedded in EU legislation and thus “limit definitional ambiguity” (Oye, 
1985, p. 17). Accordingly, if there is a CFSP policy agreed on the same topic as is 
discussed in UNGA, member states are required to uphold the common position in the 
UNGA and thus vote in unison.  
 
Beyond mere EU membership, it also matters how dedicated a member state is to the 
EU. Countries which benefit less from their EU membership (e.g. net beneficiaries of 
the EU budget rather than net contributors), which are less involved in the European 
project (e.g. countries which have opted out of a number of voluntary agreements) 
and which are less enthusiastic about the EU in general can be expected to be less 
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susceptible to coordination pressures and thus less likely to exhibit EU majority – 
oriented voting behaviour, than member states that are more dedicated.  
Hypothesis Four: EU member states are expected to be more susceptible to vote 
coordination pressures, and thus more likely to exhibit EU majority – oriented voting 
behaviour when the increase of collective bargaining power is a tangible objective. 
 
One of the arguments inherent in this thesis is that EU member states intend to work 
together to gain more clout in international affairs. That is to say, they come together 
to coordinate their otherwise individually cast votes in the United Nations General 
Assembly so that, by speaking with one voice, they may  “increase the collective 
bargaining power of the area vis-à-vis other international actors”(also see Jorgensen, 
1997, p. 95; P. C. Schmitter, 1969, p. 165). In this regard, Frieden (2004) highlights an 
expectation or hope among many proponents of European integration that “a single 
Europe would speak with more authority – and more influence – in the international 
arena” (p. 262). This notion is further summarised appropriately by the spirited words 
of a 1992 French pro-TEU campaign ad: “Let’s unite. And the world will listen to us.”
19
 
(Meunier, 2000, p. 103) Member states perceive that by acting together they carry 
more weight externally than when acting separately (Ginsberg, 1999, p. 483).  There is 
a widespread sensitivity that without much internal coherence, there is little external 
clout (Jorgensen, 1997, p. 95; Van Den Broek, 1996). 
 
It follows then, that if a concrete chance of increasing their collective bargaining power 
presents itself, EU member states should be more susceptible to vote coordination 
pressures. But how would they know if such a chance presented itself? EU member 
states are in possession of high quality information on the projected voting behaviour, 
                                                      
19
 “Qu’on s’unisse. Et le monde nous ecoutera.” September 1992; Meunier’s translation. 
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not only of their fellow EU members, but also as concerns the wider UN membership. 
This is the case for three reasons. One, many of the resolutions put to the vote are so-
called repeat resolutions.
20
 Previous voting behaviour with reference to those 
resolutions is a very good indicator of present and future voting behaviour. Two, some 
countries, such as the United States lobby for votes they perceive as important. The US 
subsequently publishes a list of these resolutions on the State Department website (US 
Department of State, 2008). Three, EU member states are in talks with the wider UN 
membership as regards voting.  
 
Before moving on to hypothesis five, at this point I want to briefly discuss the notion of 
agenda setting and how it relates to the analysis of EU vote coordination and EU vote 
cohesion inside the UNGA. Each time the EU member states collectively sponsor a 
draft resolution, they  jointly act as agenda setter - “by controlling what comes to the 
floor” (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2009, p. 823). In this circumstance, even a highly 
heterogeneous group may be able to vote in unison, as long as its members are able to 
reconcile their heterogeneous preferences beforehand and are able to collectively 
agree on a draft resolution. The ability to set the agenda thus “plays an important role 
in determining the level of vote cohesion (Kissack, 2007, p. 9). Even so, agenda setting 
is only marginally relevant for a study of EU voting behaviour inside the UNGA. I shall 
describe the way in which the UNGA agenda is shaped in more detail in chapter 4. 
Looking ahead though, neither EU member states nor Western states more generally 
act as predominant agenda setters in the General Assembly. In fact the Western states 
                                                      
20
 The concept of ‘repeat resolution’ is explained in detail in chapter 5. For the purpose of the discussion 
in the present chapter, it shall suffice to say that repeat resolutions are resolutions that recur in the 
course of multiple UNGA sessions.  
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tend to occupy a rather reactive position inside the General Assembly where they are 
left responding to third world demands rather than realising own political ideas 
(Stadler, 1989, p. 3). 
 
3.2.3 External Factors (Transatlantic Relationship) 
External factors emphasise outside factors as the driving force behind UNGA voting. 
 
Hypothesis Five: In instances of transatlantic divergence inside the United Nations 
General Assembly, disagreement between the EU member states increases and 
member states that foster closer ties with the US are less susceptible to EU vote 
coordination pressure. 
 
This hypothesis is rooted in the assumption that external factors may in fact exert any 
influence on a country’s voting behaviour inside the General Assembly. This 
assumption is supported by McGowan and Shapiro (1973) who suggest that, due to the 
interactive nature of the international system, the foreign policy output of one actor 
(country) is inter alia influenced by “other nation’s policies” (p. 41). And Rosenau 
(1966) furthermore acknowledges that “the external world impinges ever more 
pervasively on the life of national societies” and speaks of the “growing 
interdependence of national political systems” (Rosenau, 1966, p. 63). And because of 
this interdependence, Hanrieder (1967) suggests that policy is made not only in 
response to “domestic impulses” but also in response to “international restraints” 
(Hanrieder, 1967, p. 980).  He “highlights the challenges and opportunities of the 
external environment in which the actor seeks to realize his objectives” (Hanrieder, 
1967, p. 979).  
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External factors may refer to global or regional events of a certain magnitude (e.g. 
war), or they may refer to relationships between actors/states. The focus here is on 
the latter group, which can further be divided into multilateral relationships and 
bilateral relationships. As regards multilateral relationships, a number of formal and 
informal alliances have emerged inside the UN. Formal alliances include the OSCE 
Minsk Group.
21
 Less formal alliances inside the UNGA are the regional and politically 
affiliated groups.
22
 In what follows, I shall take a closer look at bilateral relationships. 
 
Relationships may be built on affinity.  Kissack (2007) highlights that 
“states remain part of other networks of states based on 
shared history, language, culture, geography or political 
similarities. These include Spain’s links with Latin America, 
Britain and France’s links to the Anglophone and Francophone 
worlds respectively, and Denmark’s to the Nordic group of 
states (Manners & Whitman, 2000)” (pp. 1-2). 
 
In addition to affinity (or instead of affinity), power or status in the international arena 
tends to have some magnetism as well.  Consider to this effect the bipolar Cold-war 
period, where both the USA and the Soviet Union (USSR) accumulated their share of 
allies. Following the demise of the bipolar international system, several potentially 
important players have emerged. While there are a number of ways to identify these 
‘most important states’ in the international system – some of which would probably 
include India, Pakistan, Brazil and Japan – the most conventional way is to focus on the 
member states of the United Nations Security Council.
23
 Beyond the two EU member 
                                                      
21
 The OSCE Minsk Group regularly makes statements inside the UNGA, regarding the Caucasus conflict. It is co-
chaired by France, Russia and the United States. The following member states also participate in the group:  
Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
22
 These are discussed further in chapter 5.  
23
 Interestingly enough, amongst others, Japan, India and Brazil all have been lobbying to become permanent 
Security Council members. 
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states France and the UK, that includes China, Russia and the US.  Having said this, the 
US – by most measures – remains the most powerful actor in the international arena.  
Of the post-Cold War UNSC members, it uses its veto power most frequently (Global 
Policy Forum, 2008). It is therefore reasonable to assume that US positions command a 
certain level of attention in international organisations.
24
   
 
In addition to US power, the transatlantic relationship can claim to be built on affinity 
as well. It is generally seen as politically and economically the most important 
relationship worldwide.  In political terms, the transatlantic partners share by and large 
the same vision of democracy, liberty, freedom and rule of law. In economic terms, the 
EU and the US are each others’ main trading partners and colossal trade flows amount 
to nearly two billion Euros per day (European Union, 2008a). Within this framework, 
the transatlantic bilateral economic relationship is both highly advanced and 
considerably balanced. The profoundness of the transatlantic relationship is 
furthermore underlined by its historic ties. Historically, the modern transatlantic 
relationship emerged as a need-based alliance immediately following World War II.  It 
was initiated by the US and welcomed by the Europeans to contain the Soviet Union as 
well as to rebuild the European and expand the American economies (Cameron, 2002; 
Lundestad, 1986). And because the US is universally recognised as important player 
and also considered a genuine transatlantic partner, it is conceivable that the US has 
the most potential to be an influential actor as regards the voting behaviour of the EU 
member states in the UNGA.
 25
   
 
                                                      
24
 To illustrate,  a group of scholars has analysed the UNGA voting behaviour of US aid recipients with reference to 
US UNGA votes (e.g. Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2006; Wang, 1999; Wittkopf, 1973). 
25
 While the multivariate analysis focuses on the US only, Russia and China, the other two UNSC 
members that are not also EU members, are included in the descriptive voting pattern analysis. 
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This hypothesis further presumes a certain degree of transatlantic voting divergence in 
the UNGA. Transatlantic voting divergence is defined as the difference between the 
vote cast by the US on the one side and the EU majority position on the other side. 
Given that a moment ago I highlighted the kinship between the transatlantic partners, 
transatlantic voting divergence at the UNGA seemingly comes as a surprise. Since the 
transatlantic partners are democracies and market economies, it is expected that they 
“vote with each other in issues concerning principles of political and economic 
liberalism” (Voeten 2000, 213). As members of the Kantian pacific union, they should 
furthermore “agree on issues that concern human and political rights” (Voeten 2000, 
190). In fact, transatlantic vote divergence draws on the same ideas about preference 
heterogeneity that explains divergent preferences between the European member 
states (see earlier in this chapter). That is to say, the Kantian liberal internationalism 
thesis that underlies Michael W. Doyle’s interpretation of the democratic peace does 
not imply that democracies would generally follow a specific kind of foreign policy on 
all issues (Doyle, 1983). Therefore, at second glance, transatlantic divergence at the 
UNGA is not altogether that surprising anymore. Kagan (2003) suggests that the 
transatlantic partners see the world with different eyes, which should reflect in their 
voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly.  
 
Hence, assuming that external factors have an impact on a country’s voting behaviour, 
further assuming that the US is such a factor for EU member states, for instances of 
transatlantic divergence, the hypothesis plays out as follows. As discussed previously, 
EU member states are under pressure from their fellow EU members to successfully 
coordinate their votes inside the General Assembly. In those instances then, where the 
US (perceived as powerful and genuine partner) and the member state both diverge 
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from the EU majority position, countries which foster closer ties with the US in 
economic, political or cultural terms are expected to be less susceptible to the EU vote 
coordination pressure and therefore less likely to engage in EU-consensus oriented 
voting behaviour.  
 
3.3 Operational Limitation 
The hypotheses in the previous section were developed for those resolutions for which 
national policy preferences diverge from the EU majority position; in other words for 
divisive resolutions. In theoretical terms this is a very useful distinction to make, as it 
aids the process of understanding member state voting behaviour in instances in which 
they do not agree with the EU majority. In other words, it helps understanding when 
member states engage in EU majority – oriented voting behaviour, thereby overriding 
their national policy preferences.  Nevertheless, without reliable data on national 
policy preference, it is exceptionally difficult to test this empirically.  The result is an 
operational limitation, which in the present section I seek to explain in more detail 
before suggesting ways in which to move beyond it. 
 
3.3.1 Nature of the Operational Limitation 
Addressing the question of EU voting behaviour in the UNGA is complex in nature.  
While it is certainly easy to ascertain whether or not EU member states vote in an 
identical manner, without reliable data on national policy preference, the question of 
why they do vote in an identical fashion, if they do so, is more difficult to answer. 
Member states may vote in unison because they share identical policy preferences or 
they may vote in unison despite the fact that they do not share identical policy 
preferences (See for example Lijphart, 1963, p. 904; MacRae, 1954, p. 192; Suganami, 
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1999, p. 6). While the latter would allow some indication as to intent, the former 
illustrates a mere consonance of preferences. To underline the dilemma, I borrow a 
phrase from Krehbiel (1993) who sees similar problems emerging in the area of 
partisan voting in legislations: 
“In casting apparently partisan votes, do individual legislators 
vote with fellow party members in spite of their disagreement 
about the policy in question, or do they vote with fellow party 
members because of their agreement about the policy 
question? In the former case, … partisan behavior may well 
result in a collective choice that differs from that which would 
occur in the absence of partisan behavior. In the latter case, 
however, … the apparent explanatory power of the variable, 
party, may be attributed solely to its being a good measure of 
preference.” (1993, pp. 238`, italics in original) 
 
The dilemma is illustrated with help of Figure 3.1. To simplify the matter, let us assume 
that a country’s national preference is either divergent from the EU majority position 
or it is identical to the EU majority position. Let us further assume that a country casts 
its vote either with the EU majority or contrary to the EU majority. A country that 
votes with the EU majority  (row 1), can do so either in instances in which its national 
policy preference is divergent from the EU majority  or in instances in which its 
national preference is identical to the EU majority. Without reliable data about 
national policy preferences, however, a vote with the EU majority because of 
agreement or despite disagreement becomes observationally equivalent.  
 
Shifting the attention to row 2, a country that votes contrary to the EU majority , can 
do so either in instances in which its national preferences is divergent from the EU 
majority  or in instances in which its national preference is identical to the EU majority 
position. Having said that, it would not be rational for a country to vote against the EU 
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majority position in instances in which its national policy preference is identical to that 
of the EU majority. In instances in which a country votes as part of a minority or even 
in isolation, it is reasonable to assume that its national policy preference does not 
coincide with the position held by the majority of the EU member states. 
 
Observable Voting Patterns  
  National Policy 
Preference same as 
EU majority   
National Policy 
Preference differs 
from EU majority  
Vote with EU 
majority  
Observationally equivalent 
Vote against EU 
majority  
Not rational 
  
 
Figure 3.1: Observable Voting Patterns 
 
While the theoretical focus of this study spans across column 2, due to the 
observational equivalence illustrated in row 1, the operational focus of the voting 
pattern analysis is reduced to the lower right cell, and thus shifted to instances of vote 
defection (Dedring, 2004). 
 
3.3.2 Response to the Operational Limitation 
To reiterate, the empirical analysis conducted in the present thesis, consists of a 
quantitative voting pattern analysis on the one hand and a qualitative analysis of the 
vote coordination process that takes place between the member states prior to the 
roll-call vote on the other hand. The quantitative voting pattern analysis is further 
divided into a system-level analysis and into an individual-level analysis.  As I shall 
illustrate in the following paragraphs, each individual analysis is affected differently by 
the operational limitation. 
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Quantitative Voting Pattern Analysis 
As illustrated in Table 3.1., the operational focus of the voting pattern analysis is 
reduced to the lower right cell, and thus shifted from instances of EU majority – 
oriented voting to instances of vote defection. Effectively that means that, instead of 
studying instances in which countries vote with the EU majority by overriding their 
national policy preference, the emphasis is on instances in which they do not.  EU 
majority – oriented voting behaviour and vote defection are diametrically opposed. 
The question that needs asking then is: How does focusing on vote defection, rather 
than on EU majority – oriented voting behaviour affect the authority of the finding? Or 
put differently: How does not knowing the national policy preference affect the 
authority of the finding? 
 
Here it is useful to make a distinction between the system-level analysis and the 
individual-level analysis, as they are affected differently by this limitation. On both 
levels, vote defections (voting against the EU majority) are juxtaposed with vote 
convergence (voting with the EU majority). With reference to vote convergence, 
however, the individual-level analysis further distinguishes between EU majority – 
oriented voting behaviour (voting with the EU majority despite disagreement) and 
voting behaviour reflecting genuine agreement with the EU majority position. Only 
analyses that focus on EU majority – oriented voting behaviour, rather than on vote 
defection are affected by this operational limitation.  
 
The focus of the system-level analysis is already on vote defections – whether EU 
cohesion levels increase or decrease is directly linked to a decrease in vote defection 
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or an increase in vote defection respectively. Hence, this is not a problem for the 
system-level analysis. The individual-level analysis on the other hand is affected. 
Surprisingly, however, the impact of shifting the focus from EU-consensus oriented 
votes to vote defections appears to be rather marginal. Having said this, one must 
distinguish between factors, such as power or EU dedication, that are applicable to 
individual actors (i.e. the member states) and factors, such as issue salience, which is 
applicable to resolutions (as well as actors). With reference to the former it can be said 
that if the basic rationale holds that certain factors will leave countries more likely (less 
likely) to engage in EU majority  voting behaviour, it automatically implies that the 
same factors will leave these  countries  less likely (more likely) to defect from the EU 
majority  position.  For instance, if, as I hypothesise, more powerful countries are less 
likely to engage in EU majority – oriented voting behaviour, that implies that they are 
more likely to defect from the EU majority  position. Similarly, if, as I hypothesise, 
countries that are less susceptible to institutional pressures (i.e. less dedicated to the 
EU) are less likely to engage in EU majority – oriented voting behaviour that implies 
that they are more likely to defect from the EU majority position.  
 
The situation is more complicated for resolutions where the factors are also applicable 
to the resolution.  For those resolutions, knowing whether or not a member state is in 
agreement with the EU majority position is crucial in setting out the expected 
observation. For instance, I may hypothesise that countries are less likely to engage in 
EU majority – oriented voting behaviour the more important they perceive the issue at 
hand to be.
26
 In reality, that actually depends on whether or not they agree with the 
                                                      
26
 Data for issue salience is derived from the Manifesto Dataset. The data specifically focuses on how 
important a country perceives an issue, but not exactly where it stands on that issue.  
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EU majority position. Only in instances in which their national policy preference 
diverges from the EU majority position, becomes vote defection more likely the more 
salient an issue is perceived. In instances in which their national policy preference is 
identical to the EU majority position, identical voting is expected irrespective of how 
salient the issue is perceived. Not knowing a country’s national policy preference 
makes any prognosis uncertain. Having said this, I still opt to include the variable 
salience in the analysis simply to test whether or not the variable salience produces 
statistically significant and consistent results. If it does, one might be able to take this 
as encouragement for further investigation.  
 
Qualitative Analysis of Vote Coordination Process 
Because of the categorical shift between theory and operationalisation, from EU 
majority – oriented voting behaviour to vote defections, one might wonder why not 
set up the hypothesis in a way so as to test for vote defection, rather than EU majority 
– oriented voting behaviour. The decision to set up the hypothesis with an emphasis 
on EU majority – oriented voting behaviour thus warrants further explanation. 
Although, as just discussed, a lack of EU majority – oriented voting behaviour implies 
vote defection; and vice versa, there is a subtle difference between the two concepts 
that is worth drawing out. Vote defection simply illustrates when a country acts 
according to its national policy preference – something that is to be expected. EU 
majority – oriented voting illustrates when a country overrides its heterogeneous 
national policy preference in order to vote with the group, which is not necessarily 
expected and thus analytically more interesting. And while the quantitative voting 
pattern analysis fails to draw out the difference and in fact cannot tell if any of the EU 
member states ever exhibit EU majority – oriented voting behaviour, the qualitative 
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analysis is able to draw out the difference. To this end, it is able to illustrate whether 
the EU as a whole can find agreement even in divisive issue areas. By conducting a 
qualitative analysis of the vote coordination process that takes place prior to each roll-
call vote (see chapter 7) it is possible to shed some light on whether or not EU member 
states vote with the EU despite of divergent national foreign policy preferences. 
27
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In chapter 3, I discussed the conceptional underpinnings of the thesis. To this end, I 
established in section 3.1. that despite their right to vote according to their 
heterogeneous national policy preferences in the United Nations General Assembly, 
EU member states find themselves under constant pressure to coordinate their votes 
so that by speaking  with a single voice in the forum, they may increase their collective 
bargaining power. I further elaborated in section 3.2. that the key to understanding 
their subsequent voting behaviour rests upon understanding how the EU member 
states respond to whatever coordination pressures they are exposed to.  For those 
resolutions for which national policy preferences diverge from the EU majority position 
each EU member state experiences a conflict of interest and must find a way to 
reconcile its national policy preference with the objective of casting a unified vote. I 
hypothesised that the balance a member state strikes between the two generally 
depends on the following aspects – how powerful it is, how important it views the 
issue at hand, how it views its relationship with the EU and how it views its relationship 
with the US as external factor. I furthermore argued that the balance tips in favour of 
                                                      
27
 At this point, the attentive observer must have noticed that although the coordination process between the 
member states takes place prior to the roll-call voting, the set-up of this project is such that it does not reflect the 
chronological order. This is because the analytical focus rests on the quantitative analysis while the qualitative case-
study subsequently serves to mitigate the operational limitation inherent in the quantitative analysis. 
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vote cohesion, if by working together the EU member states see a concrete possibility 
at taking a leadership position. In other words, the balance tips in favour of vote 
cohesion when increasing the collective bargaining power becomes a tangible 
objective. The lack of reliable data on national policy preference necessitated a 
discussion of how this operational limitation is likely to affect the validity of the 
expected findings for the empirical analysis. This discussion took place in section 3.3., 
where I argued that any of the quantitative findings, while limited, would still be valid. 
I further suggested seeking to shed more light on the issue by means of a qualitative 
analysis presented in chapter 7.  In chapter 4 I seek to discuss aspects of methodology 
and operationalisation before moving on to the empirical analysis in Part III. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND 
OPERATIONALISATION 
 
As illustrated in the introductory chapters, this thesis, in the broadest sense, is 
interested in factors which determine whether or not EU member states speak with a 
single voice in international affairs. In the narrowest sense then, I suggest to 
operationalise it as a study of EU voting behaviour in the United Nations General 
Assembly. I discussed the conceptional underpinnings of this study in chapter 3. 
Crucially, whilst the hypotheses have been set up with a focus on EU majority – 
oriented voting behaviour, due to the operational limitation discussed in chapter 3, 
with reference to the quantitative voting pattern analysis, the focus has to be moved 
towards vote defections. Before putting the hypotheses to the test in the ensuing 
empirical chapters, it is the objective of the present chapter to lay out the 
methodological framework for the analysis and to discuss aspects pertaining to the 
operationalisation of the study. To this end, I shall discuss the analytical framework in 
more detail in section 4.1 before thrashing out variable measurement in section 4.2. I 
shall look into methodological aspects in section 4.3 and a brief conclusion to the 
chapter will be provided in section 4.4.  
 
4.1 The UNGA as Analytical Framework  
In this section, I seek to make the case for the United Nations General Assembly as 
suitable framework of analysis by carefully weighing its advantages against its 
limitations. I shall subsequently discuss in more practical terms how the framework is 
being used respectively for the quantitative and the qualitative analysis.  
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4.1.1 Advantages and Limitations of the Framework 
Naturally, every framework of analysis contains advantages and limitations and the 
usefulness of discussing EU voting behaviour inside the United Nations General 
Assembly might not seem immediately obvious. However, there are a number of 
compelling reasons – conceptional reasons as well as methodological reasons – for 
selecting this framework. These are outlined below, along with a discussion of any 
potential limitations.  
 
Thanks to its “global purview” (Fasulo, 2004, p. 68), the United Nations General 
Assembly is considered the  “pre-eminent forum of global political discussions” 
(Wouters, 2001, p. 378). It is the forum in which “the international community [is] 
called on to give a political judgement” (Smouts, 2000, p. 37) on a wide-ranging set of 
issues, including “social and economic matters, human rights and humanitarian issues, 
the environment, development of international law and security and disarmament 
issues” (Paasivirta & Porter, 2006, p. 36). The resulting resolutions illustrate a genuine 
(although perhaps misguided) attempt “to find long-term solutions to persistent global 
problems” (Paasivirta & Porter, 2006, p. 36). Analysing EU vote coordination inside the 
UNGA hence provides a useful proxy for analysing EU coordination on the international 
stage more generally. It thus offers the possibility to gain some  insight into the ability 
and willingness of the EU member states to speak with a single voice (Solana, 2002) on 
a broad array of foreign affairs  issues.  
 
Nevertheless, UNGA’s relevance as international forum for political discussions has 
been called into question on more than one occasion. For instance, it has been pointed 
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out that: “The General Assembly is not a world legislature. It has no authority to issue 
mandatory norms. Except for internal governance, budgetary or membership issues, its 
resolutions are mere recommendations, without binding authority.” (Smouts, 2000, p. 
51) To this end, the forum has been described as a “merely passive arena for political 
interaction” (Dixon, 1981, p. 47) with its voting depicted as “largely symbolic” (Voeten, 
2000, p. 185). While this argument stands largely undisputed, I maintain that for the 
purpose of the present thesis, resolution relevance is only of secondary importance. 
Primarily in this study, UNGA votes are used as a vehicle for understanding EU 
cohesion. How valuable or useful UNGA resolutions are in and of themselves is 
inconsequential, as long as they are generally accepted as manifestations of foreign 
policy stances (Holmes, Rees, & Whelan, 1992, p. 161) and as such can be seen as 
“indicators [that] help […] understand the underlying dynamics of foreign policy 
preferences” (Johansson-Nogues, 2004, p. 71). And although critics might question 
what incentives EU member states have to vote in unison when it does not matter, the 
counter argument would obviously be that, given their intent to speak with a single 
voice in international affairs, what reason would they have not to vote together and 
show a united front for precisely that reason? After all they are casting their votes in a 
forum “where the value in making choices is most modest” (Gartzke, 2006, p. 2). 
 
 
It almost goes without saying that UNSC discussions are vastly more topical and 
consequential. Nevertheless, using UNSC votes for the analysis would be operationally 
forbidding since only the UK and France hold permanent membership in the UNSC and 
on average less than two other EU member states sit on the UNSC at any given point 
for the time period under consideration (United Nations, 1992-2004a). More to the 
point, the United Nations General Assembly is an exceptionally versatile framework of 
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analysis. It readily avails itself to quantitative voting pattern analysis on the one hand 
and in-depth analysis of the vote-coordination process that takes place prior to the 
roll-call voting on the other hand. The quantitative voting pattern analysis can further 
be divided into system-level analysis and individual-level analysis. With regards to the 
former, the focus is on scrutinising the variations in overall EU cohesion levels. With 
regards to the latter, the focus is on the voting behaviour of the individual EU member 
states; more precisely the focus is on their vote defection from the EU majority 
position. Finally, the qualitative analysis benefits from the possibility to carry out 
research interviews with experts at the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of 
the individual EU member states in New York. For the purpose of this project, 
quantitative and qualitative analysis complement each other well, since the “analysis 
of the voting pattern of EU Member States in the UN perhaps provides us with the 
most reliable quantified evidence” of EU vote coordination (Paasivirta & Porter, 2006, 
p. 45). By comparison, most CFSP decisions in Brussels are reached by unanimity. Even 
with the option of ‘constructive abstention’, which essentially permits a member state 
to abstain from a CFSP vote in the Council without blocking a unanimous decision, this 
does not leave much room for analysing the voting behaviour of individual EU member 
states, especially since Council deliberations are generally not made public (European 
Union, 2004a). 
 
This particular framework of analysis furthermore allows for the inclusion of the 
transatlantic angle into the study in a straight-forward fashion. The UNGA is the only 
forum in which the US and the member states of the EU, among others, deliberate and 
vote on a regular basis on a broad range of issues concerning the international 
community (Voeten, 2000, pp. 185, 186). Moreover, the votes cast in the UNGA are all 
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in response to the same question for all UN members. This circumstance makes 
therefore a direct comparison of foreign policy positions between the transatlantic 
partners possible without having to standardise the data. Finally, with the  focus of the 
thesis on the fifteen ‘old members’ of the European Union, it makes for a useful 
starting point to systematically compare the voting patterns of “old Europe” (CNN, 
2003) with those of the newly enlarged Europe. 
 
4.1.2 UNGA Workings 
The member states of the United Nations usually meet during their annual regular 
sessions, which begin in mid-September and last until right before Christmas (United 
Nations, 2006). Since 1978 these annual sessions also have “resumed every year for at 
least one day in the spring or early summer” (J. Peterson, 2006, p. 57). In fact: 
“In 1991, the General Assembly decided that its 46
th
 session 
would go up until the eve of the opening of the 47
th
! Since 
then, the GA has fallen into the habit of meeting frequently 
between January and September.” (Smouts, 2000, p. 35) 
 
Furthermore, as specified in chapter IV, Article 20 of the UN Charter, special sessions 
may be convened on request of the Security Council or a majority of the member 
states. Mostly, these “special sessions are called by decisions made at an earlier 
regular assembly session” (J. Peterson, 2006, p. 57; Smouts, 2000, p. 35). Finally, 
emergency special sessions may be called within 24 hours at a request of the Security 
Council on the vote of any nine members of the Security Council, or by a majority of 
the United Nations members, or by one member if the majority of members concurs 
(United Nations, 1945). They are convened under the procedures for rapid action 
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established by the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950 (J. Peterson, 2006, p. 57; 
Smouts, 2000, p. 35).
28
 
 
Up from “46 separate agenda items at the first session in 1946” (Smouts, 2000, p. 35), 
“the agenda of the annual General Assembly session now includes more than 150 
items” (Baehr & Gordenker, 2005, p. 24). Topics comprise “international law, human 
rights, and all forms of international social, economic, cultural, and educational 
cooperation” (Fasulo, 2004, pp. 68-69). Six different main committees have been 
established to better deal with the vastness of issues coming before the UNGA. These 
main committees are the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First 
Committee), the Economic and Finance Committee (Second Committee), the Social, 
Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee (Third Committee), the Special Political and 
Decolonisation Committee (Fourth Committee), the Administrative and Budgetary 
Committee (Fifth Committee) and the Legal Committee (Sixth Committee). “These 
committees are ‘committees of the whole’”, that is to say “exact reproductions of the 
plenary Assembly” (Smouts, 2000, p. 36). Each main committee starts work on issues 
within its remit at the beginning of the annual session around 28 September (J. 
Peterson, 2006, p. 59). 
 
The General Committee, comprised of the President of the Assembly and the chairmen 
of the six main committee, is tasked with considering provisional agenda items, put 
forward by UN member states (M. J. Peterson, 1986, p. 266), and with deciding 
whether or not they should be included on the UNGA agenda (United Nations, 2009). 
                                                      
28
 To put these into context: Between 1947 and 1998 twenty special sessions were held; and between 
1956 and 1997 ten emergency special sessions were held  (Smouts, 2000, p. 35). 
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And because its members are selected by a formula that accounts for the different 
regions of the world in a proportional manner, Third World countries make up the 
majority of the Committee. As de facto agenda setter, the Committee has the power to 
deny provisional agenda items. Yet, “it has never fully exploited any of these powers” 
and “has seldom used its power to screen the agenda to keep items off” (M. J. 
Peterson, 1986, p. 268).  
 
Issues are generally put forward in forms of draft resolutions and are sponsored 
directly by a delegation and can be co-sponsored by multiple other delegations. After 
the relevant committee has duly considered its content, the draft document is 
submitted to the plenary assembly for adoption. Some resolutions are submitted for 
adoption without references to any of the main committees. UNGA decision-making is 
governed formally by a “two-tier system” (Fasulo, 2004, p. 69), where resolutions are 
passed either by a two third majority or by a simple majority. Chapter IV, Article 18 of 
the UN Charter stipulates which matters are to be decided by a two third majority: 
“Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions 
shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present 
and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations 
with respect to the maintenance of international peace and 
security, the election of the non-permanent members of the 
Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic 
and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship 
Council in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of Article 86, the 
admission of new Members to the United Nations, the 
suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the 
expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of 
the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.” (United 
Nations, 1945: Chapter IV`, Art. 18`, 2)  
 
Furthermore, “resolutions outside the remit of Article 18 including the determination 
of putting additional resolutions into the remit of Article 18, shall be decided  by a 
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simple majority of the members present and voting” (United Nations, 1945: Chapter 
IV`, Art 18`, 3). Nevertheless, not all resolutions are put forward to a vote in the UNGA. 
If, as often happens, “the leadership can establish a consensus on a given matter, a 
formal vote may not even be needed” (Fasulo, 2004, p. 69).  It must be noted, 
however, that this is an informal arrangement between the UN member states; and 
any one member state can request a vote. The percentage of resolutions put to a vote 
varies from year to year. By and large, over the years the proportion of resolutions put 
forward to a vote has decreased from around 80% in the early days of the United 
Nations to roughly 20% now (Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999, p. 19; Marin-Bosch, 1998). 
 
Aspects Pertaining to the Quantitative Voting Pattern Analysis 
In this thesis, I am particularly interested in the 12 year time period between 1992 and 
2004. This marks the period between the signing of the Treaty of the European Union 
and the Union’s Eastern enlargement. As explained in the previous section, the annual 
sessions of the United Nations General Assembly start in September and run until the 
following summer. That is to say, UNGA sessions are not synonymous with calendar 
years. For instance, the 47
th
 session commences in September 1992 and runs until the 
following summer and the 58
th
 session commences in September 2003 and runs until 
the following summer. For the purpose of this project then, I shall either refer to the 
session, or to the year in which the session commences (See codebook Voeten & 
Merdzanovic, 2002). The countries included in the study are listed in Table 4.1. These 
are the 12 EU member states between 1992 and 1995 and the 15 EU member states 
from 1995 onwards. 
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EU Member State Year of Accession to the EU 
Austria 1995 
Belgium 1957 
Denmark 1973 
Finland 1995 
France 1957 
Germany 1957 
Greece 1981 
Ireland 1973 
Italy 1957 
Luxembourg 1957 
Netherlands 1957 
Portugal 1986 
Spain 1986 
Sweden 1995 
UK 1973 
 
Table 4.1: List of EU Member States and Accession Year 
 
The variable of interest is EU majority – oriented voting behaviour, an occurrence that 
takes places each time a member state casts its vote with the EU majority despite 
holding a divergent national policy preference.  Due to the lack of sufficiently 
quantifiable data for national policy preferences, however, for the purpose of the 
quantitative analysis this variable translates into vote defection, an occurrence which 
takes place each time a member state does not cast its vote with the EU majority  
when holding a divergent national policy position. In essence then the difference 
between vote defection and EU majority – oriented voting behaviour is the decision a 
country takes when its national policy preference diverges from the EU majority 
position. I examine vote defections by means of voting pattern analysis. As discussed 
earlier already, the UNGA framework avails itself to both system-level voting pattern 
analysis and individual-level voting pattern analysis. The system-level analysis focuses 
on the variation in overall EU cohesion levels, while the individual-level analysis 
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explores the voting behaviour of the individual member states and investigates to 
what extent they contribute to the EU majority  or alternatively to what extent they 
defect from the EU majority .  
 
The unit of analysis are the 829 resolutions subject to UNGA roll-call voting between 
1992 and 2004 (see table 4.2). Of course, resolutions are not the only type of 
document emanating from the UNGA. There are also decisions and motions. 
Resolutions, however, are the main focus of this study because unlike decisions, which 
generally deal with non-substantive matters such as elections, appointments, the time 
and place of meetings and the taking note of reports, resolutions are substantive in 
nature. The data has been compiled by using first and foremost the UN Index to 
Proceedings 1992 until 2004 (United Nations, 1987-2005). Records which were not 
accessible through this source, such as voting records for Germany for the 47
th
, 48
th
 
and 49
th
 session, were retrieved from the General Assembly Official Records for those 
years (United Nations, 1992-2004b).
29
 These are in fact verbatim records of individual 
meetings and include information about all roll-call proceedings. Voting records of 
countries other than the EU member states and voting records outside of the time 
period under consideration have been obtained from a dataset made available by 
Voeten and Merdzanovic (2002). For some resolutions amendments or individual 
paragraphs are put to the vote. These are included in this study.  
 
For each of the 829 resolutions that are put to a vote, member states have the 
possibility to vote “yes” when in favour of the resolution, or “no” when in opposition 
                                                      
29
 Other studies record data for German roll-call voting as missing for the 47
th
, 48
th
 and 49
th
 session  (e.g.Laatikainen 
& Smith, 2006). 
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to the resolution. Member states can also “abstain” from voting. Alternatively, 
member states may choose not to participate in the voting altogether. Only affirmative 
or negative votes are counted towards the passing of a resolution (United Nations, 
2006, pp. 23, Rule 86). 
 
The difference between absenteeism and abstentions is the physical presence at the 
General Assembly. In order for a country to abstain from voting, it must be present at 
the General Assembly. Absenteeism on the other hand occurs when a member state 
either involuntarily or deliberately fails to attend the UNGA roll-call voting altogether. 
In fact, many times particularly smaller delegations from poor countries find it difficult 
to consistently occupy a seat in New York, which can lead to involuntary absenteeism 
(Russett, 1966, p. 329). However, absenteeism can also be a deliberate choice by 
means of which a country “intends[s] to demonstrate opposition to the resolution or a 
conviction that the Assembly is overstepping its bounds of its authority in considering 
the issue” (Russett, 1966, p. 329). Sometimes, countries accidentally miss the roll-call 
and officially record its position later on (Russett, 1966, p. 329). 
 
When considering recorded votes, one must decide how to deal with abstentions and 
absenteeism. While abstentions are not counted towards the passing of the resolution 
in question, I have decided to include abstentions in the analysis. Since the focus of the 
thesis is on EU coordination/EU cohesion inside the UNGA, it does in fact not matter 
whether or not the member states vote in the affirmative, the negative or abstain. It 
only matters, whether or not they do so collectively.  
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Dealing with absenteeism is slightly more complicated. It emerges from the data that 
there are several cases where individual EU member states do not participate in the 
voting procedure. At first sight, Greece’s failure to participate in the voting for most of 
the 51
st
 session marks a serious problem. When asked for the reason of this failure to 
participate the “Greek Foreign Ministry [refuted] any complicated political 
disagreement scenarios and attributed this stance to a protracted strike by Greek 
diplomats in December 1996” (Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999, p. 24). This strike, which 
was related to a government debate of the 1997 austerity budget, did not only affect 
Greek diplomats, but also Greek farmers, doctors, civil servants and seamen (CNN 
Reuters, 1996). More interestingly, twice, EU member states collectively refrain from 
participating in the voting procedure, namely in resolutions A/Res/47/59 and 
A/Res/48/80 which deal with the implementation of the Indian Ocean as zone of peace 
and with environmental questions pertaining to Antarctica respectively.  This indicates 
a collective decision by EU member states not to participate in the roll-call vote. 
 
In general, researchers are divided as to how to treat absenteeism in quantitative 
studies. While Russett (1966) treats absenteeism as abstentions, Johansson-Nogues 
(2004) decides not to include any cases where one or several EU members have been 
absent altogether. Finally, Voeten (2000) treats absenteeism as missing data. In this 
research I follow Voeten’s (2000) model.  All instances, in which individual member 
states do not record a vote, are treated as missing data. Since Greece’s extended 
failure to participate is due to domestic political problems (budget discussions), and 
declared wholly unrelated to its position in EU or UN by the Greek government, 
treating those instances as missing data is deemed acceptable. Less acceptable, yet 
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necessary for the sake of consistency is the exclusion of the two resolutions for which 
EU member states collectively fail to take a vote.  
 
Resolutions that are put to a vote tend to pass with a large margin (Marin-Bosch, 1998, 
p. 95). In fact, they rarely fail in the plenary session (Voeten & Merdzanovic, 2002). 
However, should a vote be equally divided, a second vote would be taken within 48 
hours. If that vote were to be equally divided again, the resolution would be regarded 
as rejected (United Nations, 2006, Rule 95(133)). In any case, since the focus of this 
research project is on EU coordination  and vote cohesion inside the United Nations 
General Assembly, whether or not a resolution is passed in the General Assembly is 
only of secondary importance. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, not all resolutions are put to a vote. Some 
resolutions are adopted without a vote. The percentage of resolutions put to a vote 
varies over time. As illustrated in Table 4.2, the 829 roll-call votes analysed here make 
up approximately 21% of all resolutions discussed in the UNGA during the 12 year time 
period under consideration.  
 
Naturally, the decision to exclude the other 78% of resolutions warrants further 
explanation. Excluding resolutions that were adopted without a vote from this analysis 
is justifiable on two grounds. One, the focus of this study is not on explaining how 
much divergence there is, rather the focus of this study is on explaining whatever 
divergence there is. Therefore, the risk of artificially inflating the amount of 
disagreement by only including a small sample of available resolutions seems not a 
relevant concern here.  
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Two, by including all those resolutions that were adopted without a vote, an element 
of speculation would be introduced to the dataset and thus into the analysis. That is so 
for the following reasons. The only point known for certain is that these resolutions 
have not been put to the vote. Beyond that, presuming how individual countries would 
have voted if the resolution had been put to a vote is a matter of mere speculation, as 
a case can be made for all three voting options. The most frequent assumption is that 
in case of a consensus resolution a member state agrees with the resolution and would 
vote in favour of it, if it were put to the vote. The logical extension would then be that 
all EU member states agree with regards to all consensus resolutions and therefore 
perfect EU cohesion would be obtained.  It is also conceivable, however,  that a 
member state without a particular strong desire to make its voice heard (and therefore 
not calling for a vote), could still be minded to abstain from a vote, or vote against the 
resolution if it was put to the vote by another delegation. To justify including 
consensus resolutions in the analysis would require that only one of the three options 
for votes is plausible. While one option may be more plausible than another, none are 
implausible. So, all that is known is that consensus resolutions are adopted without a 
vote – where individual countries stand with regards to them remains subject to 
speculation. On those grounds, consensus resolutions are excluded from the dataset. 
The remaining dataset still leaves considerable amounts of variation in the dependent 
variable (Keohane, King, & Verba, 1994, p. 129). 
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Table 4.2:  Annual Resolutions and Roll-Call Votes  
Annual Resolutions and Roll-call Votes                   
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Session 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 
All 319 358 338 342 318 298 303 341 329 360 351 324 3981 
Roll-Call 73 66 63 69 75 70 61 69 67 67 73 76 829 
% 22.9 18.4 18.6 20.2 23.6 23.5 20.1 20.2 20.4 18.6 20.8 23.5 20.8 
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Aspects Pertaining to the Qualitative Analysis of the Vote 
Coordination Process 
While the quantitative voting pattern analysis is well designed to shed light on the 
occurrences of vote defection, it still falls short of explaining EU majority – oriented 
voting behaviour. That is to say, the quantitative voting pattern analysis is unable to 
provide any insight into whether or not EU member states ever override their 
heterogeneous national policy preference so as to vote with the EU majority. Hence, 
an in-depth case study of the EU vote coordination process that precedes roll-call 
voting may be useful in detecting whether or not countries exhibit any EU majority – 
oriented voting behaviour at all. 
 
With more than 1000 internal meetings annually (Official #13, 13 October 2008), the 
coordination among EU member states at the UN is extensive and highly systematised. 
Rasch (2008) illustrates that between 1995 and 2005 the annual EU coordination 
meetings in New York have increased from 917 meetings in 1995 to 1023 meetings in 
2005. Most of the coordination takes place throughout the autumn with October and 
November usually the busiest months (Rasch, 2008, pp. 62-63). 
 
Member states coordinate at different levels and to different ends. While vote 
coordination makes up an important part of their work, the coordination between the 
EU member states extends beyond mere vote coordination and includes coordination 
of statements and other initiatives. For instance, so-called Article 19 meetings take 
place weekly (Official #19, 27 October 2008). They have their name from the relevant 
Article in the Maastricht Treaty and are used to debrief those EU member states which 
are not members of the United Nations Security Council on what has been discussed at 
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the UNSC.
30
 There are regular meetings at the ambassadorial level to discuss topical 
issues.  
 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this research, I shall restrict my attention to the 
coordination of votes. To deal with the vastness of agenda items placed before them, 
the EU member states have emulated the UNGA main committee system, to facilitate 
their coordination efforts. Correspondingly, First Committee experts deal with military 
issues, Second Committee experts discuss development issues, Third Committee 
experts focus on resolutions pertaining to human rights, Fourth Committee experts 
deal with decolonisation  and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Fifth Committee experts discuss 
budgetary issues and Sixth Committee experts focus on legal questions. The meeting 
schedules vary from Committee to Committee and are linked to the overall GA time 
schedule. Second and Third Committee experts meet most frequently. The Third 
Committee experts even divide themselves into two clusters, so as to manage the 
workload.  The Fourth Committee experts, on the other hand, meet fairly irregularly. 
The First Committee experts first come together in early October, while the Fifth 
Committee experts do not meet before early November. These expert meetings are 
most of the time conducted by the Missions’ First Secretaries. Depending on the 
Mission, this can mean a fairly “seasoned diplomat” (Official #11, 20 November 2008) 
or a “young diplomat” (Official #14, 7 October 2008). The meetings take place at the 
                                                      
30
 In accordance with Article 24(3), “Member States represented in international organisations or international 
conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the other Member States and the High 
Representative informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which are also members of the United 
Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States and the High Representative fully 
informed.” (European Union, 1992, 19 (2))  
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offices of the Delegation of the European Commission to the United Nations, which is 
located in walking distance to the UN building and most of the Permanent Missions.  
 
The country holding the EU presidency chairs the meetings. It is thus also responsible 
for disseminating all relevant documents and meeting times. It does so by means of 
various communication systems, including NYCE (New York Collaboration 
Environment).  
“NYCE allows users to share information, organize meetings 
and to collaborate on documents providing to the users the 
ability to work between different workgroups. This system is 
destined to become the primary medium in which the 
documents and information are communicated among the 
NYLO personnel and the members of the Permanent 
Representations in the UN of the EU Member States.” (Mermig, 
2008) 
 
The Presidency may, by means of burden-sharing, allocate the role of chairman for a 
number of resolutions to another member state. “The bigger countries usually offer to 
take on a burden sharing role.”(Official #26, 16 September 2008)  
 
At times, the negotiation process can be described as a seemingly endless exercise 
marked by many empty chairs (Official #33, 13 October 2008). When First Secretaries 
are not able to agree on a common stance, the coordination process is delegated 
upwards until it reaches the Heads of Missions. The use of languages proves an 
interesting aspect of the interaction between the EU member states. The meetings are 
usually conducted in English. Both native and non-native speakers acknowledge that 
native English speakers have an advantage and that the negotiation skills of non-native 
speakers sometimes suffer. From time to time, a conversation might take place in 
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French, another major EU official langue. The French EU Presidency tends to open the 
meetings in French. Yet, in those instances it is not clear whether or not all participants 
are able to follow the conversation.  
 
4.2 Variable Measurement 
In addition to a versatile analytical framework, the empirical analysis also benefits 
from the possibility to measure certain variables in a variety of different ways so as to 
account for the various contexts in which they may be conceptionalised. In this 
section, I set out to present in detail all variables included in the empirical analysis. 
 
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
As already discussed with reference to the project parameters, the variable of interest 
is EU majority – oriented voting behaviour, an occurrence that takes places each time a 
member state casts its vote with the EU majority  despite holding a divergent national 
policy preference. While it is possible to isolate EU majority – oriented voting 
behaviour by means of a qualitative descriptive case-study of the vote coordination 
process between the EU member states, I am unable to do so by means of quantitative 
voting pattern analysis. Here the analytical focus shifts to vote defection. Calculating 
vote defection at both, system-level and individual-level is useful as it opens up the 
possibility to analyse EU voting behaviour inside the UNGA from different perspectives. 
The system-level analysis provides an overall picture and highlights possible trends of 
EU cohesion in the UNGA. The individual-level analysis takes account of the voting 
behaviour of the individual EU member states. Especially in instances of low overall EU 
cohesion in the UNGA, it is of analytical importance to know which way individual 
countries cast their votes.  
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Quantitative Analysis: System-Level Analysis 
To assess EU cohesion inside the UNGA, I employ a cohesion index by means of which 
the level of overall EU agreement in the UNGA is calculated as a continuous variable. 
Several different ways of measuring cohesion have been suggested in the field of 
political research (e.g. Attina, 1990; Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007, pp. 91-93; Rice, 1928). 
The cohesion index used  here makes use of the ‘Agreement Index’ employed by Hix, 
Noury et al  (2007, p. 91): 
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 “where Yi denotes the number of Yes votes expressed by group i on a given vote, Ni 
denotes that number of No votes and Ai the number of Abstain votes” (Hix, Noury, & 
Roland, 2007, p. 91). Its main advantage compared to the Rice-Index is that it can 
accommodate voting choices in excess of two. Values can range between 0 and 1, 
whereby a value of 1 illustrates perfect cohesion and a value of 0 indicates no cohesion 
at all (which means that all choices are equally distributed between all actors).  
 
Quantitative Analysis: Individual-Level Analysis 
There are various ways in which to capture vote defection for the purpose of the 
individual-level analysis. One common option is to measure vote defection in a binary 
fashion; to take stock of whether a member state casts a vote with the EU majority or 
in opposition to the EU majority position per resolution. Another option is to count the 
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number of voting partners a member state has for each resolution (see for instance 
Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). Each option has certain advantages and limitations.  
 
Measuring EU vote defection in a binary fashion ordinarily relies on the existence of a 
pre-determined EU majority position. As already discussed earlier in this thesis, 
however, strictly speaking, there is no fixed EU majority vote inside the UNGA, which 
would provide a definite benchmark against which to assess a member state’s voting 
behaviour. The concept of EU majority is fluid. It thus bears the risk that when casting 
a vote, especially for tight resolutions, a member state, while intending to vote with 
the majority, may end up on the wrong side of the vote by mistake. However, although 
the concept of EU majority is fluid, because of the lengthy coordination process 
preceding the roll-call voting, and the cyclical nature of UNGA proceedings (i.e. repeat 
resolutions)
31
, member states have high quality information on each other’s projected 
voting behaviour and are acutely aware of whether or not they are about to defect 
from the established consensus. In addition, the dataset reveals that resolutions where 
no distinct EU majority position is evident occur in less than 1% of all resolutions. They 
have been removed from the analysis.
32
 
 
Another shortcoming is that by measuring vote defection in a binary fashion, it is 
impossible to account for the strengths of the different groups, since there is no way 
to differentiate between a 6 to 9 ratio and a 1 to 14 ratio. That is to say, it is not 
feasible to distinguish between a member state that votes as part of a fairly large 
minority and one that casts an isolated vote. Calculating a voting partner score would 
                                                      
31
 See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of repeat resolutions. 
32
 That is to say, the unit of analysis has decreased from 829 to 821 votes.   
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circumvent this problem by shifting the focus away from any sort of EU majority voting 
position to the number of other countries voting in the same manner, the so-called 
voting partners. It could therefore provide some insight about the strength of the 
group, as some analytical potential clearly lies in the difference between being the only 
country going against a well established EU majority, or voting as part of a substantial 
minority. However, since a country’s voting partner score is the direct function of the 
voting behaviour of all the other countries, with reference to the statistical analysis, 
the methodological requirements for independence are seriously violated. I thus opt 
for measuring vote defection in a binary fashion. 
 
Qualitative Analysis: Comparative Analysis 
As already mentioned above, the dependent variable for the qualitative analysis is EU 
majority – oriented voting behaviour. In this thesis, the qualitative analysis is the only 
analysis that offers the possibility to test whether or not the EU member states are 
able and willing to override their heterogeneous policy preferences so as to speak with 
a single voice –  and if so, why. 
 
4.2.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables can be categorised into state-focused factors, institutional 
factors and external factors. I have also included control variables. The state-focused 
factors include measures for salience and power. The variable power is measured in 
military terms, economic terms, and as institutional power. The variables summarised 
as institutional factors measure institutionalised vote coordination pressure on the one 
hand, and EU dedication on the other hand. They further gauge EU leadership. Vote 
coordination pressures take into account whether or not a relevant CFSP position is in 
place, or whether or not the EU collectively sponsors the resolution in question. EU 
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dedication includes measures for EU commitment, accounts for whether or not a 
country is a net beneficiary of the EU budget and how enthusiastic the incumbent 
government is about the EU. EU leadership is also categorised as institutional factor. 
Finally, external factors refer exclusively to the transatlantic relationship. It includes 
measures for transatlantic divergence, and whether or not the US designates a certain 
resolution as important. Furthermore, it gauges the transatlantic bilateral relationships 
in economic, political and cultural terms. I use the present section to discuss all 
variables in more detail.  
 
State-Focused Factors 
Under the category of state-focused factors fall the variables salience and power.  
 
Salience – The variable salience measures the level of importance a government 
attaches to a particular policy area. That is to say, it measures how strongly a 
government feels about a specific policy area. It is calculated as a continuous variable, 
whereby higher values indicate higher levels of salience.  The Comparative Manifesto 
Dataset (CMD) (Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & McDonald, 2006)  serves as 
foundation for the measurement of the variable salience. The authors have put 
together party positions in fifty-six categories in seven major policy areas based on the 
parties’ manifestos. These party positions consist of percentages of quasi-sentences 
put into the manifesto (Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & McDonald, 2006, pp. 153, 
154). The assumption then is that the more a party talks about a particular issue area, 
the more important that particular issue is to the party. 
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The positions relevant for this study have been extracted for all parties in government 
between 1992 and 2004. Government positions are made up of the policy positions of 
their constituent parties. In a single party government as is prevalent in the UK, the 
ruling party’s position counts as the government position. To illustrate, for the time 
period between 1997 and 2004, Labour’s position counts as the government position. 
In a coalition government as is prevalent in Germany, I calculate the average between 
the positions of the ruling parties and count it as the government position. To 
illustrate, for the time period between 1998 and 2004, the average between the SPD 
and Green Party positions is calculated and counts as the government position. While 
it is possible to calculate the government position for coalition governments so as to 
take account of the relative parliamentary strength of the individual parties inside the 
coalition, the data reveals that in most cases their differences on the various issue 
areas are small enough to justify calculating the simple average.  
 
The following issue areas are included: anti-imperialism/anti-colonialism; military 
(positive and negative), peace, internationalism (positive and negative), freedom and 
human rights, democracy. The issue areas put forward by the CMD research team fit 
very well with the overarching issue areas according to which UNGA resolutions can be 
identified. These are (1) military issues, (2) decolonisation, (3) peace and security, (4) 
democratisation/democracy, (5) freedom and human rights, (6) internationalism, (7) 
self-determination/sovereignty.
33
   
 
The variable salience is measured per electoral cycle (in each country) per issue area. A 
change in leadership may mean a shift in perceived salience for some or all issue areas. 
                                                      
33
 See Appendix 4.1 for a more detailed comparison between CMD and UNGA issue areas. 
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For issues pertaining to the military framework which the CMD research team has 
divided into positive and negative groupings, the positive difference between these 
two values makes up the level of salience government attaches to that particular policy 
area. For issues pertaining to internationalism, the CMD research team has created 
two separate variables. These are internationalism positive and internationalism 
negative. For the purpose of this study these have been converted into two separate 
variables, measuring the desire for more international cooperation (internationalism 
positive) and the desire for more sovereign autonomy (internationalism negative).  
 
Power – The concept of power may be defined as the capacity of one actor to modify 
the conduct of other actors in a manner in which the former desires (Kaplan & 
Lasswell, 1950). Or as Robert Dahl’s (1976) “common sense notion”(p. 29) has it, it can 
be defined “broadly to include all relationships in which someone gets someone else 
to do something that he or she would not otherwise do” (Baldwin, 1985, p. 20). As 
such power is a relational concept and, 
“in order to make a meaningful statement about an (actual or 
potential) influence relationship, one must (explicitly or 
implicitly) specify who is influencing (or has the capacity to 
influence) whom (domain) with respect to what (scope)” 
(Baldwin, 1985, p. 20). 
 
That is to say, the concept of power is not an overarching concept. Rather, how 
powerful an actor is deemed by its fellow actors depends on the context in which 
power is measured. That is to say it depends on ‘scope’ and ‘domain’. In a world that 
consists of largely self-reliant actors and that is based on the survival of the fittest, 
power may be perceived in military terms. However, in an economically 
interdependent world, power may be perceived in economic terms.  While not 
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inconceivable that the same actor will fit both bills, it is not necessarily a foregone 
conclusion. Furthermore, the most powerful actor in a small domain may belong to the 
least powerful actors in a larger domain. The fact that I set out to measure the variable 
power in three different ways seeks to reflect this complexity. Two of the proposed 
measurements consider different scopes (military and economic), while the third seeks 
to take account of domain (EU institutional power). 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, I measure military power in terms of a country’s annual 
military expenditure in absolute terms. It finds its grounding in the perception of the 
international system as a realist system where countries are more or less dependent 
upon themselves for their survival and progress is directly linked to their ability to 
attack others or defend themselves. Measuring power in terms of a country’s military 
expenditure is output-focused and gives an indication of the country’s ability to attack 
and defend itself.  The data has been derived from the Sipri’s Military Expenditure 
Database (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2008b). 
 
Power can furthermore be measured in economic terms, with an emphasis on annual 
gross domestic product (GDP). Measuring power this way underlines the shift in 
perception of the international system from a realist international system to an 
economically integrated system. GDP data used in this thesis has been taken from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2004).  
 
While the above-mentioned indicators generally focus on power distribution in the 
international arena, power distribution can also be considered in smaller forums, such 
as the EU. While “’power’ might be determined by the gross domestic product of each 
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state, [one could equally consider the weighted votes] in the Council, since [they are] 
determined by the institutional rules and thus should be shaped by state power” 
(Thomson, Stokman, Achen, & Koenig, 2006, p. 106). A useful way in which to measure 
power within the EU is then to consider the voting weights that have been allocated to 
the individual member states in the Council of Ministers and that are applied for all 
decisions taken by a quality majority vote (QMV).
 34
   
 
Although, in anticipation of Eastern enlargement, a redistribution of voting weights 
had been discussed in the context of the Nice Treaty, for the time period under 
consideration, the allocated voting weights have been constant (Hosli, 2000, p. 9). That 
is to say, when Sweden, Austria and Finland joined the EU in 1995, the voting weights 
for the other countries did not change. Neither did any new regulations or treaties 
take effect during the time period under consideration that may have had an impact 
on the allocated voting weights.  
 
Institutional Factors 
The variables pertaining to institutional factors can further be divided into 
institutionalised voting pressure and EU dedication (exclusively for individual level 
analysis). They also take account of EU leadership. 
 
Institutionalised voting pressure – Variables in the group of institutionalised voting 
pressures include existing CFSP positions and indications of whether or not the EU 
member states collectively sponsored a resolution. Information on the former has 
                                                      
34
 There are of course more elaborate indices which use the basic distribution of voting weights as their 
foundation. Examples include the Banzhaf Index or the Shapley-Shubik Index (Felsenthal & Machover, 
1998; Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 1997; Shapley & Shubik, 1954). For the purpose of this thesis, 
however, the allocated voting weights suffice. 
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been collected from the EU Council Secretariat (European Union, 2007a). The UN Index 
to Proceedings (United Nations, 1987-2005) has been a useful source for information 
on resolution sponsorship. 
 
EU dedication – The category EU dedication incorporates the following three variables: 
EU commitment, negative opinion about the EU, and EU beneficiary. The variable EU 
commitment is measured in an ordinal manner and is based on the notion of 
“differentiated integration” (Luif, 2007, p. 3). That is to say it accounts for the number 
of voluntary agreements a country makes with regards to its EU membership. The 
agreements considered here are membership in Schengen and in the Euro, 
participation in JHA and in military cooperation via battle groups. Essentially, this 
variable captures to what extent a country participates or opts out from the various 
intra-EU commitments on offer.  
 
The variable negative opinion about the EU has been extracted from the Manifesto 
Dataset (Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & McDonald, 2006) and is measured as a 
continuous variable based on information provided in parties’ manifestos. The variable 
EU beneficiary is measured in a binary manner and illustrates whether or not an EU 
member state is a net contributor to or a net beneficiary of the EU budget. Budget 
information has been collected from EU Commission sources (e.g. European Union, 
2003a) as well as media sources (e.g. EurActiv, 2005). 
 
EU leadership – The variable EU leadership tries to measure whether successful vote 
coordination between the EU member states becomes more likely for divisive and 
contentious resolution, when that means increasing the collective bargaining power. 
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Because the focus here is entirely on EU majority – oriented voting behaviour (rather 
than vote defection), it is only possible to measure this variable by means of the 
qualitative analysis. I have considered measuring in quantitative terms, the extent to 
which a collective EU vote has been pivotal in deciding the fate of a resolution. 
However, UNGA resolutions tend to be passed by rather large margins. That is to say, 
of the 821 resolutions considered in this study, the EU had opportunity to change the 
fate of a resolution only five times. The member states cast a unified vote for all five 
resolutions. In three of the five resolutions would a change in the collective EU vote 
have made a difference. (In those three cases the EU voted with the majority of the UN 
and if it had not done so, the No votes would have been in the majority.) For the other 
two votes, the EU member states collectively cast a vote different from the UN 
majority and a change in the collective vote would have not made a difference to the 
fate of the resolution. 
 
External Factors – Transatlantic Relationship 
The transatlantic relationship is considered in a multi-stage process. First of all, I set 
out to determine the degree of transatlantic divergence. Moreover, I measure the 
bilateral relationship between individual member states and the US in economic, 
political and cultural terms. I finally provide a list of resolutions which the US considers 
“important”.   
 
Transatlantic Divergence – The variable Transatlantic Divergence measures the extent 
to which the transatlantic partners do not cast identical votes in the UNGA. As such, it 
simply illustrates the extent to which the US voting record differs from that of the 
majority of the EU member states. The variable is conceptionalised in binary terms, 
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whereby identical votes receive a value of 0 and non-identical votes receive a value of 
1. 
 
Transatlantic bilateral relationships in economic, political and cultural terms – The 
bilateral relationship between the individual EU member states and the US can be 
estimated in economic, political as well as cultural terms.  In economic terms, I account 
for the bilateral trade relationship by calculating the yearly trade volume between the 
US and the individual EU member states. The data has been derived from the IMF’s 
Direction of Trade Statistics (IMF, March 2009). In political terms I account for the 
relationship by measuring the number of international multilateral military 
interventions both countries participate in together. The data has been derived from 
SIPRI’s Facts on International Relations and Security Trends (Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2008a). Finally, in cultural terms I calculate the 
number of successful non-immigrant visa applications (e.g. student visas) issued for 
each EU member state by the US government per year (US Department of State, 2003). 
In order to take account of the varying population sizes across the EU member states, 
those numbers have further been calculated as the percentage of population.   
 
Important for the US – The variable Important for the US is included as auxiliary 
variable. The variable Important for the US refers to resolutions which the US 
considers to be important and for which it lobbies the other UN member states 
heavily. An annual list of these resolutions is published on the US Department of State 
website (US Department of State, 2008). The variable Important for the US is 
measured as a dichotomous variable, whereby a value of 1 indicates that the US 
considers the resolution as important and a value of 0 indicates that it does not.  
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Control Variables 
In addition to fixed effects (see next section), I am including three control variables in 
the analyses. For the system-level analysis I include a measure for UN Cohesion in 
order to determine whether or not EU cohesion levels are in fact a function of UN 
Cohesion levels. The UN voting data has been derived from the UN Index to 
Proceedings (United Nations, 1987-2005). For the individual-level analysis, I am 
including two control variables: government type and government position. The 
variable government type is measured by using the index Lijphart (1999) has 
developed as part of his study on Patterns of Democracy. The index is two-fold and 
measures democracies alongside the executive-parties dimension and the federal-
unitary dimension. The index essentially distinguishes between so-called 
‘Westminster-style’ democracies and so-called ‘Consensus-style’ democracies. In the 
simplest and most polarising terms, the former describes a system in which the 
concentration of executive power lies with a single-party majority in a unitary 
structure; whereas the latter describes a system in which a coalition of parties shares 
power in a decentralised structure. The variable government position is measured by 
using the index developed by the team working on the Comparative Manifesto Dataset 
(Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & McDonald, 2006) and positions a government 
alongside a left-right spectrum. 
 
4.3 Methodological Tools  
Inspired by Lieberman’s nested analysis approach, which “combines the statistical 
analysis of a large sample of cases with the in-depth  investigation of one or more of 
the cases contained within the large sample”(Liebermann, 2005:435-436), I take 
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advantage of the methodological versatility of this particular analytical framework and 
combine quantitative voting pattern analysis (system-level analysis and individual-level 
analysis) with the in-depth examination of the vote coordination process by means of 
research interviews. In this section, I shall explain the methodological aspects 
pertaining to each in more detail. 
 
Quantitative Voting Pattern Analysis 
The quantitative voting pattern analysis begins with an instructive breakdown of 
existing voting patterns over time and across issue areas. I further investigate voting 
patterns that are indicative of intra-EU dialogue as well as indicative of heterogeneous 
policy preferences. Subsequently, an attempt is made to contextualise the voting 
behaviour of the EU member states with reference to the positions upheld by other 
members of the United Nations General Assembly, particularly but not exclusively with 
reference to the votes cast by the US.  
 
As part of the inferential statistical analysis, I employ binary logistic regression both at 
the system-level as well as at the individual-level of analysis. As the name suggests, 
binary logistic regression is generally used to predict categorical outcomes. It thus 
appears a natural choice for the individual-level analysis, where I seek to estimate the 
likelihood of vote defection from the EU majority position by individual EU member 
states. It is a less obvious choice for the system-level analysis, where I seek to estimate 
the extent of overall EU cohesion, which is measured as a continuous variable. The 
decision to employ binary logistic regression for the system-level analysis thus 
warrants further explanation. The dependent variable in the system-level analysis is 
called EU cohesion index. The variable is in fact measured as a continuous variable 
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ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher levels of overall EU cohesion. 
At first sight, ordinary least square regression (OLS) would thus seem more suitable. 
However, the assumptions that need to be met for OLS regression to produce reliable 
results are especially stringent.  And with a system-level dataset that is heavily 
lopsided in favour of instances of perfect cohesion (i.e. “hard 1’s”; see table 5.3), it 
appears more appropriate to analyse the data by means of logistic regression, in which 
case the variable EU cohesion index is treated as a binary variable, whereby all 
instances of perfect cohesion are coded as 1 and all others are coded as 0. 
 
The dataset used for the individual-level analysis contains only 576 observations of 
vote defection and 11071 observations of non-defection. Considering the ratio of 5% 
to 95%, this dataset qualifies for rare events logistics as King and Zeng (2001) point out 
that there is a danger that standard binary logistic regression “underestimate[s] the 
probability of rare events” (p. 693). By using their ReLogit software, logit coefficients 
are replaced with bias-corrected coefficients; and in the end, “when the results make a 
difference, [their] methods work better than logit; when they do not, these methods 
give the same answer as logit” (King & Zeng, 2001, p. 702). It will not be necessary to 
use the ReLogit command for the system-level analysis. The dataset contains 597 
observations of full cohesion and 224 observations of partial cohesion. That is a ratio 
of 73% to 26%.  
 
Fixed effects are included in all models, so as to remove any omitted variable bias. 
(Dranove, 2004). I differentiate between issue fixed effects and year fixed effects. As 
already established in existing research (see chapter 2), the extent to which the EU 
member states speak with a single voice varies across issue area. In order not to distort 
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the findings, it thus appears prudent to control for issue area. In addition, year fixed 
effects have been included.  
 
Finally, by means of a statistical tool called CLARIFY (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2003), I 
shall attempt to estimate the predicted probabilities of the variables in the models 
presented. CLARIFY “uses stochastic simulation techniques to help [...] interpret and 
present statistical results” obtained by a number of models including binary logistic 
regression as well as interaction terms (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2003, p. 5). 
 
Qualitative Analysis of the Vote Coordination Process 
Research interviews with officials involved in the vote coordination process are used to 
circumvent the operational limitation faced by the quantitative voting pattern analysis.  
To this end, I conducted a total of 39 face-to-face research interviews at the United 
Nations in New York between September and December 2008. I met with 
ambassadors, counsellors and first secretaries of the Permanent Missions to the 
United Nations of the individual EU member states. The interviews lasted between 60 
and 180 minutes. The interviews were semi-structured. They included a list of five 
open-ended questions (see Appendix 7.1 and 7.2) and the interviewee’s “responses 
were followed up with prompts and probes” (Gillham, 2007, p. 24). I contacted some 
of the interviewees with follow-up question after the interview had taken place.  
 
In addition to interviewing officials (mainly ambassadors and counsellors) who were 
able to provide me with a more general picture of the coordination process that takes 
place between the EU member states at the United Nations General Assembly; I also 
sought out those that are particularly familiar with the coordination process pertaining 
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to military questions and to the Arab-Israeli conflict. I furthermore attended two 
coordination meetings, in which EU officials negotiated the EU majority  position with 
respect to a number of resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict that were 
about to come to a vote in the General Assembly. Unfortunately, it was not possible 
for me to attend similar negotiation meetings with respect to the military realm.  
 
While these research interviews are an invaluable part of the overall thesis,  
“it must be acknowledged that the analysis may be biased 
towards the self-interest and personal or collective agenda of 
these policy makers. Whether conscious or unconscious, it is 
certainly possible that in an effort to rationalize or defend their 
own positions, [interviewees] may be led to exaggeration, 
distortion or inaccuracy” (Tonra, 1997). 
 
In order to counteract this phenomenon, and “to reduce the pressure for self-
justification and open their analysis to greater self-criticism” (Tonra, 1997) absolute 
anonymity was granted to the interviewees and the possibility to provide comments 
on the finished product.  
 
The discrepancy between the time period used for the quantitative voting pattern 
analysis and the time period in which I conducted the interviews warrants further 
explanation. The secondment of national civil servants to the country’s diplomatic 
missions tends be based on a principle of rotation. That is to say, there is a time limit 
on how long an official may be delegated to a particular mission. This time limit varies 
between countries and of course there are exceptions to the rules, but generally it 
does not exceed beyond a few years. This means that presently, it makes it 
exceptionally difficult to get in touch with officials that manned the individual 
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Permanent Missions between 1992 and 2004. Some of the officials I have spoken to, 
had been at their Mission since 2001 (thus covering parts of the relevant time period), 
but most have been there for less than that. However, officials that have been there 
the longest have confirmed a sense of continuity in the EU coordination efforts over 
the years. This sense of continuity is further confirmed by cross-checking the results of 
the voting pattern analysis with the information received in the interviews.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
In chapter 4 I discussed aspects of methodology and operationalisation. To this end, I 
justified the choice of the United Nations General Assembly as framework of analysis. 
While acknowledging that this forum may be seen as largely inconsequential in world 
politics, I argued that in this study resolution relevance is only of secondary 
importance. Instead, I highlighted the methodological versatility of a framework which 
not only readily avails itself to quantitative and qualitative analysis but also makes 
room for incorporating the transatlantic relationship in a straight forward manner. I 
further illustrated how the framework is used in relation to the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. In the subsequent sections, I discussed variable measurement and 
methodological tools. The ensuing three chapters serve to present the results of the 
empirical analysis. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the system-level voting pattern analysis 
and the individual-level voting pattern analysis respectively. The focus of chapter 7 is 
on the analysis of the research interviews. 
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4.6 Appendices 
Appendix 4A: Mapping Policy Preferences: Comparative Manifesto 
Dataset 
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MAPPING POLICY PREFERENCES:  COMPARATIVE MANIFESTO DATASET 
MD Code MD Variable MD Variable Description Thesis 
Code 
Thesis Variable 
Per 103 Anti-
Imperialism, 
Anti Colonialism 
Negative reference  to exerting strong influence (political, military or commercial) 
over other states; negative reference to controlling other countries as if they 
were part of empire, favourable mention of decolonisation, favourable mention 
of greater self-government and independence of colonies, negative reference to 
imperial behaviour of manifesto and other countries 
2 Decolonisation 
Per 104 Military Positive Need to maintain or increase military expenditure, modernise armed forces and 
improvement in military strength, rearmament and self-defence, need to secure 
adequate manpower in military terms. 
1 Military (Disarmament, 
Mercenary, Nuclear) 
Per 105 Military 
Negative 
Favourable mention of decreasing military expenditures, disarmament, evils of 
war, promises to reduce conscription  
1 Military (Disarmament, 
Mercenary, Nuclear) 
Per 106 Peace Positive Peace as a general goal, declaration of belief in peace and peaceful means of 
solving crises, desirability of countries joining in negotiations with hostile 
countries 
3 Peace & Security 
Per 107 Internationalism 
Positive 
Need for international cooperation, cooperation with specific countries other 
than per101, need for aid to developing countries, need for world planning of 
resources, need for international courts, support for any international goal, 
support for UN 
6 Internationalism 
Per 109 Internationalism 
Negative 
Favourable mention of national independence, & sovereignty as opposed to 
internationalism 
7 Self-Determination 
/Sovereignty 
Per 201 Freedom HR 
Positive 
Favourable mention of importance of personal freedom and civil rights, freedom 
from bureaucratic control, freedom of speech, freedom from coercion in political 
and economic spheres, individualism in manifesto country and in other countries 
5 Freedom & Human 
Rights 
Per 202 Democracy 
Positive 
Favourable mention of democracy as method or goal in national and other 
organisations,  involvement of all citizens in decision-making as well as 
generalised support for manifesto country’s democracy 
4 Democracy 
/Democratisation 
Source: Klingemann, H.-D., A. Volkens, et al. (2006). Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments in Central and 
Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003 Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
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PART III EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Following the conceptual discussion in chapter 3 and the presentation of the 
methodological framework in chapter 4, it is the purpose of chapters 5 to 7 to present 
and discuss the results of the empirical analysis. The empirical analysis consists of a 
quantitative voting pattern analysis conducted in chapters 5 (system-level analysis) 
and 6 (individual-level analysis) as well as of a qualitative analysis of the vote 
coordination process that precedes the UNGA roll-call votes, presented in chapter 7. 
 
The focal point of the voting pattern analysis is the voting behaviour of the EU member 
states inside the United Nations General Assembly as seen from the collective as well 
as from the individual perspective. That is to say, my interest lies in analysing the 
overall levels of vote agreement between the member states on the one hand; and on 
the other hand, I am interested in examining how the voting behaviour of the 
individual member states fits into the picture of overall EU cohesion levels. The voting 
pattern analysis further attempts to contextualise the voting behaviour of the EU 
member states with reference to the positions upheld by other members of the United 
Nations General Assembly, in particular with reference to the votes cast by the United 
States. 
 
The voting pattern analysis is well equipped to isolate vote defections and link them to 
divergent policy preferences. In instances of vote cohesion, the voting pattern analysis 
is not able to determine if an EU member state cast a vote with its fellow member 
states because of shared preferences or despite of divergent preferences. To address 
this operational shortcoming and shed some light on the issue, a qualitative analysis of 
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the vote coordination process that precedes the UNGA roll-call votes is presented in 
chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 5: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS I: 
SYSTEM-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
In chapter 5 I set out to examine the EU member states’ voting patterns inside the 
United Nations General Assembly from a system-level perspective. That is to say the 
focus of this chapter is on EU cohesion inside the United Nations General Assembly. 
The quantitative analysis begins with an instructive breakdown of EU cohesion levels 
over time and across issue areas, before illustrating that whatever agreement exists 
between the member states is not exclusively a coincidence of overlapping 
preferences but that there is some evidence for vote coordination intention. This is 
followed by an attempt to contextualise the voting behaviour of the EU member states 
with reference to the positions upheld by other members of the United Nations 
General Assembly, in particular with reference to the votes cast by the US. As part of 
the subsequent inferential statistical analysis, I employ Logistic regression to gauge the 
likelihood of a fully cohesive vote considering an array of state-focused factors, 
institutionalised pressures, and the position upheld by the US. 
 
Accordingly, the chapter is divided into five sections. I shall inspect overall levels of EU 
cohesion in more detail in section 5.1, focusing on the extent to which cohesion levels 
vary over time and across issue areas. In section 5.2, I set out to identify patterns in the 
voting behaviour of the member states that strongly point towards their intention to 
coordinate their votes. Ahead of the multivariate analysis in section 5.4, I shall use 
section 5.3 to contextualise EU cohesion levels with reference to other UN members, 
in particular the US. Finally, a brief conclusion to the chapter will be provided in 
section 5.5. 
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5.1 EU Cohesion Levels in the UNGA 
In this section, I shall provide an overview of the dependent variable EU Cohesion. To 
this end, I shall scrutinise EU cohesion levels over time and across issue areas. As 
already discussed in chapter 4, although EU cohesion is a continuous variable and thus 
suitable for OLS regression, the variable has been recalibrated for logistic regression 
because the vast majority of resolutions yields perfect cohesion levels leaving the 
dataset lopsided. I shall further introduce EU cohesion as binary variable.  
 
EU Cohesion Levels over Time 
Figure 5.1 illustrates EU cohesion levels over time. The horizontal axis illustrates the 
individual UNGA sessions, while the vertical axis represents the cohesion index. The 
line depicts the average EU cohesion levels calculated for each individual session 
between 1987 and 2005. For sessions 42-49 (1987-1994), the voting behaviour of the 
12 existing EU member states is recorded. For sessions 50-60 (1995-2005) the voting 
behaviour of the 15 existing EU member states is recorded. Voting behaviour for the 
ten member states that joined in 2004 have not been included. The two vertical lines 
at x = 47 and x = 58 indicate respectively the beginning and end of the time period 
under consideration in the quantitative analysis. 
 
With the possible range of the EU cohesion index reaching between 0 (no cohesion) 
and 1 (perfect cohesion), the figure illustrates very clearly that high levels of EU 
cohesion in the UNGA are by far no anomaly. For the time period under consideration, 
the average EU cohesion level is .917. Average cohesion levels calculated for individual 
sessions range between .883 in the 49
th
 session (1994/1995) and .948 in the 53
rd
 
session (1998/1999). That is to say that between 1992 and 2004, on average 14 (11) 
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out of 15 (12) member states cast identical votes inside the UNGA. Nevertheless, each 
year there are a number of resolutions for which the member states do not 
successfully coordinate their votes. 
 
 
Figure 5.1:  Average EU Cohesion Levels over Time 
 
EU Cohesion Levels across Issue Areas 
Figure 5.2 illustrates average EU cohesion levels across issue area. The horizontal axis 
illustrates the individual issue areas, while the vertical axis represents the cohesion 
index. The individual columns represent the average cohesion levels per issue area. 
Despite a generally high level of average cohesion in most issue areas, successful vote 
coordination comes by slightly more difficult for resolutions in some issue areas. 
Member states are most successful in reaching agreement on resolutions pertaining to 
democracy, the Arab Israeli conflict as well as human rights. For those three issue 
areas, overall cohesion levels are near perfect. On the other hand, resolutions 
pertaining to mercenaries as well as those pertaining to decolonisation yield the 
lowest average EU cohesion levels.  
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Figure 5.2: Average EU Cohesion Levels across Issue Area 
 
As already discussed in chapter 2, existing research tends to look at military resolutions 
as particularly divisive between EU member states (e.g. Bourantonis & Kostakos, 1999; 
Brantner & Gowan, 2008, p. 39; Johansson-Nogues, 2004; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006; 
Luif, 1995, p. 279, 2003, p. 3; Wouters, 2001) And as expected, member states do not 
generally reach full agreement with reference to resolutions pertaining to military 
issues. Nevertheless, by disaggregating the topic into resolutions dealing with 
disarmament, nuclear issues and mercenaries, it appears that while less agreement is 
reached on nuclear issues and particularly on resolutions pertaining to mercenaries, 
member states tend to do fairly well on resolutions dealing with disarmament. This 
implies then that in addition to fluctuations across issue area or over time, cohesion 
levels may also vary within issue area.  
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EU Cohesion in Binary Terms 
Figure 5.3 shows that a little more than 73% of the time, EU member states speak with 
a single voice in the forum. The remaining 27% are distributed across lower levels of 
EU cohesion. So, even though the “EU cohesion index” is measured in continuous 
terms, due to the overwhelming number of fully cohesive votes (i.e. “hard 1’s”), I 
suggest to analyse the data by means of logistic regression. For this purpose, “EU 
Cohesion” must be converted into a binary variable. In this section then, I shall provide 
an overview of the dependent variable EU Cohesion in binary terms and shall scrutinise 
EU cohesion levels over time and across issue area. 
 
Figure 5.3: EU Cohesion Levels across Resolutions 
 
Figure 5.4 presents binary EU cohesion over time. The horizontal axis illustrates the 
individual UNGA sessions, while the vertical axis represents the division between fully 
cohesive and non-cohesive resolutions in percentage terms. Each bar illustrates the 
percentage of fully cohesive and non-cohesive resolutions within that particular year. 
1
73%
≥.7
18%
≥.5
6%
≤ .5
3%
EU Cohesion Levels across Resolutions
136 
 
Absolute values are depicted as well. For sessions 42-49 (1987-1994), the voting 
behaviour of the 12 existing EU member states is recorded. For sessions 50-60 (1995-
2005) the voting behaviour of the 15 existing EU member states is recorded. Voting 
behaviour for the ten member states that joined in 2004 have not been included. The 
amount of fully cohesive votes increased over time from less than 50% prior to 1992 to 
between 70% and 80% towards the end of the time period under consideration. The 
share of fully cohesive votes peaked in session 53 (1998) above 80%.  
 
Figure 5.4: Binary EU cohesion over Time 
 
Figure 5.5 illustrates binary EU cohesion across issue area. The horizontal axis 
illustrates the individual issue areas, while the vertical axis represents the division 
between fully cohesive and non-cohesive resolutions in percentage terms. Each bar 
illustrates the percentage of fully cohesive and non-cohesive resolutions within that 
particular issue area. Absolute values are depicted as well. For the vast majority of 
issue areas, more than half of the resolutions put forward to a vote receive full EU 
endorsement – including resolutions pertaining to disarmament as well as including 
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resolutions pertaining to nuclear issues. Predictably, resolutions dealing with questions 
of decolonisation tend to not be fully cohesive. The same is true for resolutions 
pertaining to sovereignty issues. Resolutions on mercenaries are the only group to 
never once reach full cohesion. Having said that, the total number of resolution differs 
widely between the issue areas with 267 Arab/Israeli resolutions on top and only 12 
resolutions dealing with mercenaries and another 12 resolutions on democratisation at 
the bottom.  
 
Figure 5.5: Binary EU Cohesion across Issue Area 
 
5.2 Intentional Vote Coordination 
As we shall see in chapter 7, the expert interviews with EU diplomats at the UN make 
explicit intention of the EU member states to coordinate their votes, I shall use this 
section to analyse in more detail the observable implications of this intent for their 
voting patterns. If the member states intended to coordinate their votes, one would 
naturally expect to observe a voting pattern that is indicative of intra-EU dialogue.  
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One would furthermore expect to see that the EU cohesion levels inside the UNGA are 
not a function of cohesion levels obtained by larger groups of which the EU member 
states constitute a part of.  Accordingly, this section is divided into two subsections. I 
first set out to analyse the extent to which collective EU voting behaviour inside the 
UNGA is indicative of intra-EU dialogue. I then seek to compare EU cohesion levels to 
the cohesion levels of other relevant groups inside the UNGA. To this end, EU cohesion 
levels are compared to overall UNGA cohesion levels, and to cohesion levels of 
regional groups, with particular reference to the Western European regional group.  
 
5.2.1 Indications of Intra-EU Dialogue 
At least two types of voting patterns are indicative of intra-EU dialogue. Both, a sudden 
rise in overall EU cohesion levels and the collective change of fully cohesive voting 
positions point towards the possibility that member states coordinate their positions. 
Each type is discussed in more detail below. 
 
Sudden Rise in EU Cohesion Levels 
A dramatic and abrupt increase in EU cohesion levels makes for a strong indication of 
intra-EU dialogue as it hints at a collective choice taken by the member states to work 
together. Figure 5.1 illustrates EU cohesion levels over time. In doing so it depicts a 
dramatic increase in EU cohesion levels following the end of the Cold War – at a time 
when cohesion levels for all other regional and politically affiliated groups temporarily 
plummet (see Appendix 5.1. and Figure 5.8.). This sudden rise in EU cohesion levels 
provides a very strong indication of intra-EU dialogue especially as it takes place in the 
immediate run-up to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which, as discussed in chapter 3, 
139 
 
requires the member states to coordinate their positions in international organisations 
including the United Nations.  
 
Within-Resolution Movement: Collective Change 
In order to explain collective change, I must first introduce the concept of repeat 
resolutions. Repeat resolutions are resolutions that after appearing during one session 
re-appear during subsequent sessions. They are easily identified because in case of a 
repeat resolution each individual resolution refers to its predecessor(s) (Voeten, 2004, 
p. 734). Many appear for all years under consideration, some for less. All in all, 758 of 
the 821 resolutions in this study are repeat resolutions. They can be grouped into 123 
individual strings of repeat resolutions. Repeat resolutions are useful for observing 
within-resolution movement. Within-resolution movement essentially refers to any 
type of change in EU cohesion levels over time with reference to the same resolution 
(repeat resolutions). This could, for instance, mean an increase in cohesion levels or a 
decrease in cohesion levels. One particular type of within-resolution movement is 
highly indicative of intra-EU dialogue. This is collective change. Collective change takes 
place when the EU membership in its entirety votes one way in a certain year and on 
the same resolution votes another way the following year. 
 
The resolution entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” shall serve as an 
example. A version of this resolution appeared in each of the annual UNGA sessions 
between the 47
th
 session and the 58
th
 session (A/RES/47/51; A/RES/48/74A; 
A/RES/49/74; A/RES/50/69; A/RES/51/44; A/RES/52/37; A/RES/53/76; A/RES/54/53; 
A/RES/55/32; ARES/56/23; A/RES/57/57; A/RES/58/36). The EU member states, 
without fail, cast a unified vote with regards to these resolutions. Although not part of 
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the dataset, Austria, Sweden and Finland cast votes identical to those of the EU 
member states for the three years prior to the 1995 enlargement. The collective vote 
cast by the member states changed twice during the time period under consideration. 
The member states support the resolution during the first three sessions (47
th
-49
th
 
session), subsequently abstained for 3 years (50
th
 session-52
nd
 session) before 
returning to their support of the resolution for the remainder of the time period under 
consideration (53
rd
 session-58
th
 session). 
 
The difference between A/RES/49/74 (full support) and A/RES/50/69 (full abstention) 
is a matter of language: In the former, the resolution “requests the Conference on 
Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms 
race in outer space”. In the latter, language is stronger. Here the General Assembly 
“regrets the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in 1995” and “requests 
the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in 1996 and to consider the question of 
preventing an arms race in outer space”. It is thus not surprising that the member 
states switched from fully supporting the resolution, to merely abstaining from voting 
on it.  No such linguistic difference can be observed between A/RES/52/37 (full 
abstention) and A/RES/53/76 (full support). This then highlights a second aspect 
concerning UNGA voting. Aside from the content of a resolution or the language used 
in a resolution, sometimes member states in their votes react to resolution 
sponsorship. That is to say, they might reject a resolution neither for content nor for 
language but simply because they disagree with the sponsor of the resolution (Official 
#7, 18 November 2008; Official #20, 6 November 2008). 
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23% of the repeat resolution groups have been subject to at least one collective 
change, tallying a total of 32 individual swaps.  Figure 5.6 illustrates the distribution 
across issue area. Almost half of them have occurred for resolutions pertaining to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, with human rights and disarmament taking another 25%. 
Sovereignty, decolonisation and peace and security take the rest of the share. 
Generally, repeat resolutions tend to be fairly constant over time. For fear of losing 
support, any changes made by the resolution sponsor are generally minimal (with co-
sponsors allowed input). 
 
Figure 5.6: ‘Collective Change’ Resolutions across Issue Area 
 
5.2.2 Independence of EU Cohesion Levels 
The preceding paragraphs illustrate that EU cohesion levels are high inside the UNGA. 
The dramatic increase in vote coordination around 1992 and the occurrences of 
collective change for some of the repeat resolutions furthermore strongly point 
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towards intra-EU dialogue. Nevertheless, in order to instil more confidence in these 
findings, they must be contextualised and be made subject to additional scrutiny.  A 
circumstance in which EU cohesion simply were a function of the vote cohesion of 
larger groups inside the UNGA, for instance, would call into question the justification 
of analysing EU cohesion inside the UNGA. Despite the fact that existing research 
already suggests that EU unity might be changing rather independently of the overall 
UNGA climate (Foot, 1979, p. 352);  to make sure that this is the case, I set out to 
compare EU cohesion levels to those of the UNGA in general and more specifically to 
the cohesion levels obtained by the Western European and Others Group (WEOG).  
 
Comparing Average EU Cohesion Levels with UNGA Cohesion 
Levels 
If the patterns of EU cohesion levels were to be very similar to those of the UNGA in 
general, it would simply be more difficult to interpret any changes in EU cohesion as 
indicative of intra-EU dialogue. If, for instance, UNGA cohesion in general rose sharply 
between 1990 and 1992, it would be more difficult to argue that such an increase is 
linked to the run-up to Maastricht. Alternative explanations would have to be sought.  
 
Figure 5.7 compares EU cohesion levels with UNGA cohesion levels over time. The 
horizontal axis illustrates the individual UNGA sessions, while the vertical axis 
represents the cohesion index.   “EU12/EU15” depicts average EU cohesion levels 
calculated for each individual session between 1987 and 2005. “UNGA” depicts 
average UNGA cohesion levels calculated for each individual session between 1987 
and 2005. The two vertical lines at x = 47 and x = 58 indicate respectively the beginning 
and end of the time period under consideration in this dissertation.  
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Figure 5.7: Comparison between Average EU and UNGA Cohesion Levels over Time 
 
Initially, between the 42
nd
 and 45
th
 sessions, EU cohesion levels are a function of UNGA 
cohesion levels. Their voting patterns run largely parallel to each other, with UNGA 
cohesion levels consistently higher than those of the EU member states. By the 47
th
 
session, the picture has changed. Not only has EU cohesion surpassed UNGA cohesion, 
but at a point when UNGA cohesion declines sharply, EU cohesion rises sharply. The 
wide margin between the cohesion levels of these two groups remains intact for the 
rest of the period under consideration, with EU voting patterns running a much 
smoother course than those of the UNGA in general. Based on these results, it can thus 
be assumed that for the time period under consideration EU cohesion levels are not a 
function of UNGA cohesion levels beyond what must be expected. The results are in 
fact confirmed by the multivariate analysis carried out in this chapter.  
 
0.6
0.8
1
42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
C
o
h
e
si
o
n
 In
d
e
x
Annual Sessions (1987-2005)
Comparison between Average EU and UNGA Cohesion Levels 
over Time
EU Cohesion
UN Cohesion
144 
 
Comparing Average EU Cohesion Levels with Cohesion Levels of 
Regional Groups 
Many “pre-voting consultations” in the UNGA “take place in group meetings”(Baehr & 
Gordenker, 2005, p. 49). And although “these groups or caucuses are not mentioned in 
the charter and have no official status […], they are of crucial importance to the 
decision making process” (Baehr & Gordenker, 2005, p. 49). Two types of groups exist 
in the UNGA. These are geographical or regional groups on the one hand, and groups 
based on political affinity on the other hand. Of direct relevance to the thesis is the 
voting behaviour of regional groups. Details comparing EU cohesion with the cohesion 
levels of other groups based on political affinity can be found in Appendix 5.1. The 
main geographical or regional groups are the Asian Group, the African Group, the Latin 
American and Caribbean Group, the Western European and Others Group as well as 
the Eastern European Group (Eye on the UN, 2008). Of particular relevance to this 
study is the comparison between EU cohesion levels and cohesion levels of the WEOG. 
The following countries make up the WEOG: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom. Although 
the United States is not officially in WEOG, for all practical purposes it is a full member 
(Eye on the UN, 2008). All EU member states are part of WEOG and constitute 
approximately 52% of its membership. 
 
In order to justify analysing EU cohesion inside the UNGA, one would expect that EU 
cohesion levels are not a function of WEOG cohesion levels beyond what is to be 
expected. Given that at 52%, EU member states constitute a significant part of the 
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WEOG, a certain amount of correlation in vote cohesion is to be expected. 
Nevertheless, a distinct similarity of voting patterns beyond what is to be expected 
would make it difficult to trace any changes in EU cohesion levels back to factors solely 
connected to the EU. Thus, here we are looking for cohesion levels that higher (rather 
than identical or lower) compared to WEOG cohesion. 
 
Figure 5.8 compares EU cohesion levels to the cohesion levels of other regional groups 
over time.  The horizontal axis illustrates the individual UNGA sessions, while the 
vertical axis represents the cohesion index. The two vertical lines at x = 47 and x = 58 
indicate respectively the beginning and end of the time period under consideration in 
this dissertation. Average cohesion levels between the 42
nd
 and 60
th
 session are 
depicted for the following regional groups: WEOG, Asia, Africa, Latin America and 
Eastern Europe. Average cohesion levels for the same time period are also depicted for 
“EU12/EU15”. 
 
Figure 5.8: Regional Comparison of Average Cohesion Levels over Time 
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The main focus here is the comparison between the voting patterns of the EU member 
states with the voting patterns of the WEOG. Due to the fact that the EU member 
states constitute a large section of the WEOG, it is hardly surprising that the voting 
patterns for EU and WEOG run largely parallel to each other. However, it should be 
noted that EU cohesion levels are consistently higher than those obtained by the larger 
regional WEOG, which indicates that those member states which belong to the EU and 
the WEOG vote more in unison than those only belonging to the WEOG, lending 
further justification to studying EU cohesion in the UNGA.  
 
Comparing EU and WEOG cohesion levels to cohesion levels of other regional groups, it 
transpires that following the end of the Cold War, all regional groups enter some sort 
of temporary freefall, while the WEOG and EU are able to increase their cohesion 
levels dramatically in the run-up to Maastricht. Another not entirely surprising 
observation is that prior to the end of the Cold War the member states of the Eastern 
European group display the highest levels of cohesion, then dropping to the lowest 
cohesion levels immediately thereafter before aligning themselves more closely with 
EU and WEOG voting behaviour in the run-up to the 2004 Eastern Enlargement (see 
Johansson-Nogues, 2004). Based on these results, it can thus be assumed that for the 
time period under consideration EU cohesion levels are not a function of WEOG 
cohesion levels beyond what must be expected. 
 
5.3 Transatlantic Relationship in the UNGA 
Because the US is one of the key players in the international system and is considered 
a genuine transatlantic partner, it is not inconceivable that the positions upheld by the 
US in some ways influence the voting behaviour of the EU member states. In 
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anticipation of the logistic regression carried out in the next section, I set out to use 
the current section to shed more light in general terms on the transatlantic 
relationship inside the UNGA.  In order to gain a better understanding of how special 
the transatlantic relationship is, I set out to examine to what extent the transatlantic 
partners speak with the same voice in the UNGA and further to contextualise the 
transatlantic partnership by comparing the voting behaviour of the transatlantic 
partners with that of several other countries. I shall further test if EU disagreement 
increases in face of transatlantic divergence.  
 
The transatlantic partners do not coordinate their UNGA votes in any systematic 
manner. That is to say, the transatlantic partners do not meet on a regular basis to 
discuss their voting behaviour on up-coming resolutions. In fact the US may not engage 
in any sort of coordination efforts as regards General Assembly roll-call voting. But, the 
EU member states (and for that matter the rest of the UN membership) are aware of 
how the US intends to vote. That is so for several reasons. One, due to the cyclical 
nature of the UNGA, where many resolutions are in fact so-called repeat resolution, 
experience shows that a country’s voting behaviour on resolutions that have been 
tabled before is likely to be the same. This is true for many if not all countries, not just 
the US. Two, the United States specifically, has adopted a practise whereby each year 
identifies a set of resolutions that it considers important and lobbies extensively for all 
those resolutions that deal with “issues which directly [affect] important United States 
interests”("Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991: Annual 
Report to Congress on Voting Practices at the United Nations", 1992). As already 
highlighted in the previous chapter, it subsequently lists these resolutions in an annual 
report to Congress which then is published on the website of the State Department 
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(US Department of State, 2008). Lobbying for these resolutions may inter alia involve 
sending demarches to other countries (Official #22, 2 October 2008; Official #28, 8 
October 2008; Official #38, 9 October 2008). Three, in some areas, such as the Arab-
Israeli conflict, the US position is so set, it may as well be written in stone.  As one EU 
member state official says:  
“For those resolutions there is no necessity for a transatlantic 
dialogue since the US is in a world of its own and away from all 
reality. The perception is such that any change in the US 
position must be preceded by a change in Israel’s position 
first.” (Official #21, 20 November 2008) 
 
The Transatlantic Partnership in Voting Records 
The voting records of the transatlantic partners are illustrated in tables 5.1 to 5.3. 
Transatlantic convergence refers to resolutions for which the US and the EU majority 
position are identical. Transatlantic divergence refers to resolutions for which the US 
and the majority of the EU member states cast different votes. Fully Cohesive Votes 
refers to all those resolutions for which the member states speak with a single voice. 
Split Votes refers to all those resolutions for which the member states do not speak 
with a single voice.  
 
As illustrated in Table 5.1, the transatlantic partners disagree more often in the UNGA 
than they agree. The EU member states speak with a single voice in the forum slightly 
more often in face of transatlantic divergence compared to transatlantic convergence. 
As Kissinger (1966)  pointed out, “in many respects [European unity] may magnify 
rather than reduce [Atlantic disagreements]”(p. 232). However, they also disagree 
more often in face of transatlantic divergence compared to transatlantic convergence.   
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All Resolutions Fully Cohesive vote Split Vote Total 
Transatlantic Convergence 284 69 353 
Transatlantic Divergence 313 155 468 
Total 597 224 821 
 
Table 5.1: Comparison of Transatlantic Votes 
 
Both, the Arab/Israeli conflict as well as military resolutions make up a fair proportion 
of the overall number of resolutions considered as part of this analysis. By considering 
resolutions pertaining to either topic separately the overall impression of the 
transatlantic relationship inside UNGA changes somewhat.
35
 It becomes evident that 
of the originally 313 resolutions for which the EU member states speak with a single 
voice in face of transatlantic divergence, more than two-thirds deal with the Arab-
Israeli conflict. This is not entirely surprising. Looking ahead to chapter 7, the Arab-
Israeli conflict is a well-known bone of contention between the transatlantic partners. 
Further noteworthy is the extremely small number of split votes in this issue area more 
generally. In fact, EU member states cast diverging votes less than 10% of the time for 
resolutions pertaining to the Arab Israeli conflict. 
 
Arab/Israeli Conflict 
Resolutions Fully Cohesive vote Split Vote Total 
Transatlantic Convergence 28 1 29 
Transatlantic Divergence 218 20 238 
Total 246 21 267 
 
Table 5.2: Comparison of Transatlantic Votes – Arab/Israeli Conflict 
                                                      
35
 Resolutions pertaining to the Arab/Israeli conflict as well as those dealing with military issues are 
furthermore selected as case studies for the qualitative analysis. The reasons for this selection are 
explained in more detail in chapter 7. However, because they are selected as case studies in chapter 7,  I 
thought it useful to isolate them, where appropriate and relevant, as part of the quantitative analysis. 
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As already mentioned, military resolutions also make up a fair share of the overall 
number of resolutions. Interestingly, more than 40% of all split votes occur for 
resolutions pertaining to military issues.  Slightly more than half of the  time that the 
member states disagree with each other on military resolutions, the majority of them 
also disagrees with the US. 
  
Military Resolutions Fully Cohesive vote Split Vote Total 
Transatlantic Convergence 109 41 150 
Transatlantic Divergence 29 53 82 
Total 138 94 232 
 
Table 5.3: Comparison Transatlantic Votes – Military Resolutions 
 
Overall then, it can be said that the bulk of transatlantic disagreement lies with 
resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, even if one 
disregarded those resolutions, for the time period under consideration the 
transatlantic partners still disagree almost nearly as much as they agree (230 to 324 
resolutions). Although it has to be pointed out that much of the time they disagree 
with the US, they also disagree with each other.  
 
Contextualising the Transatlantic Partnership 
By comparing the transatlantic voting pattern to that of other voting dyads in the 
UNGA, the extent of the transatlantic partnership in terms of UNGA voting behaviour 
can be contextualised. Undoubtedly, several UN member states would make likely 
candidates for such a comparison. For fear of an excessively arbitrary selection, I limit 
myself to the permanent member states of the UNSC. Shifting the focus to a 
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comparison between the EU voting position and other countries, I’ve opted to replace 
France and UK with the EU majority position.  
 
In order to measure the voting distance of the dyads, I employ Gartzke’s (2006) index 
of affinity scores. These are calculated with help of a formula developed by Signorino 
and Ritter (1999) who call them similarity scores.  Signorino and Ritter (1999) calculate 
the voting distance between two countries by year. The voting distance between two 
countries could also be calculated for longer/shorter time periods as well as for issue 
areas.  Per resolution, each member state receives a code for whichever vote it casts; a 
1 for “no”, a 2 for “abstain” and a 3 for a “yes”. The distance between them is 
calculated in absolute terms. The maximum distance between two countries per 
resolution is 2, since if they are diametrically opposed one would receive a 1 and the 
other one would receive a 3. All resolutions are weighted equally. The weight for the 
individual resolution is calculated as an average of all resolutions considered per year. 
 
The distance d is calculated as follows: 
 
 =  ℎ/  !"# ∗  |&' − &'(| 
 
The similarity score S, of which the distance d is an integral part of, is calculated as 
follows: 
 
) =  1 − 2 ∗ / max !"# 
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The result is a continuous variable which can range between (-1), indicating least 
similar voting record and (1) indicating identical voting record. The voting affinity 
between the resulting six dyads is presented in Figure 5.9. The horizontal axis 
illustrates the individual UNGA sessions, while the vertical axis represents Gartzke’s 
affinity index. The various dyads illustrate how similarly its members vote in the UNGA 
on average each session.  
 
 
Figure 5.9: UNGA Voting Affinity of Selected Dyads 
In the affinity index the value of zero represents a threshold, whereby scores above 
zero indicate on average a more similar voting pattern and scores below zero indicate 
on average a more dissimilar voting pattern between the partners. With reference 
Figure 5.9, only dyads that include the US exhibit scores below zero, either consistently 
(as with China), with strong tendency (as with Russia) or intermittently (as with the 
EU). Of all possible dyads, the US and China exhibit the least similar voting patterns, 
followed by the US and Russia. The EU is the voting partner most closely aligned with 
the US, although in the 50
th
 session (1995), the US voting record is as similar to that of 
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the EU as it is to that of Russia. In 2002 and 2003, the transatlantic partners on average 
cast more dissimilar votes than similar votes.  
 
The EU, on the other hand, exhibits a voting pattern that is more similar to that of 
Russia and China, than to that of the US. Indeed, while from the US perspective the EU 
exhibits the most similar voting pattern, from the EU perspective, the US exhibits the 
least similar voting pattern. That indicates that the US is the odd one out. Having said 
this, as is illustrated in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the Arab Israeli conflict, a major sticking 
point between the transatlantic partners, makes up about half of all the transatlantic 
divergent resolutions and is included in the calculations. 
 
EU Support for Resolutions Considered Important by the US 
The above paragraphs show that the transatlantic partners disagree more often than 
they agree inside the UNGA. They also indicate that the EU voting behaviour is more 
compatible with the votes cast by Russia and China than with the votes cast by the US. 
It is the purpose of this section to further scrutinise the proclaimed specialness of the 
transatlantic relationship further by examining EU voting behaviour for those 
resolutions considered important by the US.  As already elaborated on in chapter 4 and 
in the beginning paragraphs of this chapter, for the time period under consideration, 
there are 150 resolutions which the US considers highly important and for which it 
lobbies heavily. These are the focus of the current section. The question is, to what 
extent does the EU collectively stand behind the US on these? 
 
The voting records of the transatlantic partners for these lobbied votes are illustrated 
in table 5.2. Transatlantic convergence refers to resolutions for which the US and the 
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EU majority position are identical. Transatlantic divergence refers to resolutions for 
which the US and the majority of the EU member states cast different votes. Fully 
Cohesive Votes refers to all those resolutions for which the member states speak with 
a single voice. Split Votes refers to all those resolutions for which the member states 
do not speak with a single voice. The final column depicts the average cohesion levels 
for all resolutions falling under transatlantic convergence and for all resolutions falling 
under transatlantic divergence separately. 
 
Fully Cohesive Votes Split Votes Total 
Average EU 
cohesion 
Transatlantic 
Convergence 86 10 96 0.98 
Transatlantic 
Divergence 38 16 54 0.91 
Total 124 26 150   
 
Table 5.4: Comparison of Transatlantic Votes – Resolutions Considered Important by 
the US 
 
As opposed to the overall picture provided in the previous section, for those 
resolutions deemed important by the US, the transatlantic partners agree roughly 
twice as many times as they disagree. Nevertheless, in a quarter of all resolutions, the 
EU member states collectively oppose the US position.  
 
5.4 Multivariate Analysis 
The multivariate model employed in the present chapter estimates the impact of an 
array of factors on the likelihood that EU member states achieve full cohesion on the 
resolutions tabled for a vote. As already discussed in chapter 4, despite the fact that 
the variable EU cohesion index is measured in continuous terms, I choose not to 
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employ OLS. Instead, I transform the continuous variable into a binary variable and 
employ binary logistic regression. I include two fixed effects (year and issue area each 
included separately and then combined) in the models. Taken all this into 
consideration, I develop 4 variations of the same basic model. The results, including 
post estimation statistics can be found in Appendix 5.1. 
 
The Multivariate Model 
I chose one of the models (Model 4 in Appendix 5.1) for further analysis and 
interpretation in the chapter.  In addition to control variables, the model includes 
state-focused factors, institutional factors as well as external factors. In terms of state-
focused factors, each model includes a measure of issue salience. No measure of 
power is included in the system-level analysis, since the variable power is measured by 
individual member states and thus only applicable to the individual-level analysis. In 
terms of institutional factors, the model includes measures of institutional pressures 
(relevant CFSP position in place, EU collectively sponsors resolution). The model does 
not include measures of institutional dedication (degree of voluntary integration, EU 
net-beneficiary, and degree of negative opinion about the EU), since, again, these are 
only applicable for individual-level analysis. Also included is a measure to account for 
the degree of transatlantic divergence (that is to say, for the distance between the EU 
majority vote and the US vote).  Additionally, a measure of UN cohesion has been 
included in the analysis, mainly to determine whether or not any level of EU cohesion 
is a function of UN cohesion. Finally, year fixed effects as well as issue area fixed 
effects are incorporated as well.  
 
 
156 
 
Dependent Variable: Perfect EU Vote Cohesion 
State Focused Factors   
Salience Perceived issue salience 0.608 
  (0.168)*** 
Institutional Factors   
 Institutional Pressure Relevant CFSP position in 
place 
1.283 
  (0.435)*** 
 Collective EU sponsorship 0.300 
  (0.357) 
External Factors   
Transatlantic 
Relationship 
Transatlantic Divergence 
(TD) 
-2.209 
  (0.294)*** 
Control Variables UN Cohesion 2.475 
  (1.994) 
   
Constant  -1.315 
  (1.856) 
   
Fixed Effects Issue Area Yes*** 
 Year Yes* 
Model Specifications Observations 505 
 Pseudo R2 0.3 
 Wald chi2 (23) 125.6 
 Prob > chi2 0.000 
   
 
Table 5.5: Logistic Regression – Determinants of ‘Perfect EU Vote Cohesion’ 
 
 
 
The model is statistically significant. The only state-focused factor included in the 
analysis is issue salience. The results indicate a positive relationship between how 
salient an issue is perceived on average by the member states and the likelihood that 
they achieve full cohesion on that particular resolution.  These results appear to be 
contrary to the supposition made in chapter 3, where I hypothesised that the more 
salient an EU member state perceives an issue to be the less susceptible it is to vote 
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coordination pressures and the less likely it is to exhibit EU majority – oriented voting 
behaviour. However, given the problematic conceptional set-up of the variable 
salience, also discussed in chapter 3, the results are in fact non-conclusive.
36
 Without 
knowing a country’s national policy preference, it is impossible to determine whether 
the member states happen to share the same policy preferences as regards issues they 
consider salient, or alternatively whether the member states prefer a cohesive vote on 
an issue they perceive as salient, even if it means overriding one’s national policy 
preference. Any results must therefore be interpreted with caution and should be 
considered in conjunction with the results of the individual-level analysis conducted in 
chapter 6.  
 
Of the institutional pressures, only the existence of a relevant CFSP position increases 
the likelihood of the EU speaking with one voice in the UNGA at a statistically 
significant level. This is an interesting finding in as far as one could argue that rather 
than the binding nature of an existing and relevant CFSP position causing the member 
states to speak with a single voice in the General Assembly, it is the fact that an 
existing CFSP position (which in most cases is agreed unanimously) illustrates already 
existing agreement between the member states on that particular issue. While the 
latter may certainly be an appealing explanation at first sight, there are several aspects 
which point into the direction of the former (binding nature of existing and relevant 
CFSP position).  In those instances in which there are corresponding UNGA resolutions 
and CFSP positions, it cannot be said that they are in fact identical. CFSP positions are 
generally phrased in much broader terms than respective UNGA resolutions. Because it 
is the EU member states drafting their CFSP positions, they are able to draft them in a 
                                                      
36
 The problematic conceptional set-up of this discussed in chapter 3.3.  
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way so as to ensure everybody’s consent. Most UNGA resolutions are not 
(co)sponsored by the EU member states. That is to say, they do not have an automatic 
input on the text. Because these UNGA resolutions are narrower and EU member 
states usually do not have an opportunity help draft the text, it is not only feasible but 
also likely, that these resolutions include aspects that the member states do not agree 
on. Hence agreement in a relevant CFSP position does not automatically translate into 
shared views on a corresponding UNGA resolution. Still, EU cohesion levels are higher 
when relevant CFSP positions are in place. The conclusion that this is the case because 
of their binding nature has been corroborated during the interviews undertaken with 
EU diplomats at the UN as part of this study. They highlight that EU member states are 
remarkably aware of existing CFSP positions and that they are expected to speak with 
a single voice on issues on which CFSP positions exist.
37
  
 
Collective EU sponsorship, while positive, is not a statistically significant indicator of EU 
cohesion. Even though one EU official pointed out to me that generally speaking the 
EU member states tend to speak with one voice when they collectively sponsor a 
resolution (Official #15, 7 October 2008), resolution sponsorship generally does not 
seem to be playing as much of a role. In fact, EU member states very rarely sponsor or 
co-sponsor a resolution – individually or collectively. Collectively, they sponsor or co-
sponsor only 12% of all resolutions considered in this study. Furthermore, the ratio 
between split votes and fully cohesive votes is approximately the same for collectively 
sponsored resolutions and for those resolutions which have not been sponsored. Seen 
in this context, the findings are not surprising. 
 
                                                      
37
 This particular aspect is discussed in more detail in chapter 7.5.  
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As regards the transatlantic relationship, the results seem to indicate that transatlantic 
divergence generally decreases the likelihood of perfect EU cohesion at a statistically 
significant level. However, this does not necessarily mean that transatlantic divergence 
causes a decrease in EU cohesion. Transatlantic divergence might simply be an 
indicator for resolutions that also tend to be controversial among the EU member 
states. Finally, the relationship between EU cohesion and UN cohesion is not 
statistically significant, which seems to confirm that EU cohesion is not a function of 
UN cohesion. 
 
Further Interpretation Using CLARIFY 
A few of the variables have proven to be robust across the entire range of models and 
will be subject to further scrutiny and interpretation. In doing so, I shall employ the 
methodological tool CLARIFY (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2003). The variables of 
particular interest are whether or not a relevant CFSP position exists and transatlantic 
divergence. Although issue salience also yielded statistically significant results, I opt to 
exclude it from further analysis on the grounds of its difficult conceptional set-up. Two 
baseline models are presented. One model predicts the likelihood of perfect EU 
cohesion for nuclear issues for the year 1997, while a second model predicts the 
likelihood of perfect EU cohesion for Arab/Israeli issues for the year 1997.  In the 
baseline model all continuous variables are set to their mean and all other variables 
are set to their minimum. CFSP position and Transatlantic Divergence are set to the 
value of 0. That is to say, no relevant CFSP position is in place and the US voting 
position is identical to that of the EU majority position. Even for the baseline models, 
one immediately notices the near certainty in reaching full EU cohesion for resolutions 
pertaining to Arab Israeli conflict. Further, for resolutions pertaining to the Arab Israeli 
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conflict, transatlantic divergence only marginally decreases the likelihood of obtaining 
a fully cohesive vote.
38
  The picture is slightly more varied for nuclear issues. The 
probability of reaching full EU cohesion for the baseline model is 0.784.  Reaching full 
EU cohesion becomes roughly 1.2 times more likely when a relevant CFSP position is in 
place. Conversely, in instances of transatlantic divergence, EU cohesion is more than 
two times less likely. However, as discussed in the above paragraphs, transatlantic 
divergence may not be the cause, but could simply be indicative of generally 
controversial issues 
                                                      
38
 This observation is corroborated by interview material.  
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Table 5.6: Predicted Probabilities of Perfect EU Vote Cohesion – Arab/Israeli Issues, 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted Probabilities of Perfect EU Vote Cohesion – Arab/Israeli Issues, 1997 
    
Baseline Model 
Probability 
Probability Modified 
Model 
Confidence 
Interval 
        
Institutional Pressure CFSP position in place 0.985 0.997 0.993 0.999 
External Factors Transatlantic Divergence 0.985 0.928 0.861 0.968 
Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at a value of zero for all other variables. 
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Predicted Probabilities of Perfect EU Vote Cohesion – Nuclear Issues, 1997 
    
Baseline Model 
Probability 
Probability Modified 
Model 
Confidence 
Interval 
            
Institutional Pressure CFSP position in place 0.784 0.925 0.810 0.979 
External Factors Transatlantic Divergence 0.784 0.337 0.154 0.562 
Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at a value of zero for all other variables. 
 
Table 5.7: Predicted Probabilities of Perfect EU Vote Cohesion – Nuclear Issues, 1997 
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5.5 Conclusion 
In chapter 5 I set out to examine the EU member states’ voting patterns inside the 
United Nations General Assembly from a system-level perspective. To that end I 
illustrated that despite some variation over time and across issue area, EU cohesion 
levels are generally high. In fact, the vast majority of all roll-call votes yield perfect 
cohesion levels. This circumstance led me to opt for binary logistic regression instead 
of OLS regression as part of the multivariate analysis later on in the chapter.  
 
Prior to that I highlighted voting patterns that strongly support the claim that EU 
member states intend to coordinate their votes inside the UNGA. Voting patterns 
indicative of intra-EU dialogue include a sudden rise in EU cohesion levels in the run-up 
to the Maastricht Treaty as well as instances of collective change, whereby member 
states uniformly adjust their positions for repeat resolutions. I also illustrated that EU 
cohesion levels stand on their own and are not a function of the cohesion levels of 
other regional groups or that of the UN at large beyond what is to be expected.  
 
An entire section was dedicated to the close scrutiny of the transatlantic relationship. 
By contextualising the transatlantic relationship and comparing voting patterns of the 
transatlantic partners to that of several other countries, it emerged that far from a 
special relationship, the EU exhibits voting patterns more similar to Russia and China 
than to the US. Furthermore, for a quarter of resolutions explicitly considered 
important by the US, the EU collectively opposes the US vote. Having said this, the 
chapter has also highlighted that the Arab-Israeli issues is a particular bone of 
contention between the transatlantic partners. 
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The multivariate analysis has produced some interesting findings. As hypothesised, a 
strong positive link is present between existing and relevant CFSP positions and EU 
cohesion in the General Assembly. Importantly, the analysis has confirmed that EU 
cohesion levels inside the UNGA are in fact not a function of UNGA cohesion. While 
perceived issue salience as well as transatlantic divergence both produce statistically 
significant results, for both it is difficult to unambiguously interpret the results and 
both will benefit from further scrutiny in the subsequent chapter where EU member 
states’ voting patterns inside the United Nations General Assembly are examined from 
an individual-level perspective. 
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5.6 Appendices 
Appendix 5A: Models Including Postestimation Results 
Determinants of Perfect EU Cohesion 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
State Focused Factors 
     Salience Perceived issue salience 0.635 0.693 0.586 0.608 
  
(0.128)*** (0.129)*** (0.163)*** (0.168)*** 
Institutional Factors 
     
Institutional Pressure 
Relevant CFSP position in 
place 1.511 1.695 0.976 1.283 
  
(0.364)*** (0.384)*** (0.4)** (0.435)*** 
      
 
Collective EU sponsorship 0.239 0.318 0.277 0.300 
  
(0.3) (0.318) (0.334) (0.357) 
      
External Factors 
     
Transatlantic Relationship 
Transatlantic Divergence 
(TD) -1.586 -1.677 -2.083 -2.209 
  
(0.225)*** (0.242)*** (0.279)*** (0.294)*** 
Control Variables UN Cohesion 2.352 2.669 2.407 2.475 
  
(1.438) (1.588) (1.77) (1.994) 
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Constant 
 
-1.645 -1.590 -1.960 -1.315 
  
(1.308) (1.46) (1.629) (1.856) 
      Fixed Effects Issue Area 
  
Yes*** Yes*** 
 
Year 
 
Yes** 
 
Yes* 
      
Model Specifications Observations 516 516 505 505 
 
Pseudo R2 0.207 0.246 0.267 0.3 
 
Wald chi2 (6)98.190 (17) 108.9 (12) 108.76 (23) 125.6 
 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
Post-estimation Statistics Linktest 0.451 0.292 0.61 0.613 
 
Lfit 0.0007 0.2462 0.3343 0.1542 
 
Lroc 0.8035 0.8194 0.828 0.8493 
 
Mean VIF 1.17 1.53 1.65 1.72 
Notes: Logistic Regression; estimated with robust standard errors; significance levels: *** p≤ 0.01, **p≤ 0.05, 
*p≤ 0.1; Model in bold used for further analysis in chapter 5 
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Appendix 5B: Comparing Average EU Cohesion Levels with Cohesion Levels of Politically Affiliated 
Groups  
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CHAPTER 6: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS II: 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
In chapter 5, I illustrated that EU member states are by and large successfully able to 
coordinate their voting positions inside the United Nations General Assembly. 
Cohesion levels are generally high and the voting patterns observed are indicative of 
intra-EU dialogue. Moreover, several of the factors that were hypothesised to 
influence whether or not the EU member states speak with a single voice in the 
General Assembly performed as expected during multivariate analysis and EU cohesion 
levels varied accordingly.  
 
In chapter 6 I set out to examine the EU member states’ voting patterns inside the 
United Nations General Assembly from an individual-level perspective. That is to say 
the focus of this chapter is on the voting behaviour of the individual EU member states 
with reference to the overall EU position. The quantitative analysis begins with an 
instructive breakdown of individual votes cast over time and across issue areas, before 
illustrating how heterogeneous policy preferences play into the voting behaviour of 
the member states. This is followed by an attempt to contextualise the voting 
behaviour of the EU member states with reference to the positions upheld by other 
members of the United Nations General Assembly, in particular with reference to the 
votes cast by the US. As part of the subsequent inferential statistical analysis, I employ 
logistic regression to gauge the likelihood of a member state defecting from the EU 
majority position considering an array of state-focused factors, institutionalised 
pressures, and under certain circumstances, the position upheld by the US. 
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Accordingly, the chapter is divided into five sections. I shall inspect the voting 
behaviour of the individual member states in more detail in section 6.1, focusing on 
vote defections more generally and isolated votes in particular. Comparisons are made 
over time and across issue area. In section 6.2, I set out to identify patterns in the 
voting behaviour of the member states that strongly point towards heterogeneous 
policy preferences. Ahead of the multivariate analysis in section 6.4, I shall use section 
6.3 to analyse the voting behaviour of the individual EU member states with reference 
to the US. Finally, a brief conclusion to the chapter will be provided in section 6.5. 
 
6.1 UNGA Vote Defections by EU Member States 
Of the 821 resolutions put to the vote before the United Nations General Assembly 
between 1992 and 2003 (47
th
 session to 58
th
 session), the EU member states voted in 
unison for 597 of the resolutions. For the remaining 224 resolutions, the member 
states did not vote in unison. Because in this chapter the focus is on how each country 
votes for each resolution, the dataset contains a total of 11647 observations (number 
of resolutions x country x year) 
 
Vote Defection per Country over Time 
In this section I investigate vote defections per country over time more generally 
before focusing on isolated votes in particular. As illustrated in table 6.1, over the 
twelve-year time period, the 224 split votes led to a total of 643 individual vote 
defections.  France and the UK have incurred the majority of the vote defections and 
together account for approximately 37% of all of them. Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg 
each have incurred less than 20 vote defections and together account for less than 6% 
of all vote defections. Despite a one year hiatus, at 50 vote defections, Greece’s vote 
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defection record is still above the average. Despite a three year hiatus, Austria’s and 
Sweden’s vote defection record is at the median level and above the median level 
respectively.  While almost half of the member states have years in which they do not 
defect from the EU majority vote at all (i.e. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands), each EU member state has defected from the position held 
by the majority of the member states at some point or another. Generally speaking, 
vote defections are most prevalent during the early years under consideration, 
decrease by nearly half by 1998 and abruptly rise again towards the end of the time 
period under consideration. In 2003 they in fact surpass early year figures.
39
 
 
Isolated Votes per Country over Time 
As is illustrated in table 6.2, in 44 of the 224 resolutions for which EU member states 
do not speak with a single voice, isolated voting behaviour takes place. That count 
includes non-participations. That is to say, in 44 instances one EU member state either 
does not participate in the roll-call vote at all or votes alone against the EU majority. If 
non-participations are disregarded, there are still thirty instances in which one 
member state or another votes alone against the EU majority. Most of the isolated 
votes are incurred by the UK, France and Ireland, while Belgium, Finland and Italy do 
not incur any. If non-participations are discounted, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Austria also never vote in isolation. While at least one isolated vote is cast in each year 
under observation, their occurrence is more prevalent during the early years. During 
the last years under observation the occurrence of isolated votes has approximately 
halved. And as opposed to vote defections more generally, the number of isolated 
votes do not increase again during the 2002 and 2003 sessions. 
                                                      
39
 The voting behaviour of the three countries joining the EU in 1995 (i.e. Sweden, Finland and Austria) is 
illustrated separately in the Appendix 6.2. 
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Table 6.1: Vote Defections per Country over Time 
 
 
Vote Defections per Country  over Time 
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Austria n/a n/a n/a 2 5 3 2 3 3 3 5 5 31 
Belgium 0 1 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 2 11 
Denmark 5 4 2 0 3 3 1 1 0 3 1 1 24 
Finland n/a n/a n/a 2 4 4 2 1 2 1 2 4 22 
France 8 13 13 11 9 9 9 11 10 7 11 8 119 
Germany 0 2 1 2 3 1 1 3 1 1 4 3 22 
Greece 13 12 5 7 n/a 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 50 
Ireland 11 9 7 4 6 4 3 5 5 6 6 9 75 
Italy 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 3 4 13 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 2 2 3 2 1 1 0 1 1 13 
Netherlands 0 1 1 3 4 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 20 
Portugal 6 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 7 6 34 
Spain 12 11 5 4 2 2 1 1 3 3 5 6 55 
Sweden  n/a n/a n/a 2 6 4 2 4 2 4 5 8 37 
UK 12 13 13 11 8 8 7 8 7 8 9 13 117 
Total 67 70 50 52 55 49 34 44 40 43 65 74 643 
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Isolated Votes per Country  over Time 
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total NP* 
Austria n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 
Finland n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 2 2 2 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 11 4 
Germany 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 4 2 
Greece 0 1 1 2 n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 
Ireland 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 2 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Spain 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 
Sweden  n/a n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
UK 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 1 
Total 8 6 7 2 4 1 2 2 3 2 4 3 44 14 
*NP = not participated in roll-call vote  
 
Table 6.2: Isolated Votes per Country over Time 
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Vote Defection per Country across Issue Area  
In this section I investigate vote defections per country across issue area more 
generally before focusing on isolated votes in particular. Table 6.3 tabulates instances 
of vote defection across issue area. The 643 individual vote defections do not spread 
evenly across issue areas. Most vote defections occur for resolutions pertaining to 
nuclear issues and decolonisation, followed by a middle-group consisting of resolutions 
that deal with sovereignty and self-determination, mercenary issues, disarmament, 
peace and security and the Arab Israeli conflict. Resolutions pertaining to 
internationalism, human rights and democracy incur fewer vote defections still. 
 
Isolated Votes per Country across Issue Area 
Although resolutions pertaining to human rights and internationalism by far do not 
incur the most vote defections, along with nuclear issues they incur most of the 
isolated votes. And while resolutions dealing with mercenaries issues draw much of 
the vote defections, they incur not a single isolated vote. Unsurprisingly then, the UK 
and France are the two most confrontation-prone countries followed by Ireland as 
distant second. And while Spain and Greece both incur above average vote defections, 
especially Spain does not match that voting behaviour with isolated votes. Also 
unsurprisingly, resolutions dealing with decolonisation and sovereignty and self-
determination as well as those dealing with various aspects of military issues incur 
most of the vote defections. These are also the issue which, among others, incur the 
majority of the isolated votes. 
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Table 6.3: Vote Defections per Country across Issue Area 
 
Vote Defections per Country  across Issue Area 
  AT BE DK FI FR DE EL IE IT LU NL PT ES SE UK Total 
Decolonisation 1 0 0 5 19 6 9 11 0 6 8 11 11 1 24 112 
Peace/ Security 2 7 7 0 12 0 1 3 2 0 0 2 2 0 12 50 
Democratisation 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Human Rights 0 0 3 1 3 2 3 0 0 3 2 0 2 4 4 27 
Internationalism 0 1 1 0 3 0 4 6 2 0 3 6 5 1 6 38 
Sovereignty/Self-determination 0 2 2 2 19 3 6 1 1 1 2 3 4 0 19 65 
Arab-Israeli Conflict 0 1 2 1 6 4 11 3 0 1 2 1 12 0 6 50 
Disarmament 1 0 2 0 17 2 0 6 2 1 1 1 1 3 15 52 
Mercenary 5 0 2 0 8 1 11 12 3 0 0 7 12 0 0 61 
Nuclear 22 0 5 13 31 4 5 33 3 1 2 3 6 28 31 187 
Total 31 11 24 22 119 22 50 75 13 13 20 34 55 37 117 643 
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Table 6.4: Isolated Votes per Country across Issue Area 
 
Isolated Votes per Country across Issue Area 
AT BE DK FI FR DE EL IE IT LU NL PT ES SE UK Total 
Decolonisation 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 6 
Peace/ Security 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Democratisation 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Human Rights 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 8 
Internationalism 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 8 
Sovereignty/Self-determination 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Arab-Israeli Conflict 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 4 
Disarmament 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Mercenary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 
Total 1 0 3 0 11 4 4 6 0 1 1 1 2 1 9 44 
NP* 1 0 0 0 4 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 14 
*NP = not participated in roll-call vote   
176 
 
6.2 Policy Preference Heterogeneity 
In chapter 3 I argued that EU member states intend to coordinate their votes inside the 
UNGA despite holding heterogeneous policy preferences. I further pointed out that for 
those resolutions for which the member states vote in unison, it is impossible to detect 
whether they do so because they hold homogeneous policy preferences or despite the 
fact that they have heterogeneous policy preferences. However, resolutions for which 
EU member states do not cast their votes in unison, in and of themselves, are 
indicative of heterogeneous policy preferences. Looking ahead to chapter 7, it has 
been suggested during the expert interviews that while EU member states do not 
easily break EU cohesion; once the EU is split, member states are quite happy to vote 
according to their individual policy preferences – which may or may not overlap 
(Official #32, 4 December 2008).  
 
It is not unreasonable to assume that heterogeneous policy preferences exist between 
the EU member states. As already highlighted in chapter 3, despite the many 
similarities between the advanced societies of the European Union and  the notion of 
liberal democracy presenting a “strong unifying link between the members of the 
European Union, […] there are substantial differences between [them]” 
(Athanassopoulou, 2008, p. xi; also see Doyle, 1983).  
 
Socially Progressive/Conservative Countries 
This notion is supported by Ingelhart’s World Value Survey, designed to provide a 
comprehensive measurement of all major areas of human concern – from religion to 
politics to economic and social life (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). The corresponding 
factor analysis puts the focus on two dimensions. The Traditional/Secular-rational 
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values dimension emphasises the contrast between societies where religion is very 
important and societies where religion is not so important. The Survival/Self-
Expression values dimension emphasises the transition from industrial society to post-
industrial societies.  
 
Because the fifteen EU member states under analysis here are similarly advanced and 
tend to cluster together on the Survival/Self-Expression values dimension, of the two 
dimensions, the Traditional/Secular-rational values dimension plays the more 
important role in outlining possible differences between the EU member states. While 
some countries are more progressive, others may be deemed more conservative (Rees 
& Young, 2005).  Of the countries in this thesis, the Inglehart Values Map categorises 
the Nordic countries as well as Germany and the Netherlands as socially progressive. 
The following countries are mapped as increasingly socially conservative: Greece, 
France, Luxembourg, Belgium, UK, Austria, Italy, and Spain.
40
 Ireland is the most 
socially conservative country in the EU 15 (Inglehart, 2009). 
 
Militarily Progressive/Conservative Countries 
In addition to differences in their views on social issues, EU member states also differ 
in their views on military issues (Rummel, 1988, p. 118). They may be divided into 
militarily conservative and militarily progressive countries. The two nuclear powers 
France and the United Kingdom may be classified as militarily conservative, while the 
four neutral countries Finland, Austria, Ireland and Sweden may be classified as 
militarily progressive.  
 
                                                      
40
 Portugal is not listed in the map, but may also be deemed socially conservative.  
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As these illustrations highlight, “even if we limit ourselves to the national level of the 
[…] fifteen member states, Europe is characterised by the great diversity of its […] 
national and state traditions” (Loughlin, 2008, p. 187).  Based on its cultural 
traditions
41
 and historical ties, a nation’s political framework reflects that nation’s 
interpretation of the political, economic and fiscal currents of the time. And that is 
precisely the reason why policy preferences even between countries that share basic 
democratic values may differ (Kimmel, 1992, p. 26).   
 
6.3 The Transatlantic Relationship in the UNGA 
I illustrated in chapter 5, that there is more disagreement between the EU member 
states in instances of transatlantic divergence than in instances of transatlantic 
convergence. I further highlighted, that even for those resolutions considered 
important by the US, EU member states do not consistently support the US position.   
 
The Bilateral Transatlantic Relationships in Voting Records 
Taking a closer look at the voting behaviour of the individual member states, Figure 6.8 
illustrates the voting position of individual EU member states with reference to the US 
position on the one hand and the EU majority position on the other hand. The voting 
distances are calculated from the perspective of the individual EU member states with 
references to the EU majority position (light) and with reference to the US position 
(dark). The closer a score is to (1) the smaller the distance between the dyad’s voting 
records (i.e. many identical votes). The closer the score to (-1), the bigger the distance 
between the dyad’s voting records (i.e. many directly opposing votes). Scores close to 
                                                      
41
 “Culture is a system of attitudes, values and knowledge, widely shared within a society and may vary between 
societies.” (Inglehart, 1990, p. 18) 
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zero indicate that countries either agree as many times as they disagree or 
alternatively tend to only indirectly oppose each other (i.e. one party tends to abstain 
while the other either supports or rejects a resolution). 
 
Even for the votes considered important by the US (the so-called lobbied votes), the 
voting records of the individual member states are generally more similar to that of 
the EU majority position than to that of the US. If we only look at the voting record 
distance to the US (the marks towards the centre of the chart), we find that of all the 
EU member states, the voting record of the UK is most similar to that of the US, 
followed by the three Nordic countries and Belgium, closely followed by France. 
Greece’s voting record is the least similar to the US.
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Figure 6.1: Average Voting Distance between EU and US 
                                                      
42
 Please note that no voting records have been included for the 3 Nordic countries between 1992 and 
1995 and for Greece during 1996.  
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6.4 Multivariate Analysis 
The multivariate models employed in the present chapter estimate the impact of an 
array of factors on the likelihood that a member state defects from the EU majority 
position. I employ binary logistic regression. As illustrated in chapter 4, I measure the 
variable power in three different ways (one, as the member states’ military 
expenditure; two, as their GDP; and three, as their allocated voting weights in the 
Council of Ministers). I further measure the variable Transatlantic Relationship in three 
different ways (one, in political terms; two, in cultural terms; and three in economic 
terms). And finally, I include two fixed effects (year and issue area each included 
separately and then combined) in the models. Taken all this into consideration, I 
develop 27 variations of the same basic model. The results, including post estimation 
statistics can be found in Appendices 6.1 to 6.3.  
 
The Multivariate Model 
I chose three representative models for further analysis and interpretation in the 
chapter. The models include state-focused factors, institutional factors as well as 
external factors. In terms of state-focused factors, each model includes a measure of 
power (measured as military expenditure, GDP or allocated Council voting weights) 
and a measure of issue salience. In terms of institutional factors, each model includes 
measures of institutional pressures (relevant CFSP position in place, EU collectively 
sponsors resolution) and measures of institutional dedication (degree of voluntary 
integration, EU net-beneficiary, and degree of negative opinion about the EU). Also 
included are measures to account for transatlantic relationship (transatlantic trade as 
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percentage of GDP, number of joint international military operations, number of non-
immigrant visas to US as percentage of home population). Additionally, measures of 
government type and government position are included as control variables. Finally, 
year fixed effects as well as issue area fixed effects are incorporated as well. The 
results are illustrated in Table 6.5. 
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Dependent Variable : Vote Defection 
  Model 2 Corrected 
Estimates 
Model 4 Corrected 
Estimates 
Model 9 Corrected 
Estimates 
State Focused Factors 
Power Military Expenditure as 
% of GDP 
0.000 
(0.000)*** 
0.000 
(0.000)*** 
    
 GDP   -0.001 -0.001   
    (0.000)*** (0.000)***   
 Council Voting Weights     0.128 
(0.022)*** 
0.126 
(0.022)*** 
Salience Perceived issue salience -0.084 
(0.087) 
-0.078 
(0.087) 
-0.062 
(0.093) 
-0.062 
(0.093) 
-0.179 
(0.100)* 
-0.171 
(0.100)* 
Institutional Factors 
Institutional 
Pressure 
Relevant CFSP position 
in place 
-1.755 
(0.350)*** 
-1.696 
(0.349)*** 
-1.781 
(0.355)*** 
-1.781 
(0.355)*** 
-1.755 
(0.353)*** 
-1.694 
(0.352)*** 
        
 Collective EU 
sponsorship 
0.160 
(0.162) 
0.164 
(0.161) 
0.143 
(0.164) 
0.143 
(0.164) 
0.137 
(0.161) 
0.140 
(0.160) 
Institutional 
dedication 
Degree of voluntary 
integration 
-0.142 
(0.075)* 
-0.141 
(0.074)* 
0.102 
(0.054)* 
0.102 
(0.054)* 
0.005 
(0.058) 
0.006 
(0.057) 
        
 Member states is net-
beneficiary 
-0.946 
(0.162)*** 
-0.939 
(0.161)*** 
-1.174 
(0.154)*** 
-1.174 
(0.154)*** 
-1.310 
(0.159)*** 
-1.298 
(0.158)*** 
        
 Degree of negative 
opinion about EU 
0.485 
(0.112)*** 
0.481 
(0.111)*** 
-0.286 
(0.118)*** 
-0.286 
(0.118)*** 
0.529 
(0.107)*** 
0.523 
(0.106)*** 
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External Factors 
Transatlantic 
Relationship 
Transatlantic 
Divergence (TD) 
-1.142 
(0.275)*** 
-1.119 
(0.273)*** 
1.101 
(0.114)*** 
1.101 
(0.114)*** 
0.575 
(0.092)*** 
0.568 
(0.091)*** 
        
        
        
Cultural 
Relationship 
Non-immigrant visas as 
pop % 
    1.841 
(0.322)*** 
1.811 
(0.320)*** 
 TD*Cultural 
Relationship 
    -0.303 
(0.174)* 
-0.291 
(0.173)* 
        
Political 
Relationship 
Number of joint 
international military 
operations 
-0.508 
(0.060)*** 
-0.502 
(0.060)*** 
    
 TD*Political 
Relationship 
0.181 
(0.027)*** 
0.178 
(0.027)*** 
    
        
Economic 
Relationship 
Trade as % of GDP   0.349 
(0.046)*** 
0.349 
(0.046)*** 
  
 TD* Economic 
Relationship 
  -0.113 
(0.021)*** 
-0.113 
(0.021)*** 
  
Control Variables 
Government 
Position 
Right/Left (Laver/Budge 
Index) 
-0.012 
(0.006)*** 
-0.012 
(0.006)*** 
-0.019 
(0.006)*** 
-0.019 
(0.006)*** 
-0.014 
(0.006)** 
-0.014 
(0.006)** 
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Government 
Type 
Consensus/Westminster 
(Lijphart) 
-0.394 
(0.086)*** 
-0.388 
(0.086)*** 
-1.169 
(0.086)*** 
-1.169 
(0.086)*** 
-0.338 
(0.084)*** 
-0.333 
(0.084)*** 
Constant  0.735  -4.058  -2.023  
  (0.679)  (0.492)***  (0.394)***  
Fixed Effects Issue Area Y***  Y***  Y***  
 Year Y***  Y***  Y***  
Model 
Specifications 
Observations 6841  6632  6841  
 Pseudo R2 0.215  0.266  0.207  
 Wald chi2 (31) 510.640  522.800  519.78  
 Prob > chi2 0.000  0.000  0  
Notes: Logistic Regression; estimated with robust standard errors; significance levles: *** p≤ 0.01, **p≤ 0.05, *p≤ 0.1; 
corrected estimates calulated with relogit command 
 
Table 6.5: Logistic Regression – Determinants of ‘Vote Defection’ 
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For these three models I present the corrected estimates (calculated with the ReLogit 
software) to address the potential dangers associated with using a rare events dataset. 
The corrected estimates obtained by ReLogit by and large correspond with the original 
estimates. There are no changes in levels of significance or in direction. While for some 
coefficients, no change at all can be observed, for some of the institutional pressures 
and for some of the transatlantic relationship a small change in the value of the 
coefficient can be observed. The three models are statistically significant.  
 
The coefficient for power measured as military expenditure and measured as GDP 
virtually is equal to zero, and thus indicates no relationship between dependent and 
independent variable. Only when power is measured in EU institutional terms, as 
allocated voting weight in the Council, can a positive and statistically significant 
relationship be observed. That is to say, increased levels voting power in the Council 
are associated with an increased likelihood of vote defection.  Having said this, it 
should be noted here that this variable is neither consistent nor robust across all 27 
models.  
 
The other state-focused variable is salience. Although not always statistically 
significant and producing fairly small coefficients, the variable salience consistently 
predicts a decreased likelihood of vote defection the more salient an issue area is 
perceived by the individual member states.  In conjunction with the corresponding 
findings of the system-level analysis – which indicate a positive relationship between 
how salient an issue is perceived on average by the member states and the likelihood 
that they achieve full cohesion on that particular resolution – this makes for an 
interesting result for two reasons. 
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One, the results of both system-level analysis and unit-level analysis run contrary to 
the hypothesis that I developed in chapter 3. I hypothesised that the more salient an 
EU member state perceives an issue to be the less susceptible it is to vote coordination 
pressures and the less likely it is to override its national policy preference in order to 
vote alongside its fellow EU members; whereas it appears that the member states tend 
to speak with a single voice on issues they each individually consider important 
(although the results are not able to determine whether or not the EU member states 
are in fact overriding heterogeneous policy preference so as to speak with a single 
voice on issues they consider important). 
 
Two, even without a working hypothesis in addition to operational limitations faced by 
the variable (i.e. there is no reliable data on national policy preference), the results are 
consistent across a total of 31 models (i.e. 4 models for the system-level analysis and 
27 models for the individual-level analysis) and are sometimes highly significant. For 
this reason they should be noted and used as a starting point for further investigation. 
As it stands, they are still non-conclusive. Without knowing a country’s national policy 
preference, it is impossible to determine whether the member states tend to agree on 
issues they consider salient, or alternatively whether the member states prefer a 
cohesive vote on an issue they perceive as salient, even if it means overriding one’s 
national policy preference.  
 
Overall, it appears that institutional factors make more robust indicators (that is to say 
statistically significant and one-directional) for predicted voting behaviour than do 
state-focused factors. For instance, member states that can be considered net-
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beneficiaries of the EU budget as well as the existence of a relevant CFSP position are 
consistently associated with decreased likelihood of vote defection. Both variables are 
statistically significant across all 27 model variations. The responses for all other 
institutional factors are neither robust nor consistent and should be interpreted with 
caution.  
 
The bilateral transatlantic relationships are estimated in economic, political as well as 
cultural terms, by considering trade volume, numbers of joint military operations and 
the number of non-immigrant visas (as percentage of population) respectively. In 
addition, I have included an interaction term, accounting for instances of transatlantic 
divergence; that is to say for instances in which the US and the majority of the EU 
member do not cast identical votes.  
 
Table 6.6 depicts the marginal effects of the transatlantic relationship on the likelihood 
that a country will defect from the EU majority position in instances of transatlantic 
divergence. The strength of the bilateral transatlantic relationship is categorised as 
weak, medium and strong. These terms refer to the minimum value, mean value and 
maximum value of the individual measures. For instance, the number of joint military 
operations ranges between four military operations and fourteen military operations. 
The mean is at approximately nine military operations.  
 
The results indicate that the likelihood of vote defection decreases as the political 
relationship becomes stronger, while the likelihood of vote defection increases sharply 
as the economic and cultural relationship becomes stronger. In addition to the 
opposing trends between the political relationship and the one hand and the economic 
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and cultural relationships on the other hand, the confidence intervals for the predicted 
probabilities are partially overlapping. This makes it difficult to report conclusively on 
the extent to which the transatlantic relationship reflects in the voting pattern of the 
EU member states. The qualitative analysis conducted in chapter 7 provides further 
insights into the matter. 
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Table 6.6: Marginal Effects of the Transatlantic Relationship on the Likelihood of Vote Defection in Instances of 
Transatlantic Divergence
Marginal Effects of the Transatlantic Relationship on Likelihood of Vote Defection in instances of Transatlantic Divergence 
  Model 2 (Political) Model 4 (Economic) Model 9 (Cultural) 
Transatlantic 
Relationship 
Probability Vote 
Defection Confidence Interval 
Probability Vote 
Defection 
Confidence 
Interval 
Probability Vote 
Defection Confidence Interval 
Weak 0.136 0.810 0.215 0.083 0.068 0.100 0.106 0.088 0.125 
Medium 0.095 0.077 0.114 0.104 0.086 0.122 0.125 0.104 0.147 
Strong 0.070 0.039 0.115 0.184 0.095 0.305 0.668 0.472 0.828 
Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at a value of zero for their binary variables. 
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Finally, both of the control variables, government type and government position, are 
consistent indicators. Here, the results seem to indicate that ‘consensus democracies’  
are less likely to defect from the EU majority position than the so-called ‘Westminster-
style democracies’(Lijphart, 1999).
43
  And while the signs consistently indicate that 
centre-left governments are less likely to defect from the EU majority position 
compared to centre-right governments, in fact the coefficients for government 
position are very close to zero.  
 
Further Interpretation Using CLARIFY 
A few of the variables have proven to be robust across the entire range of models and 
will be subject to further scrutiny and interpretation. In doing so, I shall employ the 
methodological tool CLARIFY (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2003). The variables of 
particular interest are whether or not a relevant CFSP position exists, whether or not 
the EU member state is a net beneficiary of EU funds and government type. Moreover, 
I have included power (measured as Council voting weights). Corresponding to the 
three models presented in this chapter, I am devising six baseline models, two for each 
of the models presented. One baseline model is set for nuclear issues in 1997 and the 
second baseline model is set for Arab Israeli resolutions in 1997.  
 
In the baseline models, all continuous variables are set to their mean, which all 
categorical variables are set to their minimum value. That is to say, for instance, in the 
baseline models CFSP position and transatlantic divergence are set to 0, indicating that 
                                                      
43
 The correlation coefficient between government type and power (military, economic, institutional) is 
(.18; .46; 26). The correlation coefficient between government position and power (military, economic, 
institutional) is (.10; .20; .25). The correlation coefficient between government type and government 
position is .14.  
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no relevant CFSP position is in place and the US voting position is identical to that of 
the EU majority position. Moreover, the interaction term between the transatlantic 
divergence and type of transatlantic relationship is set as the product of transatlantic 
divergence (set to its minimum value) and the number of joint military operations (set 
to its average value) (On interaction terms and CLARIFY see King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 
2000; King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2003) 
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Table 6.7: Predicted Probabilities of Vote Defection – Nuclear Resolutions, 1997 (Model 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Predicted Probabilities for Vote Defection –  Nuclear Resolutions, 1997 (Model 2) 
    Change 
Probability 
Baseline 
Model 
Probability 
Modified Model Confidence Interval 
Institutional Pressure Relevant CFSP position in place 1 0.136 0.028 0.012 0.056 
Institutional Dedication Member states is net-beneficiary 1 0.136 0.057 0.032 0.094 
              
Government Type 
‘Consensus’/’Westminster’ 
(Lijphart) 
Mean to 
Max 0.136 0.055 0.026 0.097 
  
‘Consensus’/’Westminster’ 
(Lijphart) 
Mean to 
Min  0.136 0.191 0.128 0.270 
Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at their minimum for all other variables 
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Predicted Probabilities for Vote Defection – Nuclear Resolutions, 1997 (Model 4) 
    Change 
Probability 
Baseline 
Model 
Probability 
Modified Model Confidence Interval 
Institutional Pressure Relevant CFSP position in place 1 0.077 0.015 0.006 0.030 
Institutional Dedication Member states is net-beneficiary 1 0.077 0.025 0.015 0.042 
              
Government Type 
‘Consensus’/’Westminster’ 
(Lijphart) 
Mean to 
Max 0.077 0.015 0.007 0.030 
  
‘Consensus’/’Westminster’ 
(Lijphart) 
Mean to 
Min  0.077 0.144 0.095 0.207 
Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at their minimum for all other variables 
 
Table 6.8: Predicted Probabilities of Vote Defection – Nuclear Resolutions, 1997 (Model 4) 
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Predicted Probabilities for Vote Defection – Nuclear Resolutions, 1997 (Model 9) 
    Change 
Probability 
Baseline 
Model 
Probability 
Modified Model Confidence Interval 
Power Council Voting Weights 
Mean to 
Max 0.121 0.178 0.120 0.254 
Council Voting Weights 
Mean to 
Min 0.121 0.072 0.047 0.109 
              
Institutional Pressure Relevant CFSP position in place 1 0.121 0.025 0.011 0.049 
Institutional Dedication Member states is net-beneficiary 1 0.121 0.036 0.021 0.058 
              
Government Type 
‘Consensus’/’Westminster’ 
(Lijphart) 
Mean to 
Max 0.121 0.060 0.033 0.101 
  
‘Consensus’/’Westminster’ 
(Lijphart) 
Mean to 
Min  0.121 0.161 0.107 0.230 
Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at their minimum for all other variables 
 
Table 6.9: Predicted Probabilities of Vote Defection – Nuclear Resolutions, 1997 (Model 9) 
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Predicted Probabilities for Vote Defection – Arab Israeli Conflict,  1997 (Model 2) 
    Change 
Probability 
Baseline 
Model 
Probability 
Modified Model Confidence Interval 
Institutional Pressure Relevant CFSP position in place 1 0.025 0.005 0.002 0.013 
Institutional Dedication Member states is net-beneficiary 1 0.025 0.011 0.005 0.022 
              
Government Type 
‘Consensus’/’Westminster’ 
(Lijphart) 
Mean to 
Max 0.025 0.011 0.004 0.022 
  
‘Consensus’/’Westminster’ 
(Lijphart) 
Mean to 
Min  0.025 0.037 0.019 0.068 
Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at their minimum for all other variables 
 
Table 6.10: Predicted Probabilities of Vote Defection – Arab/Israeli Conflict, 1997 (Model 2) 
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Predicted Probabilities for Vote Defection – Arab Israeli Conflict,  1997 (Model 4) 
    Change 
Probability 
Baseline 
Model 
Probability 
Modified Model Confidence Interval 
Institutional Pressure Relevant CFSP position in place 1 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.002 
Institutional Dedication Member states is net-beneficiary 1 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.004 
              
Government Type 
‘Consensus’/’Westminster’ 
(Lijphart) 
Mean to 
Max 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.003 
  
‘Consensus’/’Westminster’ 
(Lijphart) 
Mean to 
Min  0.005 0.010 0.005 0.017 
Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at their minimum for all other variables 
 
Table 6.11: Predicted Probabilities of Vote Defection – Arab/Israeli Conflict, 1997 (Model 4) 
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Predicted Probabilities for Vote Defection – Arab Israeli Conflict, 1997 (Model 9) 
    Change 
Probability 
Baseline 
Model 
Probability 
Modified Model Confidence Interval 
Power Council Voting Weights 
Mean to 
Max 0.008 0.012 0.006 0.020 
 
Council Voting Weights 
Mean to 
Min 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.008 
              
Institutional Pressure Relevant CFSP position in place 1 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.003 
Institutional Dedication Member states is net-beneficiary 1 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.004 
              
Government Type 
‘Consensus’/’Westminster’ 
(Lijphart) 
Mean to 
Max 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.006 
  
‘Consensus’/’Westminster’ 
(Lijphart) 
Mean to 
Min  0.008 0.011 0.006 0.018 
Note: The baseline models are held constant at their mean for continuous variables and at at their minimum for all other variables 
 
Table 6.12: Predicted Probabilities of Vote Defection – Arab/Israeli Conflict, 1997 (Model 9) 
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Across all baseline models, it becomes evident that the probability of vote defection is 
virtually non-existent for resolutions pertaining to the Arab Israeli conflict and a fully 
cohesive vote is a near certainty. The picture is considerably more varied for 
resolutions dealing with nuclear issues. Here the probability of vote defection differs 
between the baseline models and ranges from .07 (Model 4) to .14 (Model 2). Moving 
on from there, when a relevant CFSP position is in place, the likelihood of vote 
defection decreases approximately 4 to 5 fold, depending on the model (considering 
both, resolutions pertaining to Arab Israeli conflict and military resolutions). The 
impact of being a net beneficiary of the EU budget, while in the same direction, is not 
always quite as large. Net beneficiary status decreases the likelihood of vote defection 
by a factor of 2 to 5 fold (depending on the model) Government type also plays a role. 
Changing the Lijphart index from its mean to its maximum (‘Consensus’) and 
subsequently to its minimum (‘Westminster’) highlights that consensus-style 
democracies are at least three times less likely to defect from the EU majority position 
than ‘Westminster’ democracies. (For two models the difference between the two is 
almost ten-fold.) 
 
Countries that hold most of the weighted voting power in the Council of Minister are 
approximately three times more likely to defect from the EU majority positions with 
regards to Arab/Israeli resolutions than countries holding the least weighting power in 
the Council. For nuclear resolutions, countries that hold most of the weighted voting 
power in the Council of Ministers are 2.5 more likely to defect from the EU majority 
position that countries holding the least voting power. Having said this, while the 
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coefficients for Council Voting Weights were robust in this model, they are not across 
the 27 models and should thus be interpreted with caution. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
In chapter 6 I set out to examine the EU member states’ voting patterns inside the 
United Nations General Assembly from an individual-level perspective. To that end I 
illustrated that while every single EU member state at some point or another has 
defected from the EU majority position, only on very few occasions have countries 
done so alone. The UK and France lead both rankings. I further highlighted that 
resolutions pertaining to decolonisation and military issues tend to be more frequently 
subject to vote defections than resolutions pertaining to human rights and the Arab 
Israeli conflict. The concept of preference heterogeneity was further explored in this 
chapter. To this end, I reiterated that vote defection in itself is indicative of preference 
heterogeneity and further supported the notion by discussing Ingelhart’s World Value 
Survey, designed to provide a comprehensive measurement of all major areas of 
human concern – from religion to politics to economic and social life (Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005). An entire section was dedicated to the close scrutiny of the transatlantic 
relationship. From the perspective of the individual member states, by comparing their 
voting distance to the US and to the EU majority position (the extent to which they 
defect from the EU majority ), I illustrated that member states on the whole are fairly 
far removed from the US. The UK is, unsurprisingly, a notable exception. The results of 
the multivariate analysis indicated that institutional factors (i.e. relevant CFSP position 
in place, EU net-beneficiary) are strongly associated with a decrease in vote defection. 
The state-focused factors are less robust in the case of power and highly interesting in 
the case of salience. Without a working hypothesis in addition to operational 
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limitations, the results consistently and sometimes statistically significantly predict a 
decrease in vote defection as issue salience increases. Finally, the results of the 
interaction term are inconclusive. In addition to overlapping confidence intervals, the 
predicted voting behaviour changes direction depending on the type of relationship. 
Chapter 7 shall be devoted to examine the EU coordination process in depths. 
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6.6 Appendices 
Appendix 6A: Models 1 to 9 Including Postestimation Results 
 
Dependent Variable:  Vote Defection from EU Majority Position 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
State Focused Factors 
Power 
Military Expenditure as 
% of GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
GDP -0.001 0.000 0.000 
(0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** 
Council Voting Weights -0.172 0.245 0.128 
(0.027)*** (0.050)*** (0.022)*** 
Salience Perceived issue salience -0.130 -0.084 -0.145 -0.062 -0.168 -0.190 -0.115 -0.159 -0.179 
(0.098) (0.087) (0.101) (0.093) (0.091)* (0.098)* (0.095) (0.091)* (0.100)* 
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Institutional Factors 
Institutional 
Pressure 
Relevant CFSP position 
in place -1.777 -1.755 -1.768 -1.781 -1.747 -1.754 -1.782 -1.752 -1.755 
(0.354)*** (0.350)*** (0.354)*** (0.355)*** (0.351)*** (0.353)*** (0.353)*** (0.352)*** (0.353)*** 
EU collectively sponsor 
resolution 0.149 0.160 0.110 0.143 0.166 0.135 0.151 0.167 0.137 
(0.163) (0.162) (0.163) (0.164) (0.162) (0.160) (0.163) (0.162) (0.161) 
Institutional 
dedication 
Degree of voluntary 
integration 0.018 -0.142 -0.037 0.102 -0.145 -0.002 0.043 -0.325 0.005 
(0.052) (0.075)* (0.052) (0.054)* (0.061)** (0.059) (0.051) (0.070)*** (0.058) 
Member states is net-
beneficiary -1.246 -0.946 -1.156 -1.174 -1.048 -1.225 -0.907 -1.195 -1.310 
(0.171)*** (0.162)*** (0.153)*** (0.154)*** (0.155)*** (0.155)*** (0.148)*** (0.160)*** (0.159)*** 
Degree of negative 
opinion about EU -0.100 0.485 0.159 -0.286 0.593 0.597 -0.153 0.633 0.529 
(0.116) (0.112)*** (0.106) (0.118)*** (0.113)*** (0.103)*** (0.116) (0.109)*** (0.107)*** 
External Factors 
Transatlantic 
Relationship 
Transatlantic 
Divergence (TD) 1.095 -1.142 0.910 1.101 -1.486 0.583 1.066 -1.253 0.575 
(0.113)*** (0.275)*** (0.100)*** (0.114)*** (0.310)*** (0.090)*** (0.113)*** (0.301)*** (0.092)*** 
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Cultural Relationship 1.451 1.747 1.841 
(Non-immigrant visas as pop %)   (0.339)***   (0.322)***   (0.322)*** 
TD*Cultural Relationship -0.620 -0.348 -0.303 
 
 
 
  (0.204)***   (0.176)**   (0.174)* 
Political Relationship  -0.508 -0.339 -0.514 
(Number of joint intl 
military operations) (0.060)*** (0.055)*** (0.064)*** 
TD*Political 
Relationship 0.181 0.212 0.187 
(0.027)*** (0.031)*** (0.029)*** 
Economic Relationship  0.322 0.349 0.300 
(Trade as % of GDP) (0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)*** 
TD* Economic 
Relationship -0.112 -0.113 -0.108 
(0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** 
Control Variables 
Government 
Position Right/Left (CMD) -0.021 -0.012 -0.020 -0.019 -0.022 -0.013 -0.015 -0.024 -0.014 
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)** 
Government 
Type 
Consensus/Westminster 
(Lijphart) -1.265 -0.394 -1.186 -1.169 -0.102 -0.307 -1.174 -0.266 -0.338 
(0.101)*** (0.086)*** (0.097)*** (0.086)*** (0.107) (0.095)*** (0.092)*** (0.088)*** (0.084)*** 
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Constant   -1.235 0.735 -0.478 -4.058 0.058 -1.615 -3.463 3.028 -2.023 
(0.428)*** (0.679) (0.377) (0.492)*** (0.663) (0.382)*** (0.494)*** (0.633)*** (0.394)*** 
Issue Area Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** 
Year Y**  Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** 
Model 
Specifications Observations 6632 6841 6841 6632 6841 6841 6632 6841 6841 
Pseudo R2 0.261 0.215 0.2533 0.266 0.2005 0.2001 0.259 0.2074 0.207 
Wald chi2 (31) 503.670 510.640 533.83 522.800 516.58 510.95 520.58 512.78 519.78 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0 0 0 0 0 
Postestimation  Linktest 0.100 0.209 0.507 0.373 0.578 0.754 0.239 0.325 0.72 
Lfit 0.249 0.331 0.6307 0.075 0.3503 0.1492 0.3051 0.1168 0.5104 
Lroc 0.863 0.833 0.6802 0.866 0.8262 0.8282 0.8619 0.8286 0.8307 
  Mean VIF 2.960 4.300 2.97 2.940 4.35 3.01 4.34 4.5 2.98 
Notes: Logistic Regression; estimated with robust standard errors; significance levels: *** p≤ 0.01, **p≤ 0.05, *p≤ 0.1; Model in bold used for further analysis in chapter 6 
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Appendix 6B: Models 10 to 18 Including Postestimation Results 
 
Dependent Variable: Vote Defection from EU Majority Position 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
State Focused Factors 
Power 
Military Expenditure as % 
of GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)** 
GDP -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.00)*** 
Council Voting Weights -0.098 -0.115 -0.084 
(0.032)*** (0.055)** (0.031)*** 
Salience Perceived issue salience -0.069 -0.030 -0.101 -0.044 -0.023 -0.072 -0.053 -0.015 -0.086 
(0.084) (0.079) (0.088) (0.084) (0.079) (0.087) (0.83) (0.078) (0.086) 
Institutional Factors 
Institutional 
Pressure 
Relevant CFSP position in 
place -1.711 -1.722 -1.729 -1.726 -1.737 -1.738 -1.713 -1.723 -1.729 
(0.329)*** (0.333)*** (0.331)*** (0.330)*** (0.334)*** (0.331)*** (0.328)*** (0.333)*** (0.330)*** 
EU collectively sponsor 
resolution 0.138 0.154 0.128 0.161 0.161 0.130 0.135 0.150 0.123 
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(0.148) (0.149) (0.148) (0.147) (0.149) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.148) 
Institutional 
dedication 
Degree of voluntary 
integration -0.068 -0.182 -0.038 -0.045 -0.115 -0.009 -0.045 -0.112 -0.020 
(0.049) (0.052)*** (0.049) (0.048) (0.054)** (0.049) (0.050) (0.066)* (0.049) 
Member states is net-
beneficiary -0.880 -0.755 -0.925 -0.913 -0.789 -0.949 -0.778 -0.678 -0.826 
(0.178)*** (0.166)*** (0.171)*** (0.158)*** (0.146)*** (0.152)*** (0.146)*** (0.137)*** (0.142)*** 
Degree of negative 
opinion about EU -0.076 0.131 0.145 -0.078 0.099 0.084 -0.101 0.083 0.106 
(0.100) (0.090) (0.090) (0.097) (0.097) (0.095) (0.101) (0.093) (0.092) 
External Factors 
Transatlantic 
Relationship 
Transatlantic Divergence 
(TD) 0.856 -1.283 0.784 0.778 -1.270 0.795 0.857 -1.260 0.785 
(0.087)*** (0.215)*** (0.078)*** (0.100)*** (0.210)*** (0.078)*** (0.087)*** (0.210)*** (0.078)*** 
Cultural Relationship 
(Non-immigrant visas as % 
of population) 1.654 1.631 1.598 
(0.325)*** (0.326)*** (0.326)*** 
TD*Cultural Relationship -0.527 -0.531 -0.534 
(0.187)*** (0.188) (0.188)*** 
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Political Relationship 
(Number of joint 
international military 
operations) -0.431 -0.361 -0.371 
(0.049)*** (0.045)*** (0.061)*** 
TD*Political Relationship 0.207 0.207 0.205 
(0.022)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** 
Economic Relationship 
(Trade as % of GDP) 0.241 0.194 0.229 
(0.042)*** (0.064)*** (0.042)*** 
TD* Economic 
Relationship -0.084 -0.053 -0.083 
(0.019)*** (0.029)* (0.019)*** 
Control Variables 
Government 
Position Right/Left (CMD) -0.012 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.013 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 
(0.006)** (0.005)*** (0.006) (0.006)* (0.005)** (0.006) (0.006)* (0.005) (0.005) 
Government 
Type 
Consensus/Westminster 
(Lijphart) -1.071 -1.073 -0.995 -1.063 -0.948 -1.001 -1.101 -1.113 -1.020 
(0.107)*** (0.103)*** (0.103)*** (0.093)*** (0.083)*** (0.088)*** (0.05)*** (0.105)*** (0.101)*** 
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Constant Constant -0.752 1.439 -3.204 -3.033 0.874 -3.217 -2.912 1.229 -2.969 
(0.334)** (0.520)*** (0.337)*** (0.351)*** (0.519)* (0.318)*** (0.361)*** (0.544)*** (0.363)*** 
Issue Area YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** 
Year 
Model 
Specification Observations 6193 6402 6402 6193 6402 6402 6193 6402 6402.000 
Pseudo R2 0.235 0.2576 0.2382 0.234 0.2535 0.2404 0.236 0.2585 0.239 
Wald chi2 
(20) 
532.390 
(20) 
571.27 
(20) 
549.76 
(20) 
531.88 
(20) 
568.24 (20) 549.4 (20) 529.4 
(20) 
573.06 
(20) 
547.94 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Postestimation Linktest 0.246 0.622 0.201 0.24 0.61 0.218 0.240 0.687 0.217 
Lfit 0.1081 0.006 0.3255 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.02 .0.0096 0.3209 
Lroc 0.8415 0.8508 .8405 0.8405 0.8477 0.8449 0.842 0.8518 0.8441 
Mean VIF 3.42 4.46 3.45 3.39 4.4 3.41 3.39 4.58 3.43 
Notes: Logistic Regression; estimated with robust standard errors; significance levles: *** p≤ 0.01, **p≤ 0.05, *p≤ 0.1; Model in bold used for further analysis in 
chapter 6 
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Appendix 6C: Models 19 to 27 Including Postestimation Results 
 
Dependent Variable: Vote Defection from EU Majority Position  
    Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 
State Focused Factors 
Power 
Military Expenditure as 
% of GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
 
 
GDP -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)*** 
 
 
Council Voting Weights -0.166 -0.185 -0.174 
 
(0.026)*** (0.068)*** (0.028)*** 
 
Salience Perceived issue salience -0.468 -0.472 -0.495 -0.456 -0.459 -0.488 -0.466 -0.461 -0.481 
    (0.095)*** (0.094)*** (101)*** (0.096)*** (0.093)*** (0.103)*** (0.096)*** (0.092)*** (0.099)*** 
Institutional Factors 
Institutional 
Pressure 
Relevant CFSP position 
in place -2.277 -2.296 -2.250 -2.274 -2.305 -2.253 -2.274 -2.306 -2.257 
 
(0.348)*** (0.346)*** (0.347)*** (0.348)*** (0.346)*** (0.348)*** (0.347)*** (0.345)*** (0.347)*** 
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EU collectively sponsor 
resolution 0.119 0.114 0.088 0.118 0.124 0.091 0.119 0.122 0.093 
 
(0.154) (0.156) (0.153) (0.153) (0.156) (0.153) (0.153) (0.155) (0.152) 
 
 
Institutional 
dedication 
Degree of voluntary 
integration 0.036 -0.097 0.011 0.111 -0.134 0.064 0.079 -0.082 0.044 
 
(0.047) (0.055)* (0.049) (0.050)** (0.066)*** (0.050) (0.048) (0.076) (0.049) 
 
Member states is net-
beneficiary -1.329 -1.456 -1.280 -1.164 -1.158 -1.114 -0.983 -1.045 -0.954 
 
(0.159)*** (0.155)*** (0.147)*** (0.141)*** (0.138)*** (0.135)*** (0.139)*** (0.135)*** (0.136)*** 
 
Degree of negative 
opinion about EU -0.026 0.218 0.178 -0.192 0.111 0.081 -0.105 0.109 0.091 
 
(0.110) (0.107)** (0.102)* (0.110)* (0.113) (0.108) (0.111) (0.109) (0.04) 
                      
External Factors 
Transatlantic 
Relationship 
Transatlantic 
Divergence (TD) 0.567 -1.829 0.667 0.791 -1.646 0.641 0.777 -1.656 0.649 
 
(0.098)*** (0.259)*** (0.095)*** (0.107)*** (0.243)*** (0.095)*** (0.108)*** (0.245)*** (0.096)*** 
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Cultural Relationship 
(Non-immigrant visas as 
% of population) 1.375 1.440 1.305 
 
(0.332)*** (0.330)*** (0.332)*** 
 
TD*Cultural 
Relationship -0.584 -0.532 -0.573 
 
(0.202)*** (0.194)*** (0.201)*** 
 
Political Relationship 
(Number of joint 
international military 
operations) -0.441 -0.508 -0.445 
 
(0.055)*** (0.064)*** (0.074)*** 
 
TD*Political 
Relationship 0.262 0.240 0.239 
 
(0.027)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** 
 
Economic Relationship 
(Trade as % of GDP) 0.092 0.285 0.247 
 
(0.027)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)*** 
 
 
TD* Economic 
Relationship -0.031 -0.091 -0.090 
    (0.029) (0.021)*** (0.021)*** 
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Control Variables 
Government 
Position  Right/Left (CMD) -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 
 
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.005)** 
 
Government 
Type 
Consensus/Westminster 
(Lijphart) -1.274 -1.502 -1.267 -1.132 -1.293 -1.084 -1.202 -1.355 -1.189 
    (0.100)*** (0.112)*** (0.101)*** (0.086)*** (0.096)*** (0.090)*** (0.090)*** (0.100)*** (0.095)*** 
Constant   -2.419 2.553 -2.255 -3.194 2.832 -2.434 -2.617 2.729 -1.975 
(0.371)*** (0.582)*** (0.337)*** (0.395)*** (0.617)*** (0.341)*** (0.411)*** (0.633)*** (0.357)*** 
 
Issue Area 
 
Year YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES*** YES** YES*** YES*** YES*** 
Model 
Specifications Observations 6781 6994 6994 6781 6994 6994 6781 6994 6994 
Pseudo R2 0.2028 0.2281 0.2035 0.2064 0.2258 0.2012 0.2048 0.2235 0.2014 
 Wald chi2 
(24) 
417.53 
(24) 
464.00 (24) 442.8 
(24) 
450.72 
(24) 
726.01 (24) 472.5 
(24) 
442.89 
(24) 
483.13 
(24) 
461.18 
 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Postestimation  
Linktest 0.004 0 0.002 0.01 0.004 0.02 0.003 0.003 0.01 
 
Lfit 0.0001 0 0.0011 0.0012 0 0.015 0.0033 0 0.0147 
 
Lroc 0.8302 0.8391 0.8294 0.8306 0.835 0.8267 0.8297 0.8347 0.827 
  Mean VIF 1.56 3.74 1.92 1.89 3.56 1.89 1.89 3.85 1.91 
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Notes: Logistic Regression; estimated with robust standard errors; significance levles: *** p≤ 0.01, **p≤ 0.05, *p≤ 0.1; Model in bold used for further analysis in 
chapter 6 
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Appendix 6D: Vote Defection of 1995 Accession Countries prior to Accession 
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CHAPTER 7: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF EU 
VOTE COORDINATION PROCESS 
 
The quantitative voting pattern analysis has been very useful in identifying factors that 
affect the likelihood of EU member states to defect from the EU majority position and 
in that it has highlighted instances in which EU member states, holding a divergent 
policy preference, prefer not to cast a vote in accordance with the EU majority 
position. As discussed several times in this thesis already, the quantitative voting 
pattern analysis suffers from an operational shortcoming, which makes it impossible to 
unequivocally draw the important distinction between a country casting a vote with 
fellow EU members “in spite of their disagreement” or “because of their agreement” 
(Krehbiel, 1993, p. 238). Despite its usefulness, the quantitative voting pattern analysis 
is not equipped to explore whether EU member states ever vote with their fellow EU 
member states despite of disagreements. By investigating the vote coordination 
process that takes place between the member states prior to roll-call votes in more 
detail in the present chapter, I seek to address this question.   
 
In chapter 3, I hypothesised that for divisive and contentious resolutions the balance 
tips in favour of vote cohesion, when increasing the collective bargaining power 
becomes a tangible objective. At this point, member states work hard to “hammer out 
collective external positions” (P. C. Schmitter, 1969, p. 165). That is to say, when 
increasing the collective bargaining power becomes a tangible objective, member 
states attach a higher value to EU unity, are more willing to compromise with regards 
to their national policy preferences and are generally more susceptible to coordination 
pressures. In the absence of such a tangible objective in divisive and contentious issue 
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areas the balance is less likely to tip in favour of vote cohesion. Consequently, when 
increasing the collective bargaining power is not a tangible objective member states 
attach a lower value to EU unity, are less willing to compromise with regards to their 
national policy preference and are less susceptible to coordination pressure. Unable to 
put this hypothesis to the test as part of the quantitative voting pattern analysis (see 
section 4.2), I seek to illustrate in this chapter that EU member states are able to 
successfully coordinate their voting positions in divisive and similarly contentious issue 
areas; that is to say, they are able to successfully coordinate their voting positions “in 
spite of their disagreement” (Krehbiel, 1993, p. 238). 
 
The chapter is set up as follows: I shall explain my selection of cases in section 7.1. In 
section 7.2 I describe the fundamentals of EU vote coordination for resolutions 
pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict and for resolutions pertaining to military issues. I 
seek to illustrate how increasing the collective bargaining power by means of 
successful vote coordination is a tangible objective in the former, but not the latter. In 
section 7.3, I set out to illustrate how member states view EU unity as very important 
for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as opposed to for resolutions 
pertaining to military issues where they view it as only marginally important. Section 
7.4 serves to illustrate how member states are remarkably willing to compromise on 
their national policy positions with reference to resolutions pertaining to the Arab-
Israeli conflict compared with resolutions pertaining to military issues. In section 7.5 I 
seek to illustrate that more coordination pressure is exerted and member states are 
more susceptible to it for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict compared 
with resolutions pertaining to military issues. In section 7.6 I will offer a conclusion to 
the chapter. 
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7.1 Case Selection 
By means of a comparative analysis, I set out to contrast the coordination efforts for 
resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict with vote coordination efforts that 
take place in the military realm. This is not an in-depth analysis of either issue area. 
The comparative case study is not motivated by a desire to account for particular 
events and outcomes; rather it serves as a framework to evaluate the EU coordination 
process in the United Nations General Assembly, with particular view to EU vote 
coordination in divisive and contentious issue areas.  
 
I have chosen these two issue areas for the following reasons. One, both issue areas 
area divisive and similarly contentious, in which EU member states hold divergent 
preferences, illustrated by polarised cleavages. Successful vote coordination, if at all 
feasible, is the result of excessively “lengthy” (Official #22, 2 October 2008) and 
“painful” (Official #33, 13 October 2008) negotiations. Yet, while coordination efforts 
for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict generally lead to high levels of EU 
cohesion, the voting pattern is much more varied in the military realm.  
 
Consider Figure 7.1 to this effect. Figure 7.1 illustrates a scatter plot of EU cohesion 
and resolution leverage per topic for the entire time period under consideration. The 
vertical axis depicts average cohesion levels calculated per topic. The horizontal axis 
depicts the resolution leverage, calculated by multiplying the average cohesion level 
with the number of resolutions per topic. The more often a topic comes up, the higher 
its resolution leverage index. The average cohesion level across all topics for the time 
period under consideration is depicted by y = 0.8489. The average leverage value 
across all topics for the time period under consideration is depicted by x = 82.99.  
218 
 
 
Generally, the figure can be read as follows: the higher a topic is located on the graph, 
the higher its average cohesion levels; the further to the right a topic is located on the 
graph, the more often it comes up in UNGA roll-call votes. To break it down even 
further, the top-right box represents all those topics which are frequently voted on and 
produce high levels of cohesion, while the bottom-left box represents all those topics 
which are not frequently voted on and which produce low levels of cohesion. With 
reference to the two issue areas under consideration, the graph clearly illustrates that 
resolutions pertaining to both issue areas are similarly prevalent on the agenda. 
However, resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict are on the whole much 
more cohesive than military resolutions. As highlighted by the European Commission : 
“Even on contentious issues like the Middle East, the EU has managed to achieve 
unanimity on virtually every occasion over the past decade” (European Union, 2004b, 
p. 12). 
 
Figure 7.1: Average EU Cohesion and Resolution Leverage across Issue Area 
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Two, the United States plays a very different role in the member states’ coordination 
efforts for each of the issue areas. Its position tends to be taken into consideration for 
military issues while largely ignored for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.  As Wouters (2001) observes:  
 
“Especially in the First Committee, there is a very close 
coordination between the EU and the USA. A practice has 
grown in which, during the Committee’s session, troika 
meetings with the USA are held on a regular (sometimes even 
weekly) basis during the session.” (p. 388) 
 
This view has been confirmed by the interviews with First Committee experts. 
Conversely, for resolutions pertaining to the Arab Israeli conflict, the US position is 
perceived “so far from reality” (Official #21, 20 November 2008) and non-negotiable 
that the EU member states by and large ignore it. This allows us to draw a distinction 
between the two issue areas, with one adding the US position and the other one not. 
  
7.2 Coordination Basics 
“The EU certainly has the potential to lead within the UN and heavily influences the 
positions of states in its ‘orbit’.” (K. E. Smith, 2006a, p. 165) In fact, there is “a regular 
pattern for the EU to reach out to States which are not EU members and associate 
them to its official positions (Paasivirta & Porter, 2006, p. 35). As such the EU in the 
UNGA is a “dominant player [with] the ability to muster significant numbers of 
votes”(Laatikainen & Smith, 2006, p. 16).  
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Yet, in order for EU member states to increase their bargaining power by voting 
collectively in the United Nations General Assembly, equally important to overcoming 
their divisions, they must first encounter an opportunity that in fact enables them to 
increase their bargaining power by voting collectively. The Arab Israeli conflict offers 
such an opportunity. Approached as a bloc by the Palestinians, as long as the EU 
member states manage to speak with one voice, they are able to shape the text of the 
resolutions and by means of casting their votes collectively, they are able to assume a 
bellwether function that other UN member states follow. The resolutions pertaining to 
the military realm, on the other hand, are a diffuse mix of resolutions seeking to 
highlight concerns mainly as regards nuclear and conventional disarmament. They do 
not offer an outright opportunity for EU member states to increase their bargaining 
power by acting collectively. 
 
Resolutions Pertaining to the Arab Israeli Conflict  
Resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict are negotiated by the Middle East 
experts based at the Permanent Missions of the individual EU member states to the 
United Nations in New York. They usually, but not exclusively, come together in the 4
th
 
committee. Each year, they discuss their intended voting behaviour for about twenty 
such resolutions. The resolutions deal with a variety of different aspects pertaining to 
the conflict. With most of the resolutions drafted by the Palestinians, they 
unsurprisingly tend to serve as outlet for the Palestinians to address their grievances. 
Without a seat at the United Nations, the Palestinians usually have countries of the 
Arab group sponsor their resolutions. Before they do so, however, they present the 
text to the EU presidency, for the EU member states to negotiate among themselves 
any amendments that might be needed for their unified support for these resolutions.  
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A unified EU vote in support of the Palestinian resolutions is useful for the Palestinians 
because it pulls along another 20 to 30 non-Arab UN member states which explicitly 
align their votes with the EU member states in such an instance (Official #29, 18 
September 2008). To this end, the Palestinians approach the EU as a bloc and “for 
policy purposes of  their own, decide to treat the [EU] as […] a viable, authoritative” 
actor (P. C. Schmitter, 1969, p. 165). By acting as a bloc, the EU member states “are 
able to shape the text” (Official #21, 20 November 2008). Additionally, successful vote 
coordination as regards these resolutions enables the EU to assume a bellwether 
function inside the General Assembly. Consequently, “the negative impact of a lack of 
cohesion in the Arab-Israeli conflict is much more problematic than in other areas” 
(Official #19, 27 October 2008). If the EU member states were not able to successfully 
coordinate their votes, the Palestinians would be less inclined to view the EU as its 
partner; the EU would lose its opportunity to shape the text and finally would lose its 
bellwether function as regards the votes. Nevertheless, with the Arab-Israeli conflict 
being such a highly politicised and contentious topic among the EU member states, it 
usually takes weeks or months to find a common position. Two major camps have 
emerged inside the EU. On the one hand, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark make 
up the core of the pro-Israeli camp with Germany and Italy part of the more 
moderating forces.
44
 They essentially see these resolutions that are drafted by the 
Palestinians as unbalanced and are looking to replace some of the more emotional 
language with more neutral terms  (Official #21, 20 November 2008). The members of 
the Pro-Palestinian camp including Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Belgium, Greece, 
Sweden and France
45
 are essentially happy with the text as it stands. In fact the 
                                                      
44
 Of the post-2004 enlargement group, the Czech Republic also belongs to this camp.  
45
 Of the post-2004 enlargement group, Malta and Cyprus belong to this camp. 
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Southern enlargement in the 1980s, including the accession of Greece, Spain and 
Portugal meant a shift within the EU in favour of the pro-Palestinian camp (Stadler, 
1989, p. 24). 
 
Military Resolutions  
Resolutions pertaining to military issues are negotiated by the military experts, based 
at the Permanent Missions of the individual EU member states to the United Nations in 
New York. For the time period of intense negotiations every autumn, most of the EU 
member states fly in additional military experts from their Missions at the United 
Nation Office at Geneva; the core setting for international diplomacy in the field of 
disarmament and non-proliferation. In New York, they usually come together in the 1
st
 
committee. Each year, they discuss their intended voting behaviour for about twenty 
such resolutions.
46
 Resolutions pertaining to military issues generally deal with aspects 
pertaining to nuclear and conventional disarmament.
47
 Member states are faced with 
a multitude of cleavages, most pertinently the following: nuclear/non-nuclear, 
Nato/non-Nato, aligned/non-aligned. 
 
As opposed to the Arab Israeli conflict, where the EU Middle East experts assume an 
active role in shaping the text, in the 1
st
 committee the experts “rarely draft new texts” 
(Official #34, 1 December 2008) with much of the coordination already having taken 
place in Geneva, the capitals or Brussels (Official #31, 13 November 2008). In fact 
“practically no resolutions are introduced by the Presidency on behalf of the EU” and 
while member states might sponsor draft resolutions on their own, particular in the 
                                                      
46
 Approximately 40 more resolutions are discussed which ultimately are adopted without a vote. 
47
 In the early to mid 1990s they also still included resolutions pertaining to mercenary issues.   
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area of nuclear disarmament, they do not tend to be co-sponsored by the rest of the 
EU membership (Wouters, 2001, p. 390). 
 
The wider context of the international debate on military issues has a bearing on the 
discussions in the 1
st
 committee and general guidelines and major documents, such as 
the European Security Strategy or the European Strategy against Proliferation, inform 
the negotiation process (Official #31, 13 November 2008). And while 1
st
 committee 
resolutions are by no means a-political, whatever political issues there are, they are 
unlikely to be addressed in the 1
st
 committee (Official #20, 6 November 2008; Official 
#31, 13 November 2008). Thus there is little scope for member states to shape the 
texts and to take on a leading role in the debate by working together collectively. 
 
7.3 Value Attached to EU Unity 
In abstract terms, all member states proclaim the value of EU unity in international 
affairs in general and in the United Nations General Assembly in particular. They view 
it as their “moral obligation to coordinate their voting positions” (Official #3, 15 
September 2008; Official #22, 2 October 2008). They see EU unity as a “matter of 
pride” (Official #6, 23 October 2008)  and an “expression of strength”(Official #24, 16 
September 2008), so much so that they have devised ways of presenting EU cohesion, 
even in the presence of voting splits. As, for instance, when for a particular resolution 
the EU voting pattern displays a split between No-votes and Abstain-votes, the 
member states still legitimately claim that the EU as a whole cannot support this 
particular resolution (Official #31, 13 November 2008). This “masking of policy 
differences” is generally seen as “strength of the process” (Tonra, 1997, p. 182). 
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Predictably, smaller countries go as far as to see EU unity as an end in itself. They 
believe in the “diplomatic reflex to look for a common position”(Official #28, 8 October 
2008) and “know it is better to swallow a national point of view to show EU unity” 
(Official #3, 15 September 2008). They “feel the pulse of others before making up 
[their] own minds” (Official #28, 8 October 2008). As such they quite naturally tend to 
perceive their interest to be close to that of the EU majority (Official #2, 15 September 
2008).  While larger countries without a doubt appreciate the value of EU unity, they 
disagree that “it should be an objective per se” (Official #14, 7 October 2008; Official 
#38, 9 October 2008). Nevertheless, even some countries which could certainly 
weather breaking EU cohesion prefer to “go along with the EU majority ” (Official #33, 
13 October 2008) as soon as a “palpable EU position emerges” (Official #20, 6 
November 2008; Official #31, 13 November 2008). 
 
Further to universally supporting a resolution or to universally rejecting a resolution, a 
common abstention is another way to arrive at a unified EU vote. As such a common 
abstention fulfills multifaceted functions. It may be used to introduce aspects into the 
resolution that are perceived as missing. It may furthermore be used as a sign of 
disagreement that the General Assembly was chosen as forum to address the issue at 
hand, or it could also highlight opposition to a particular sponsor of the resolution 
(Official #7, 18 November 2008; Official #31, 13 November 2008). Alternatively it may 
serve as a sign of neutrality, trying to avoid choosing sides on particular issues (Official 
#3, 15 September 2008). 
 
Most controversially among the EU member states, in lieu of arriving at universal 
support or universal rejection of a resolution, it is seen by some as a justified means to 
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achieve EU cohesion (Official #9, 27 October 2008; Official #19, 27 October 2008; 
Official #32, 4 December 2008). Others view this “vacuity of unanimous common 
statements” (Tonra, 1997, p. 182) as complete failure of impact and a sign of weakness 
(Official #12, 7 October 2008; Official #23, 7 October 2008; Official #29, 18 September 
2008; Official #38, 9 October 2008). One might even call it a “fake consensus”  (Official 
#33, 13 October 2008). This distinction is not made purely along power lines, but 
appears to be more based on the importance a member state attaches to making a 
point. Those against using a common abstention merely as means to achieve EU 
cohesion fear that by opting for a common abstention there is a risk of getting a 
position that does not make much sense outside of the EU (Official #26, 16 September 
2008). They fear that a common abstention prevents the member states from making 
a substantive point. As one official put it: 
“Sometimes you run the risk of putting the value of EU 
cohesion so high that you stand ready to give up everything 
else, …, [while] abstention can make sense in some cases, […]it 
is [generally] not very satisfactory as you withdraw yourself 
from positioning yourself.” (Official #14, 7 October 2008) 
 
In more concrete terms it can be observed that EU member states attach a higher 
value to EU unity for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict compared to 
resolutions pertaining to the military issues. As opposed to the military experts, the 
Middle East experts furthermore more frequently contemplate a common abstention 
as a tolerable means to achieve EU cohesion. 
 
Resolutions Pertaining to the Arab Israeli Conflict  
The Arab Israeli conflict is a “major conflict” and serves as ideal platform to 
“demonstrate a common foreign policy” (Official #8, 18 November 2008). 
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Consequently, the EU member states attach a high value to EU unity for resolutions 
pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict. By means of successful vote coordination, they 
are able to increase their collective bargaining power and have an opportunity to 
strengthen the role of the West in this particular conflict.  
“For their part, third countries are often keen to know the 
European attitude […] while the member states themselves 
increasingly wait for a common European point of reference to 
emerge before fixing their national opinion and communicating 
it to the public.” (Rummel, 1988, p. 120) 
 
The Palestinians only care to deal with the EU if it speaks as one. And only if they view 
the EU as negotiation partner, can the member states shape the resolution texts and 
can assume a bellwether function for other UN member states to follow. Furthermore, 
the EU as representatives of the West, by negotiating with the Palestinians has an 
opportunity to act as a bona fide mediator in the conflict. With the majority of the 
resolutions sponsored by the Arab group and designed to address Palestinian 
grievances, collective EU support brings the point across to the Israelis in a more 
profound manner, rather than if it was simply made by the Arab world (Official #21, 20 
November 2008). Achieving and maintaining EU cohesion is therefore seen as crucial. 
As one official put it: 
“Sometimes you have to join a consensus you do not want. The 
only way we can play a role in this conflict is by being united. 
The Palestinians do not care so much about what we say if we 
are not united.” (Official #32, 4 December 2008) 
 
With such importance attached to successful vote coordination in an issue area this 
contentious, a common abstention is at times contemplated as one way to achieve 
cohesion. And although it does not come down to it excessively, the EU’s Middle East 
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experts seem far more likely to opt for a common abstention as means to achieve EU 
cohesion than its military experts. 
 
Military Resolutions  
The general perception in the military realm is that EU cohesion cannot be stipulated 
at any price. While cohesion is certainly taken into consideration and reached when 
possible, it is never set as a “blank cheque” goal (Official #31, 13 November 2008). 
Many countries have a selected few areas, for which they rather uncompromisingly 
pursue their national policy preferences. Especially without the added advantage of an 
increased bargaining power by voting collectively, a general acceptance exists that for 
certain resolutions, agreement is unlikely to be found (Official #7, 18 November 2008; 
Official #20, 6 November 2008). In relative terms then, compared to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict a lower value is attached to EU unity.  
 
7.4 Importance of National Policy Preference 
The relationship between the Permanent Mission at the UN and the capital is 
important. It is not a one-sided relationship, whereby the capital provides the 
instructions which the delegate subsequently simply relays to his or her colleagues 
during the negotiations. Rather, the regular dialogue between the capital and the 
Permanent Mission informs the policy formation process (Official #38, 9 October 
2008). 
 
Naturally, the delegates at the Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York 
do not negotiate in a political vacuum (Official #35, 3 October 2008). That is to say, 
they all receive instructions from their capitals and are in regular contact with the 
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relevant ministries at home. Nevertheless, the extent to which the delegates receive 
instructions varies between countries. The bigger states tend to have more rigid and 
more codified instructions on more resolutions (Official #17, 7 October 2008; Official 
#25, 16 September 2008). Smaller states tend to work on so-called framework 
instructions (Official #37, 7 November 2008) or general guidelines (Official #23, 7 
October 2008). For them, the hierarchy tends to be rather flat and the information 
flows quickly (Official #1, 13 November 2008; Official #10, 20 November 2008). 
Because they generally do not have as many resources, they sometimes choose a 
limited number of issues they follow with interest and bandwagon on EU majority 
position for the remaining issues (Official #6, 23 October 2008). Most of the time 
instructions are based on substance (Official #12, 7 October 2008). They may include 
suggested changes in resolution language (Official #27, 5 September 2008), such as 
replacing the term “cease fire” with the term “period of calm” (Official #5, 10 
November 2008) for instance. At times instructions may stipulate to accommodate the 
EU majority (Official #9, 27 October 2008; Official #22, 2 October 2008). Instructions 
tend to become more detailed on trickier issues (Official #10, 20 November 2008), 
epitomised by strong national views (Official #34, 1 December 2008). Regardless the 
initial directions, instructions also tend to become more detailed when a rift emerges 
between the EU member states (Official #26, 16 September 2008), at which point 
capitals “all of a sudden wake up and realise they have red lines” (Official #29, 18 
September 2008). 
 
But, even with detailed national instructions, there is generally still room for 
manoeuvre (Official #20, 6 November 2008), since capitals do not give their 
instructions in a political vacuum either. They are attentive to the negotiation process 
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going on between the EU delegates in the General Assembly and are keenly aware of 
voting constellations between the EU member states (Official #32, 4 December 2008). 
For the most part, instructions do not seem to be written in stone and allow for a 
certain amount of flexibility especially when a member state finds itself in isolation. 
Capitals view the actual vote coordination process as important. They tend to more or 
less heavily rely on the expertise of their delegates in the Missions to set the 
negotiation tactics (Official #6, 23 October 2008; Official #8, 18 November 2008; 
Official #11, 20 November 2008; Official #26, 16 September 2008; Official #37, 7 
November 2008). The reason for that is that the capitals are not familiar with the 
dynamics inside the coordination meetings (Official #9, 27 October 2008) and at times 
delegates have to react quickly to changes in the ongoing negotiations (Official #3, 15 
September 2008; Official #6, 23 October 2008). Especially the last point can naturally 
at times create difficulties for the negotiator. He or she might be left with making a 
quick decision in a situation where he or she might not have obtained the exact 
concessions demanded by the capital, but potentially enough to warrant a 
convergence towards the EU majority (Official #29, 18 September 2008). Formal 
instructions are definitely sought when there is a split (Official #32, 4 December 2008). 
Especially if breaking the consensus is at stake, it is important for the negotiator to 
have the full support of the capital (Official #26, 16 September 2008). Conversely, 
whenever a member state assumes the EU Presidency for the duration of which 
national preferences are supposed to be secondary, it is not unheard of that the 
delegates ask the capital to refrain from sending instructions altogether (Official #15, 7 
October 2008; Official #17, 7 October 2008; Official #31, 13 November 2008; Official 
#32, 4 December 2008). 
 
230 
 
In more concrete terms then it can be observed that substantive instructions exist for 
both issue areas, whereby hard-liner capitals in both issue areas predictably tend to 
release more detailed instructions. Instructions can be particularly uncompromising, 
where capitals have “strong sense of national interest in the formulation of policy” 
(Laatikainen, 2006, p. 81; see also Official #29, 18 September 2008). Nevertheless, 
compared to military issues, a much larger scope for compromise can be observed for 
resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, where national instructions 
additionally to substantive points might also specifically emphasise the importance of 
accommodating the EU majority. 
 
Resolutions Pertaining to the Arab Israeli Conflict  
For resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, national instructions are 
generally substantive in nature. They tend to highlight resolution language which is not 
deemed acceptable by the capital and may include suggestions for compromise. That is 
to say instructions may include a change of term or a change of location within the 
resolution text for a certain sentence or paragraph. It might also be suggested to drop 
the contentious paragraph altogether (Official #25, 16 September 2008). Significantly, 
in addition to substantive instructions, some national instructions include a “standing 
order to seek EU majority” (Official #22, 2 October 2008). That is to say that 
additionally to whatever substantive points they have to defend on behalf of their 
capitals, the Middle East experts enter the coordination process with a second 
objective. They are asked to take into consideration the atmosphere between the EU 
member states and if possible to find a common position. In the end, even the 
staunchest hard-liners generally come around to a common EU position.  
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Military Resolutions 
National instructions for resolutions pertaining to military issues are also substantive in 
nature. They may be more detailed for newer resolutions compared to repeat-
resolutions, where existing voting patterns are commonly known (Official #31, 13 
November 2008). Not much flexibility exists for finding a voting compromise. National 
positions are mutually respected without much effort to find a commonly acceptable 
position. Particularly on nuclear issues, instructions tend to “be firm regardless of any 
hope to achieve EU cohesion” (Official #1, 13 November 2008). There is a common 
perception that somehow in the 1
st
 committee “[the member states] are stuck in a 
classic way of dealing with matters, where national positions take precedent” (Official 
#4, 10 November 2008). 
 
7.5 Coordination Pressures and Responses 
Pressure for vote coordination exists. It takes on different forms and member states 
deal with it differently. Most of the pressure exerted can be summarised as an appeal 
to EU unity whereby a “friendly reminder” (Official #28, 8 October 2008) of existing 
Brussels positions is given. While the member states are of course bound to support 
any existing CFSP position, in reality the case is less straight forward with reference to 
United Nations General Assembly resolutions. Even comparable Brussels positions do 
not usually translate into UN resolutions one to one. The CFSP positions tend to be 
more ambiguous in language so as to facilitate agreement between the EU member 
states in Brussels. Resolutions in New York, meanwhile, especially those not sponsored 
by the EU, tend to be phrased in much more concrete terms. Consequently, with the 
Brussels text generally set up in a way that “one could not move a comma without 
losing agreement”, in those instances in which the UN text differs from the CFSP text, 
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member states are likely to have different positions as well (Official #9, 27 October 
2008).
48
 Other types of pressures include plain emotional behaviour accompanied by 
threats of vote retaliation at a later point. Furthermore, resistant capitals may be 
demarched by the EU Presidency. 
 
In response to coordination pressure, countries may either stick with their national 
positions or try to look for a compromise, enabling them to vote with the rest of the 
member states. Even when isolated and unpopular, some governments still will not 
budge (Official #39, 20 November 2008). This tends to be due to a matter of national 
interest as well as a matter of size (Official #12, 7 October 2008). Intriguingly, some of 
the more traditionally isolated countries freely admit that they do not perceive much 
coordination pressure. This indicates either that considerably more pressure is put on 
those countries which are likely to budge; or alternatively, it may indicate that 
countries that are not likely to budge are also less sensitive to coordination pressures. 
Traditional isolationists tend to handle isolation especially on established points of 
disagreement generally in a low-key manner (Official #14, 7 October 2008). In fact the 
UK, traditionally in isolation on resolutions pertaining to decolonisation, finds that by 
letting many of those resolutions pass without calling a vote, it shows much goodwill 
already and subsequently does not make much effort to find a consensus on those that 
are called to a vote (Official #38, 9 October 2008). 
 
There is furthermore a big difference between causing a voting split and taking 
advantage of an existing voting split. Some countries are explicitly uncomfortable with 
causing a split, and will vote with the EU majority despite divergent national positions. 
                                                      
48
 See chapter 5.4 for more details. 
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Nevertheless, once another EU member state has caused the split and the countries do 
no longer speak with single voice, those same countries are quite happy to vote 
according to their divergent national position. Strömvik (1998) summarises the 
problem as follows: 
“If one state repeatedly breaks the unity, the choice for the rest 
of the members is no longer one between total EU unity versus 
being the one that breaks the unity. It is rather a choice 
between securing partial EU unity versus deteriorating the 
partial unity even further. In the latter situation, the “costs” of 
deviating from the EU line of action becomes less severe.” (p. 
197) 
 
In most instances, however, member states in isolation actively seek to find a 
compromise which would enable them to vote with the EU majority. They talk to their 
capital on the one hand and seek support at the EU coordination table, especially with 
the like-minded countries, on the other hand (Official #23, 7 October 2008). In fact, 
being in a minority but signalling willingness to compromise is a very powerful tool in 
this particular setting. While the threat of “[d]efections [is naturally an expression] of 
relative dissatisfaction with the coordination outcome”, more significantly it “is a 
public attempt, made at some cost, to force the other actor[s] into a different 
equilibrium outcome”(Stein, 1982, p. 314). And with the “clear attempt [by the 
consensus-seeking majority] to move towards the minority to accommodate their 
wishes in terms of wording” (Official #19, 27 October 2008), countries in the minority, 
as toughest negotiators, have the ability to dictate the majority (Official #9, 27 October 
2008; Official #23, 7 October 2008; Official #38, 9 October 2008).
49
 Delegates 
occasionally try to take advantage of the fact that most of the time the EU majority 
position is not predetermined. Many countries do not have a set view and are happy to 
                                                      
49
 See chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of bargaining tactics. 
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follow whenever a “palpable EU majority ” emerges (Official #31, 13 November 2008). 
That opens up a possibility for member states with strong views to become informal 
agenda setters. One official reveals aspects of his negotiation tactics:  
“Once you have your instructions, you engage in pre-meeting 
talks with others to sound out the situation. If you have a 
strong point you need to make it quickly (in the EU 
coordination meeting). Only five or six other countries (not 
always the same) tend to have a strong view and when you 
obtain the support of two or three you have won.” (Official #34, 
1 December 2008) 
 
In more concrete terms it can be observed that considerably more pressure for 
coordination is exerted for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, than for 
resolutions pertaining to military issues. Furthermore, member states are more willing 
to budge under pressure in the former issue area compared to the latter. 
 
Resolutions Pertaining to the Arab Israeli Conflict 
The pressure for vote coordination in the Arab Israeli conflict is intense. It generally 
exceeds the “friendly reminder of existing Brussels positions” (Official #28, 8 October 
2008). Seemingly forgetting that everybody works under national instructions from 
Ministers and political directors (Official #5, 10 November 2008; Official #8, 18 
November 2008; Official #26, 16 September 2008), it at times manifests itself by angry 
finger pointing and shouting (Official #29, 18 September 2008). There might even be 
threats to retaliate on other issues important to the resisting delegations. Demarches 
may be sent to the capital of the resisting delegation, alleging that negotiators are 
misbehaving (Official #29, 18 September 2008). Significantly, the Palestinians 
themselves at times threaten to reevaluate the relationship (Official #29, 18 
September 2008). They thereby essentially threaten to undermine the very basis for 
235 
 
the EU to increase its collective bargaining power. It is not unusual that when 
disagreement at the expert level prevails, extraordinary meetings between the Heads 
of Missions must be called (Official #22, 2 October 2008). That varies from year to year, 
and to a certain extent mirrors the particular situation on the ground between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis at the time (Official #5, 10 November 2008). In times of 
relative calm on the ground, agreement is obtained more easily than in times of crisis 
when opposing hard-line positions become more hardened still. Nevertheless, because 
the desire for consensus is particularly high in the Arab Israeli conflict, isolated 
countries can more or less successfully make use of the “power of minority” (Official 
#23, 7 October 2008). They are able to exploit the situation and make their demands 
accordingly, knowing that in all likelihood they will be accommodated (Official #38, 9 
October 2008). The subsequent compromise is found usually not in the middle but 
closer to the minority position (Official #29, 18 September 2008; Official #32, 4 
December 2008). 
 
Those countries that generally find themselves in the minority on resolutions 
pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict tend to stick together regardless of minor 
discrepancies between their respective positions. Most simply they stick together on 
virtually all resolutions for fear of being exposed at a later point. (Official #8, 18 
November 2008) And because many of the resolutions are repeat-resolutions, every 
newly established status-quo has a potential impact on negotiations in the following 
year and could leave the isolated countries incrementally losing ground. For 
resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, EU member states are not 
particularly concerned about the position taken by the US. The US position is seen as 
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virtually identical to the Israeli position and as such so far removed from any possibility 
to compromise so as to render it irrelevant for discussion. 
 
Military Issues 
Negotiations at the military expert level are extremely static (Official #1, 13 November 
2008). The delegates make use of a so-called matrix, which essentially is a table that 
illustrates their previous voting behaviour for the particular resolutions, going back 
one year. Delegations emphasise their sovereignty and are strongly loyal to their 
national instructions (Official #20, 6 November 2008). Breaking away from the EU 
majority position in the 1
st
 committee is generally more easily justified than in other 
issue areas, especially in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Official #19, 27 October 2008). 
Particularly nuclear states are not uncomfortable in their isolated position (Official #38, 
9 October 2008). However, even among nuclear states some sense of community 
seems to exist. They see each other as well as the US as partners (Official #14, 7 
October 2008). Isolation tends to be more difficult to bear for non-nuclear states 
(Official #34, 1 December 2008). Some find it not desirable to share a vote position 
with just France and the UK, so as not to be perceived as “being pocketed by the big 
guys” (Official #7, 18 November 2008). 
 
There are no excessive attempts inside the 1
st
 committee to pressure countries into 
vote coordination. Rather, coordination attempts tend to resemble a simple exchange 
of information. And as opposed to the Arab-Israeli conflict, where appeals to EU unity 
are accompanied by drawing attention to the significance of the conflict, appeals to EU 
unity for resolutions pertaining to military issues tend to be underlined by the 
harmlessness of the resolution at hand (Official #36, 7 November 2008). The respect 
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for divergent national positions is prevailing (Official #1, 13 November 2008). The 
groupings are well known before the negotiations and very little effort to change is 
sensed (Official #10, 20 November 2008). There are no thorough discussions or 
genuine contemplations of changing one’s position. There might be talk about 
individual instructions but everybody is aware where the other delegations stand 
(Official #4, 10 November 2008). 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
In chapter 7 I presented a comparative case study of the EU vote coordination process 
inside the General Assembly contrasting the coordination process in the 1
st
 Committee 
with that taking place in the 4
th
 Committee.  I sought to illustrate that when EU 
cohesion leads to a tangible increase of collective bargaining power, EU member states 
are successfully able to coordinate their voting positions even in issue areas deemed 
divisive and contentious. I demonstrated that EU member states were successfully able 
to coordinate their votes in the former, where EU unity results in a tangible increase of 
collective bargaining power.
50
 I further demonstrated that EU member states were not 
successfully able to coordinate their votes in that latter, where EU unity does not 
automatically involve a tangible increase of collective bargaining power. To this end, I 
illustrated that for resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict, EU member states 
attach a higher value to EU unity, are more willing to compromise with regards to their 
national policy preferences and are more susceptible to the higher levels of 
coordination pressure exerted.   
                                                      
50
 This conclusion is based on the information received during the interviews – that in fact other UN 
member states openly align themselves with the EU position as regards the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
Although an empirical cross-check goes beyond the scope of this research project, a future analysis of 
UN voting behaviour might include such a cross-check.  
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7.7 Appendices 
Appendix 7A: Interview Guide (English) 
This interview guide has been used for the research interviews conducted at all the 
Permanent Missions to the United Nations General Assembly included in this study, 
with exception of Germany and Austria. Those interviews were conducted in German.  
 
Introduction 
• EU voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly  
• statistical analysis for voting pattern analysis 
• social science  – numbers only make up half the picture, so to talk to officials 
with an insight about how the EU member states work inside UNGA is 
invaluable 
 
Practical Issues 
• completely anonymous 
 
Core Interview Questions 
 
Dynamics inside EU coordination meetings 
• What happens when minority groupings or isolated constellations emerge? 
• What happens when you are in a minority? 
• How does pressure manifest itself? 
• How do you deal with pressure? (How much room for compromise do your 
national instructions provide for – what does it depend on? 
Complexity of trying to consolidate national instructions/positions with EU 
majority  
• How detailed are national instructions? 
• Are they substantive in manner or generally stipulate to follow EU majority ? 
• How important is it to achieve EU cohesion?  
• How far do you go to achieve it? 
• How do you view abstention as a means to achieve EU cohesion? 
Impact of Transatlantic Relationship on EU coordination 
• How does the transatlantic relationship factor into EU coordination? 
• How does your bilateral relationship with the US factor into your positions at 
the EU coordination table? 
 
Conclusion  
• Anything you want to add? 
• Anybody I should talk to? 
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Appendix 7B: Interview Guide (German) 
 
This interview guide has been used for the research interviews conducted at the 
German and Austrian Permanent Missions to the United Nations General Assembly 
 
Einleitung 
• Abstimmungsverhalten der EU Mitgliedstaaten in UNO General Versammlung 
• Habe statistische Analysen erhoben 
• Da es Sozialwissenschaft ist, ist es aber auch wichtig Forschungsinterviews an 
den einzenlene Staendigen Vertretungen der EU Mitgliedsstaaten 
durchzufuehren 
 
Praktisches 
• Kann vollstaendige Anonymitaet garantieren 
 
Interview – Leitfragen 
Dynamik in EU Koordinationsversammlungen 
• Was passiert wenn sich Minderheiten oder Isolationskonstellationen 
entwickeln? 
• Was passiert wenn Ihr Land in der Minderheit ist? 
• Wie wird Druck ausgeuebt? 
• Wie reagieren Sie auf diesen Druck? (Wie flexibel sind Ihre Weisungen aus der 
Hauptstadt?) 
Komplexitaet wenn man versucht nationale Weisungen mit EU Koherenz zu 
vereinen? 
• Wie detailliert sind Ihre nationalen Weisungen? 
• Sind sie eher allgemein gehalten und fordern generell zur Mehrheitsfindung 
auf? 
• Wie wichtig ist EU Koherenz fuer Sie? 
• Wie bewerten Sie Stimmenthaltung als Mittel zur EU Koherenz? 
Auswirkung der Transatlantischen Beziehungen auf EU Koordination 
• Wie wirkt sich die transatlantische Beziehung auf die EU Koordination aus? 
• Wie wirkt sich die bilaterale Beziehung zwischen Ihrem Land und der USA auf 
Ihre Verhandlungsposition aus? 
 
 
Abschluss  
• Gibt es Ihrerseits noch etwas dazuzufuegen? 
• Koennen Sie Kollegen fuer weitere Forschungsinterviews empfehlen?
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PART IV CONCLUSION 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
Puzzled by the inconsistency with which EU member states honour their commitment 
to stand united in foreign policy matters, this thesis has been motivated by the 
underlying interest in analysing which factors determine whether or not EU member 
states speak with a single voice in international affairs.  The United Nations General 
Assembly served as a useful analytical framework. While it may not be the most topical 
of international forums, its methodological versatility provided for a genuine possibility 
to analyse EU voting behaviour in a systematic manner. As such, it has not only offered 
me the opportunity to employ a quantitative voting pattern analysis, but has also 
enabled me to conduct a qualitative in-depth analysis of the vote coordination process 
that precedes the UNGA roll-call votes. Because the overall UN membership 
encompasses virtually all of the world’s states, it further made it possible to 
contextualise the voting patterns of the EU member states by comparing them to that 
of other countries. Although here, the primary focus rested on the United States, I 
further extended the comparison to the other permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council.  
 
The present chapter forms the conclusion of this thesis. The chapter is divided into 
three sections. In section 8.1, I shall in a few paragraphs rehearse the main arguments 
of the thesis and summarise its key findings. I subsequently seek to consider the 
broader theoretical and empirical conclusions of the thesis in section 8.2. Finally, in 
section 8.3, I shall address some of the shortcomings present in the thesis and further 
discuss future research opportunities.  
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8.1 Main Argument & Key Findings  
The central argument of the thesis runs as follows: The member states of the European 
Union intend to coordinate their voting positions in the UNGA, despite their right to 
vote according to their heterogeneous policy preferences. The validity of this 
argument leans on the following two considerations. One, it depends on the 
correctness of the notion that the EU member states intend to coordinate their voting 
positions. For, if the member states did not intend to coordinate their voting positions, 
irrespective of the level of vote cohesion, studying EU coordination in the United 
Nations General Assembly would not be justified. Two, it further relies on the fact that 
national policy preferences are indeed heterogeneous. For, if the member states of the 
European Union had identical voting preferences, they would be expected to cast 
identical votes by default, irrespective of any coordination efforts on their part. 
Because “where interests are in full harmony, the capacity of states to cooperate […] is 
irrelevant to the realization of mutual benefits” (Oye, 1985, p. 6). Hence, a 
considerable amount of space in this thesis has been devoted to elaborate on these 
points in conceptional terms (chapter 3) and to demonstrate their legitimacy 
empirically (chapter 5 and 7 for intentional vote coordination and chapter 6 for 
heterogeneous policy preferences).  
 
Evidently, so long as national policy preferences and EU majority positions coincide, it 
is not a problem for the member states of the European Union to cast identical votes 
inside the UNGA. However, for divisive resolutions EU member states face a conflict of 
interest. On the one hand they are committed to successfully coordinate their UNGA 
positions with the fellow EU member states and thus subject to coordination 
pressures. On the other hand, as sovereign nation states, they are free to vote 
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according to their national preferences in the General Assembly. In those instances 
then, the resultant conflict of interest has to be reconciled. The member states must 
decide whether to vote according to their national policy preferences or (effectively 
amounting to vote defection from the EU majority position); or alternatively, whether 
to engage in EU-consensus oriented voting behaviour (effectively overriding their 
heterogeneous policy preferences in order to cast a vote alongside the EU majority) 
 
The key to understanding their subsequent voting behaviour rests upon understanding 
how the member states of the European Union respond to whatever coordination 
pressures they are exposed to by their peers inside the EU.  In chapter 3, I 
hypothesised that the balance a member state strikes between these two options 
generally depends on the following aspects – how powerful it is, how important it 
views the issue at hand, how it views its relationship with the EU and how it views its 
relationship with the US as external factor. I furthermore argued that the balance tips 
in favour of vote cohesion, if by working together the EU member states see a 
concrete possibility at taking a leadership position. In other words, the balance tips in 
favour of vote cohesion when increasing the collective bargaining power becomes a 
tangible objective. In the following paragraphs, I shall in a few words rehearse the core 
propositions and highlight the main findings. 
 
State-Focused Factors 
Both power and issue salience are state-focused factors, in that they emphasise the 
national position rather than EU membership as the driving force behind UNGA voting 
(chapter 3). As regards power, the argument holds that more powerful states are less 
susceptible to EU vote coordination pressure and therefore less likely to engage in EU 
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majority – oriented voting behaviour. In short, the reason for that is that as chief 
provider of whatever extra clout cooperation entails, in relative terms they gain less 
from successful vote coordination compared to less powerful states. For that reason 
more powerful states tend to be more reluctant to give up their national policy 
preference. And because less powerful states gain so much more from successful vote 
coordination, they in turn are reluctant to punish more powerful states for the 
occasional vote defection, for fear that the entire system might collapse.  As for issue 
salience, the argument holds that the more important a member state perceives the 
issue at hand to be; the less likely it will surrender its national policy preference in 
favour of a uniform EU position.   
 
Both variables have been put to the test by means of quantitative voting pattern 
analysis (chapters 5 and 6).  Generally speaking, power is inadequate as gauge for the 
UNGA voting behaviour of the EU member states. Conceived of in traditional terms of 
military prowess or economic might, it is a rather poor indicator. Measured in 
institutional terms, as voting weights in the Council of Ministers, it fares slightly better 
but still fails to produce consistent and robust results.  
 
The variable salience has delivered very interesting results. Across both parts of the 
quantitative voting pattern analysis, the variable salience consistently and sometimes 
significantly predicts a decreased likelihood of vote defection the more salient an issue 
area is perceived by the individual member states. In terms of system-level analysis, 
this means an increased likelihood of perfect vote cohesion, the more important an 
issue is perceived on average. While these outcomes alone might have been less 
interesting, they not only have resulted in contradiction to the stated hypothesis but 
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also in face of insurmountable operational limitations (both discussed in more detail in 
chapter 3). As it stands, the findings of the quantitative analysis are of course 
theoretically non-conclusive. Without knowing a country’s national policy preference it 
is impossible to determine whether the member states simply happen to agree on 
issues they individually perceive as salient, or alternatively, whether the member 
states prefer a cohesive vote on an issue they perceive as  salient, even if it means 
overriding  one’s national policy preference (!). Having said this, these results should 
be taken as encouragement for further exploration of this particular question. 
 
Institutional Factors 
In this thesis I suggested that institutional factors, the set of factors associated with EU 
membership, constitute another driving force of UNGA voting behaviour of the EU 
member states. The argument maintains that the countries of the European Union by 
mere association through membership are susceptible to those formal and informal 
vote coordination pressures that are manifested in their EU membership. These 
include first and foremost existing relevant CFSP positions but also more informal 
pressures, such as the collective sponsorship of a resolution. The argument further 
goes that in addition to these institutional pressures, a country’s dedication to the EU 
affects how susceptible it is to vote coordination pressure. Essentially, those countries 
which (a) benefit directly from EU membership, (b) have demonstrated their 
commitment by never opting out and consistently choosing further integration, or (c) 
are generally enthusiastic about the concept of the EU, are expected to place a high 
premium on EU majority – oriented voting. Finally, if by working collectively, the EU 
member states see a concrete possibility at taking a leadership position – in other 
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words, if the collective bargaining power becomes a tangible objective – they are much 
more willing to engage in EU majority – oriented voting behaviour.  
 
The empirical results of the quantitative voting pattern analysis seem to indicate that a 
country’s relationship with the EU is a much stronger determinant of its voting 
behaviour inside the UNGA than is either power or issue salience (see chapters 5 and 
6). Particularly the existence of a relevant CFSP position serves as strong indicator of 
EU cohesion inside the General Assembly. Similarly, member states that are net-
beneficiaries of the EU budget are much less likely to defect from the EU majority 
position than those that are net-contributors. Significantly, it emerges from the 
qualitative analysis in chapter 7 that the Union as a whole is capable of coordinating a 
united position, despite underlying disagreement, so long as doing so implies a 
tangible increase in their collective bargaining power. This is indeed an important 
finding, since it shows that, even in contentious issue areas, it is possible for the EU 
member states to override their national policy preference in order to stand united.  
 
External Factors  
External factors add another possible driving force to the mix. Rooted in the 
assumption that external factors may affect a country’s voting behaviour inside the 
UNGA, the argument holds that because the United States is one of the most 
significant international actors as well as perceived to be a genuine partner by the 
Europeans, its positions inside the UNGA are likely to command a certain level of 
attention. And while not all EU member states are equally close to the US, for those 
that do foster a tight political, economic or cultural bond with the US, in instances of 
transatlantic divergence that bond is expected to relieve some of the vote 
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coordination pressure exerted by the EU, thereby providing the EU member state 
some room for vote defection. 
 
Notwithstanding those academics who periodically question the soundness of the 
transatlantic relationship (e.g. Allin, 2004; Cohen-Tanuga, 2003; Daalder, 2001; 
Freedman, 1982; Morgenthau, 1957; Wallace, 2002), its specialness tends to generally 
be accepted  by practitioners without much additional thought. The interview 
programme conducted as part of this study corroborates this view. It has thus come as 
a surprise that the presumed specialness of the transatlantic relationship does not 
reflect in the UNGA voting behaviour of the partners (chapter 5). Indeed, the 
transatlantic partners disagree more often than they agree. It appears that the votes 
cast by the majority of the EU states are much closer to those of Russia and China than 
to the votes cast by the US. Interestingly, however, from the US perspective, the EU is 
in fact its closest voting partner, since China and Russia are even further removed. This 
overall picture indicates that the US is the odd-one out. While these figures include the 
resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict – a well-known bone of contention 
between the two sides – even disregarding those, the transatlantic partners still 
disagree almost as much as they agree. Finally, for all those resolutions deemed 
important by the US, the transatlantic partners agree roughly twice as many times as 
they disagree; although for a quarter of the so-called ‘lobbied votes’ the EU member 
states collectively oppose the US position (chapter 5). Regrettably, when testing for 
the likelihood of vote defection in instances of transatlantic divergence in chapter 6, 
the strength of the bilateral relationship in political, economic or cultural terms does 
not produce unequivocal results. In addition to overlapping confidence intervals, the 
predicted voting behaviour changes direction depending on the type of relationship. 
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In quest of answers to the questions one has posed, there is always a possibility in 
each research project to stumble upon patterns and trends not previously considered. 
Some of the more fascinating unintended findings are summarised here.  Quite 
naturally, much of the existing research deals with the occurrence and/or extent of 
disagreement between the EU member states. To this end there is a general tendency 
to distinguish between more disagreement-prone issue areas and less disagreement-
prone issue areas (see chapter 2). In carrying out my own research, I have come to 
realise two things. One, the occurrence of issues where member states are unable to 
find agreement is generally overestimated.  In fact, they make up only a small fraction 
of all resolutions (see Figure 7.1). Two, while the contentiousness of certain topics in 
comparison to other topics is not disputed in this thesis, the suggestion that levels of 
contention are static is rejected. For instance, by further disintegrating military issues 
(which are generally seen as divisive since protecting member states’ proclivities), one 
observes that general disarmament issues are much less divisive than nuclear issues 
(chapter 5). Repeat resolutions make up another example (those that re-appear in 
several UNGA annual sessions). By looking at repeat resolutions, one can observe that 
for virtually identical resolutions, the level of EU cohesion varies over time.  
 
8.2 Overall Conclusions 
Following the rehearsal of the main arguments and the presentation of the key 
findings, I shall now outline some of the contributions of this thesis to the existing 
bodies of knowledge.  To this end, I want to highlight how this thesis adds to the field 
of study on EU voting behaviour in the UNGA, before focusing on what implications the 
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findings of this thesis have for the larger theoretical framework concerning EU foreign 
policy particularly and inter-state cooperation more generally. 
 
The Thesis in the Field of Research on EU Voting Behaviour in 
the UNGA 
In chapter 2, I discussed the various ways in which this thesis would attempt to add to 
the current research assessing the voting behaviour of the EU member states inside 
the UNGA.  To this end, I endeavoured to draw out the conceptual distinction between 
EU member states casting identical votes because of agreement or despite of 
disagreement. By means of descriptive and particularly inferential statistics, I further 
hoped to systematise the transatlantic relationship as well as to identify underlying 
patterns of the EU voting behaviour in the UNGA. 
 
By distinguishing between vote defections (in instances of preference divergence, the 
member state chooses to vote according to its national policy preference) and EU 
majority – oriented voting (in instances of preference divergence, the member state 
chooses to surrender its national policy preference in favour of a uniform EU position), 
this thesis makes a comprehensive attempt at gaining a better insight into the ability 
and willingness of the EU member states to vote with the EU majority  when it means 
overriding their national policy preferences. To this effect, I have demonstrated in the 
empirical chapters (chapters 5 to 7) that given certain conditions, EU member states 
are able to successfully coordinate their positions despite divergent policy preferences. 
The specifics of my findings are highlighted in the above paragraphs.  
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The Thesis in the Field of European Foreign Policy Studies 
In chapter 1 I argued that in a world dominated by Westphalian nation-states the 
European Union is a relatively new type of political entity. I made the point that if such 
a new type of political entity were in a position to formulate a cohesive foreign policy, 
it would affect current International relations theory in a profound manner. For that 
reason I suggested it would be prudent to take stock of the situation empirically.  With 
this thesis I attempted to take a step into that direction. The most significant score in 
favour of the Westphalian nation-state would have been a clear inability for EU 
member states to vote cohesively when it means overriding national policy 
preferences. This has proven not to be the case (chapters 5-7). And as highlighted 
already earlier, not only do member states very frequently speak with one voice in the 
forum; significantly, they are able and willing to successfully coordinate their votes in 
instances of divergent national policy preference. 
 
Having said this, the UNGA is a very particular forum (chapter 4) and one in which the 
EU member states act in their capacity as sovereign nation-states. And while it is not 
unreasonable to assume that similar coordination efforts take place in comparable 
forums (e.g. for EU coordination in the ILO see Kissack, 2006), the field of European 
Foreign Policy is rather complex where depending on the context,  EU member states 
might act in sovereign, intergovernmental or even supranational fashion (chapter 2). 
And although the research at hand provides a useful insight into those aspects of 
European Foreign Policy where the member states act in their capacity as sovereign 
nation-states, the question remains to what degree the findings of this thesis are 
extendable to other forums, where the member states might be required to act in an 
intergovernmental or even supranational fashion. 
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The Thesis and the Question of Inter-State Cooperation 
The larger theoretical framework presented in this thesis that deals with inter-state 
cooperation in international affairs contains several approaches which differ in some 
or all of their assumptions. As outlined in chapter 2, most of the theoretical 
perspectives discussed view the state as the chief actor in international affairs.  
Furthermore, state preferences are most narrowly defined for the Realist, for whom 
the ultimate driving force is state sovereignty; a means to security and facilitated by 
power.  The preferences for the remaining theoretical approaches are more broadly 
defined. Liberal Intergovernmentalism, furthermore, acknowledges a domestic role in 
preference formation, while constructivism stresses the importance of the 
intersubjective structure for interest (and identity) formation. Following on from this, 
the Realist is very pessimistic about any sort of cooperation and can see it happen only 
in extraordinary circumstances and on a temporary basis. Neofunctionalism, on the 
other side of the spectrum, envisages full-fledged integration of the member states 
which would imply cooperation by default. The remaining theoretical approaches are 
generally optimistic about the prospects of cooperation.  
 
The Constructivist-Rationalist Debate Revisited 
The thesis shows clearly that EU member states cooperate inside the General 
Assembly. They make a genuine and continuous effort to coordinate their votes.  Both, 
the constructivist as well as the rationalist approach seem to be reflected in the 
findings. To this end, some of the results appear to support a more constructivist 
understanding of EU voting behaviour in the UNGA. Particularly the existence of a 
relevant CFSP position is associated with a higher degree of EU cohesion and lower 
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defection rates. Moreover, among the member states EU unity appears to be seen by 
the EU diplomats as a  “matter of pride” (Official #6, 23 October 2008)  and the result 
of a “coordination reflex” (Official #28, 8 October 2008). Yet, other findings seem to 
support a more rationalist understanding of EU voting behavior in the UNGA. Net-
beneficiaries of the EU budget, for instance, are significantly less likely to defect from 
the EU majority position than those that are net-contributors. Furthermore, the results 
of the qualitative analysis suggest that for divisive resolutions, countries tend to 
consider the benefits and costs of their various options. They seem more willing to 
override their heterogeneous policy preferences where doing so results in a tangible 
increase of collective bargaining power. That is to say, they seem more willing to 
override their heterogeneous policy preferences for resolutions pertaining to the 
Arab/Israeli conflict, and less willing to do so for military resolutions.  
 
As such, this thesis is not in a position to unequivocally resolve the theoretically debate 
surrounding foreign policy cooperation between the EU member states. Rather its 
results further nourish the constructivist-rationalist debate. While a certain degree of 
socialisation among the EU member states inside the UNGA seems to be evident, the 
results of the empirical analysis also suggest that “effects of socialization are often [...] 
secondary to dynamics at the national level” (Zuern & Ceckel, 2005, p. 1047). 
Accordingly, the member states are generally concerned with weighing the domestic 
costs of overriding heterogeneous policy preference in exchange for tangible rewards. 
Conformity can be expected so long as the political utility actors derive from 
cooperation and exceeds the domestic costs associated with it (Schimmelfennig, 2005, 
p. 830). The higher and more tangible the rewards for cooperation are, the stronger is 
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the incentive to override national policy preferences (see Schimmelfennig, 2005, p. 
828).  
 
8.3 Opportunities for Future Research  
I would like to bring this project to a close by highlighting opportunities for future 
research.  Every research project suffers from constraints. Most frequently time, space 
and resources are short in supply. Hence with additional time, space and resources 
greater depth and accuracy could be added to the analysis presented here. More 
specifically, this thesis could be improved and brought forward in five ways.  
 
One, as highlighted earlier in the present chapter, EU cohesion levels vary within 
repeat resolution over time. This occurrence warrants further investigation as it might 
provide us additional insight into the EU coordination process inside the United 
Nations General Assembly. 
 
Two, for reasons outlined in chapter 4, the focus of this PhD project has been on the 
fifteen old EU member states. That in itself is not necessarily a shortcoming of this 
analysis, since I considered it necessary to focus on the 15 ‘old members’ of the 
European Union, in order to make for a useful starting point for further comparisons. 
Having said this, by analysing fifteen of 27 member states, I have focused on only a 
sub-set of the entire EU membership. The analysis could easily be replicated to include 
the twelve newer member states and could perhaps even be extended to include the 
candidate countries.  
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Three, while this study acknowledges the potential impact of external factors on a 
country’s voting behaviour inside UNGA, it limits its focus on the transatlantic 
relationship for reasons outlined in chapter 3. Regardless, also in chapter 3, I 
acknowledge that especially since the disintegration of the post-Cold war bipolar 
international system, numerous important actors have emerged. Thus any future 
projects might consider including those in the analysis.  
 
Four, one of the biggest shortcomings of the current project has been the operational 
limitation derived from the unavailability of reliable data on national policy preference. 
This has entailed implications for the conceptional understanding as well as for the 
empirical transposition of the hypotheses. In this research project, data for issue 
salience has been derived from the Comparative Manifesto Dataset. (Klingemann, 
Volkens, Bara, Budge, & McDonald, 2006) The CMD data specifically focuses on how 
important a country perceives an issue, but not exactly where it stands on that issue. 
In future research, this measure may be improved by using other more relevant 
indices. Instead of relying purely on government manifestos, additional media 
coverage or voter perceptions might help in the estimation of government policy 
positions. (e.g. Kleinnijenhuis & Pennings, 2001; Kriesi et al., 2008) The consistent and 
sometimes robust findings with regards to the variable salience make for an 
encouraging start. 
 
Five, in the quantitative chapters of this PhD (chapters 5 and 6), I have conducted a 
descriptive voting pattern analysis as well as an inferential statistical analysis where 
appropriate. Nevertheless, this type of data also conveniently avails itself to spatial 
modelling and one could elaborate on the work of  Frieden (2004). In such analysis one 
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might find the possibility to further explore the power of defection (chapter 3); a 
phenomenon that has EU member states proclaiming red lines in an effort to move the 
agreed consensus position closer to their ideal point before caving in.  
 
In this thesis, I set out to analyse EU coordination efforts and subsequent voting 
behaviour in the General Assembly. The results confirm that coordination efforts take 
place. The results further suggest that that EU member states are successful in 
speaking with one voice in instances other than when they share identical preferences. 
Despite the limited extent to which these findings can be applied to all aspects of EFP, 
the simple fact that the EU member states do seek to speak with a single voice in 
international affairs and at times successfully so, should be taken as encouragement 
for further research in the field of EU foreign policy. 
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